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ABSTRACT

Arranged in four parts, this collection of conference papers addresses selected philosophical and social questions being faced by contemporary educators. Part 1 contains the presidential address, the subject of which is conceptions of the educated person, and a response to that address. Part 2, the general session, contains two papers which discuss the distinction between the existentialist and analytical philosophy of education and an interpretation of Martin Buber's philosophy. Part 3, the concurrent sessions, comprises 12 papers. Topics covered include Kohlberg's moral theory, the relationship between children's literature and moral education, the teacher as a moral example, the impact of law on social and educational policy, bicultural and bilingual education, and the philosophy of John Dewey. An official program of the annual meeting, minutes, treasurer's report, society membership list, and manuscript style guidelines are also included. (LP)

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philosophical studies in education

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PROCEEDINGS—ANNUAL (1982) MEETING
of THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY
of EDUCATION SOCIETY

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY - 1982

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Cincinnati, Ohio
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OFFICIAL PROGRAM
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1982 ANNUAL MEETING
NOVEMBER 19-20, 1982
STOUFFER'S TOWER HOTEL
CINCINNATI, OHIO
HOST INSTITUTION
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 19

REGISTRATION AND COFFEE HOUR 9:00 - 10:00

OPENING SESSION
COMMODORE ROOM (FIRST FLOOR) 10:00 - 12:00

Chair: Keith Raitz (University of Louisville)

Welcoming Remarks: Hendrik D. Gideonse, Dean, School of Education (Univeristy of Cincinnati)

Presidential Address: Walden Crabtree (University of Akron)

Response: Frederick M. Schultz (University of Akron)

Discussion

LUNCH 12:00 - 1:30

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 19

REGISTRATION 1:00 - 1:30

CONCURRENT SESSIONS I: 1:30 - 3:00

Session A - Commodore Room 1:30 - 3:00

Chair: Clint Collins (University of Kentucky)

Paper: Patrick Socoski (University of Pittsburgh) "Recent Criticisms of a Review of Kohlberg et. al. on the Cognitive Developmental Study of Morality"

Paper: Jo Ann Freiberg (The Ohio State University) "Philosophical Confusions in an 'Other' Moral Education"

Discussion

Session B - Cabana Room (Fourth Floor) 1:30 - 3:00

Chair: John Brown (Maharishi International)

Paper: Steve Alan Johnson (Indiana University) "Did Socrates Basically Know Theaetetus? An Analysis of a Theory of Qualitative Knowing"

Paper: Nancy Christoff (The Ohio State University) "Reasoning or Evidence: What Does One Possess?"

Discussion

CONCURRENT SESSIONS II: 3:15 - 4:45

Session A - Commodore Room 3:15 - 4:45

Chair: Richard La Brecque (University of Kentucky)

Paper: Steve Kay (Kentucky State University) "Educational Research as if Community Matters"

Paper: Barbara S. Stengel (University of Pittsburgh) "Weighing Justice on the Scales of Liberalism"

Discussion

Session B - Cabana Room 3:15 - 4:45

Chair: Esther Leung (Eastern Kentucky University)

Paper: Timothy Reagan (University of Illinois) "Bilingual-Bicultural Educaiton: A False Parallel?

Paper: Joseph Watras (University of Dayton) "Can We Legislate Good Teaching? A Critique of the Concept of Subject Matter in Public Law 94-142"

Discussion

DINNER 5:00 - 8:00

FRIDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 19

GENERAL SESSION
COMMODORE ROOM 8:00 -10:30

Chair: David Engel (University of Pittsburgh)

Paper: Conrad Pritscher (Bowling Green State University) "Risking the Split or Splitting the Risk in Warfare Between Analytic and Phenomenologist/Existential Philosophers of Education"

Paper: Raymond Wilkie (University of Kentucky) "The Secular and the Religious in Education and the Social Sciences: A Critique of Martin Buber's I-Thou and I-It"

Discussion

SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 20

COFFEE 8:30 - 9:15

CONCURRENT SESSIONS III: 9:15 -10:45

Session A - Commodore Room 9:15 -10:45

Chair: Gerald M. Reagan (The Ohio State University)

Paper: Dennis Senchuk (Indiana University) "Moral Constraints on Teaching"

Paper: Kathleen Ferraro (University of Pittsburgh) "Education, Power, and Self-Esteem: A School for Maggie and Tess"

Session B - Cabana Room 9:15 -10:45

Chair: Robert N. Grise (Eastern Kentucky University)

Paper: John T. Holton (Morehead State Unviersity) "The Particulars of Life: Radical Empiricism and General Education"

Paper: Ronald Lee Zigler (Maharishi International University) "Experience and Pure Consciousness: Reconsidering Dewey's Aesthetics"

BUSINESS MEETING 11:00 -12:00
COMMODORE ROOM

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SPEAKING OF INQUIRY: AN INTRODUCTION

Robert J. Skorvira

"What is the task which philosophers set themselves to perform; and why do they philosophize at all? Almost everyone will immediately reply: they desire to attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which everyone by nature carries about with him under his hat." (William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality")

Without being narcissistic about the matter, these essays present views on what counts as doing philosophy of education. The articles form a configuration of normal philosophical discourse on educational topics. Thus, we find each author giving us a clarifying reconception of a state-of-affairs and providing us with its use to better describe and explain educational experiences. Although idiosyncratic, the following essays participate in general schemata and intersect with continuing dialogues in the educational arena.

This is as it should be. Within the educational arena, the task of normal philosophy of education is to describe and interpret or speculate about the structures and processes of knowing which are functional within the arena. In other words, philosophical inquiry into educational topics is the investigation of the possible limits and forms of belief for educators.

But is this the only task? Were we instead to begin our philosophical peregrinations from within the social/cultural reality where we live out our lives, we would see that all learning and knowing begins and continues within this social/cultural reality. Thus, how and what we come to know are structurally continuous with the reality which stands around us. Within our circumstances, we carry on conversations, seeking the right words by which we can formulate our idiosyncratic thinking about various educational issues. We strive to maintain significant continuities between ideas of various perspectives. Perhaps, in doing philosophy of education in this manner, we see ourselves responding to events, people, and ideas of our time (generation) as these impact upon the educational arena.

Whether these essays are representative of searching for conceptual truths (or validity and realibility) or of conversations aimed at engaging each other in dialogue about educational matters, or both, is for you the reader to decide. It is sufficient to say that these essays will provide some impetus for reflection.

In his presidential address, Crabtree claims that to deal rationally with the events of this nihilistic time, a new conception of the educated person must be arrived at and used. He asks what it means to be an educationed person living under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Wilkie seems to suggest a possible solution. If Buber's concept of I-Thou is pried out of its context of the Sacred, and viewed merely as a basic life-attitude, then the approaching (seemingly) catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust might be averted.

One pattern in which several articles participate focuses on legal and social principles, Watras, although ultimately at a loss about what to do, raises (in regard to P.L. 94 142) a concern about the impact of law on social and educational policy. This law, according to Watras, fosters several misconceptions about curriculum, schools, and learning. Stengel argues that Green's claim that the principle of educational opportunity conflicts with the principle of cultural pluralism and, hence, is unjust, is actually based upon an invalid frame of reference about how the self and society interact. In effect, she suggests that Green reevaluate his position. Ferraro asserts that Strike's ideas of self-respect as inhering in the person and self-esteem as empirical properties are counterproductive to the self-worth of female students. She claims that Nyberg's schema of skills of freedom are the correct avenue to take. Reagan raises a significant question about the uses of the concepts of bicultural and bilingual education. He argues that, contrary to the common understanding, they are not the same and in most respects are not compatible ideas.

Another pattern into which some of the essays fall is epistemological in nature. Kay once again reminds us that the source of meaningful research and information is the

community and that without an awareness of the social reality of knowledge gained via research, such knowledge is invalid. Holton reviews the Jamesian position of radical empiricism. He argues that James' ideas of consciousness-as-function and experience as a unity could be significant for educational theory today. Zigler argues that Dewey's conception of aesthetic experience is equivalent to the conception of pure consciousness attainable in Transcendential Meditation. Johnson takes issue with Maccia's idea of qualitative knowledge (an aspect of his pedagogical epistemology) and argues that Maccia "equivocates if not contradicts himself on the matter." Christoff discusses the proposition that group membership causes one to accept what the group takes to be knowledge and evidence for this knowledge.

A set of articles form a pattern of discourse about moral theory. Socoski describes and defends Kohlberg's moral theory; he begins with the assumptions of the schema and argues for the Kohlbergian scheme because of its power to evaluate moral actions across multiple situations within the circumstances of the "lived world". Freiberg discusses the significant relationships between children's literature and moral education. She wants to bridge the gap between philosophers (of education) and language arts scholars and teachers. Senchuk asks if there are moral constraints on teaching--not only whether the subject matter and methods of teaching must be moral (or at least not immoral), but also whether the teacher must be a moral person.

And, finally, Pritscher returns us to a crisis theme by discussing the distinction between existentialist and analytic philosophy of education. He reminds us all of the problems facing us as we try to resolve the split and the attending risks (should we feel it imperative to try to resolve anything).

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

CONCEPTIONS OF THE EDUCATED PERSON

Walden Crabtree
The University of Akron

I hope this address turns out to be rational, clear, substantive, logical, and relevant, not dry, cold, sterile, trivial or irrelevant, nor pure *logos* and no *pathos*. I would not mind at all if aesthetic elements, aspects, or dimensions were to appear, nor do I hope to exclude the inspirational or the persuasive. If this address provides for some a clear-headed, intelligible message of hope to move us in these hours of darkness, toward the light of truth, beauty, and love, I would be pleased.

Introduction

When I first began this study, and even after I had been into it for some time, I thought that I would have to introduce my paper the way Professors Gregory and Woods introduced their twenty-five page article in Snook's *Conception of Indoctrination;* they said: "The chances of saying anything new or original are slight. We do not pretend that anything we have to say is new; we can offer no fresh insights."[1] I am not sure, but I think now that I did hit upon a modest insight that can make a contribution, albeit small. Of course, recently, I thought that I had had an original idea and found the same thing soon thereafter in Aristotle, as well as in other writers since the time of the philosopher.

I wanted to study conceptions of the educated person to see if I could learn anything more than what I already knew about the topic. My goal was the understanding of how this concept functions and how its uses are related to times, contexts, situations, etc. In doing this inquiry, I hoped to be able to make a contribution to clarifying this concept and to improving its functions through this clarification. I wondered if this concept takes on different functions, and if its clear usage might be more critical during certain types of historical times. What I took for logic suggested to me an affirmative response to these queries. Therefore, I hoped to be able to find out how, in current times, which I believe are uniquely critical, the use of this concept and language surrounding it, or connected with it, have especially important uses during this kind of historical period. I hoped that by learning more about how the concept functions during critical times I might make a contribution to dealing with these critical times.

Parts of my paper rely heavily on a book, *What is an Educated Person? The Decades Ahead,*[2] which contains many of the papers and discussions produced in connection with two conferences, where scholars (all from the Western World, so far as I could tell) made inquiries about the concept of the educated person.

Some questions I had when I began included the following: 1. What functions do conceptions of the educated person have in times of nihilism? 2. What functions ought conceptions of the educated person have in nihilistic times? 3. What is required of a conception of the educated person in nihilistic times? and 4. Is such a conception available, or might one be brought into being?

As I studied, I soon learned that talk of the educated person is talk about the means and ends of education, and ergo every writing about education is pertinent. Thus, I did not read exhaustively, nor even representatively, whatever that might mean in this context. I did study as much pertinent literature about the topic as I could in the time I had.

There are some points, or propositions, which are a part of my argument, and which I had originally defended or attempted to justify in this paper,

but inclusion of those paragraphs would have made this address longer than is customary, so I have decided just to read to you these main points, without their defense, because the rest of my address is based on these propositions. I believe these conclusions or propositions are readily accepted by members of this audience, anyway. These propositions are the following:

1. Societies throughout the Western World are currently marked by confusion about goals and criteria of knowing and valuing and are marked by relativism, demoralization, and nihilism.

2. Schools in the United States and in the Western World reflect this same confusion about goals and criteria, and also are marked by relativism, demoralization, and nihilism.

3. One cause of these conditions in schools, according to Henry Steele Commager, is a hypocritical society that lives one set of values and asks its schools to teach a different set; a second cause is simply that schools are reflecting societal conditions.[3]

4. The cause of these conditions in society is the collapse or weakening of authority and of the value of traditional criteria for knowing and valuing.

5. Authority and criteria of knowing and valuing have been weakened because religion, reason, and then science and technology, which in turn provided ground authority and criteria, have in turn lost the force they had formerly in providing authority and criteria for knowing and valuing.

6. Nietzsche's predictions about the death of god and the ensuing consternation have come true.

7. Last, added to the sizable burdens men and women bear these days because of fast changes in values and criteria of knowing, is the awful and constant fear of the possibility of nuclear annihilation.

Weltschmerz

A part of current conditions, I am surmising, is a realization that all the hopes and ideals we have for ourselves, our loved ones, and our fellow humans, may be doomed to extinction, while the silent universe goes on for eons, without us. What hurts so is we think that it might have been different, if only we could have been a little more rational, a little more humane, a little less greedy. Perhaps it is this huge sense of sadness, this *Weltschmerz*, that incapacitates us. We are angry because we fear that, no matter what we may become, what knowledge we might gain, what art we might produce, what virtue we might manifest, all may be dissolved in flames, undiscriminating fire that will dossolve the good as well as the bad, the beautiful as well as the ugly, the true as well as the false, as heartlessly and mindlessly the one as the other. In this vein, Bullock has offered the following:

> Perhaps we are at the end of a long cultural tradition that is becoming more and more attenuated, and we can no longer fall back upon the strength of that tradition. Perhaps changes in the world of ideas and the world of the arts reflect the same sort of symptons that disturb us in the educational world. If we believe there are such changes and that this is a fundamental affair, then this is the real turning point. Of course, some feel that this is the end of the road. Civilization has ended, and there isn't any purpose in continuing to talk about education.[4]

At least one other writer concurs that man may be "doomed to defeat by his own hand, or by threat of invaders who behave as he always has behaved, or by his own maternal or mechanical creations."[5]

In view of these kinds of times, how does the concept of the educated person function, and what may be required of it during times of nihilism?

Uses of the Concept

When one uses "education," or the "educated person," he or she is referring to some good, i.e., something approved of, delighted in, sought, or prized.[6] Many examples could be given; just a few sould suffice. Todd Simon says of education that it "is a good investment in developing countries. It helps to alleviate poverty, . . . helps make productivity grow . . [and] improves the quality of life for the individual, his community and his nation."[7]

Another example of this usage is that of William James, who viewed education as that process which "builds up a character in pupils . . . and plays a critical role in determining the moral character of individuals . ."[8]

R. S. Peters believes central uses of the concept function to refer to the transmission of something worthwhile.[9] Education refers, according to Aristotle, to developing human excellences.[10] Seay, in a recent article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, argued that inner city or urban youth, who are attending community colleges, ought not be denied the opportunity to get an education, while they are getting training; education is a good, over and above training, that these youth should be able to receive, if they wish it, by studying "ideas," which are to be found in literature, philosophy, history, and the sciences.[11] While reading Terkel's *American Dreame*, I was impressed with the number of workers, who spoke wistfully of getting an education; they wish they had had more of it, and they said they wanted education for their children, i.e., something good. Trilling has said "We all recognize that in our society higher education is the most dependable means of upward social mobility."[12]

Second, the conceptions of "education" or the "educated person" refer to an ideal[13] that does not exist *in concreto*, but which exists in the mind, or in language, and is something created by the imagination of men and women When using the concept, the logic of the term requires that this aspect be recognized.

Also, the terms are contested, as Soltis has pointed out,[14] or as Aristotle acknowledged when he said that "Men do not all honor the same distinctive human excellence and so naturally they differ about the proper training for it," or as Ravitch has noted, when she wrote that "In theory everyone favors good education but people differ concerning what is good and what is education."[15] This aspect of contestedness follows from the fact that "education" refers to something good and is a value or normative word. If it is a normative concept, then it will likely be contested, since these values which we espouse, or things of which we approve, as Hume said, spring from "the passions"; our approving of things, our valuing and prizing, is a response of our characters, our selves, our patterns of meaning to some perceived existent, real or ideal. These patterns of meaning differ from person to person and thus what each values often conflicts with what another values.

In addition to these usages, these conceptions should also be contextual, i.e., relative to their historical-social context, if they are to function forcefully as ideals.[16] Kaplan refers to this aspect of contextuality when he asks: "What competencies and attitudes can plausibly be advocated at this historical moment?"[17] Another writer says, "Past experience seems to suggest that any satisfactory educational ideal for our own time must be appropriate to our kind of society and government."[18] Adler also acknowledged this need when he said that "We agreed that . . . all past models of the educated person were no longer applicable because they were non-democratic conceptions, applicable only to an elite; that we had to find a new, democratic conception . . ."[19]

Weinberg was referring to the present pluralistic context when he suggested that "We shouldn't get one model; we should have many models."[20] Last, it was said that "There were some who felt that education . . . must provide a way of overcoming the social conflicts, the cultural contradictions, and moral confusion of our society."[21] Daniel Bell described this connection

between a model of the educated person and historical context when he said that there are currently certain problems in constructing a single model: the pluralistic society, the seeming lack of agreed upon set of judgments "as to what is worthwhile," and the "syncretism of culture that goes beyond any particular society," making it difficult to construct a model and to agree on goals.[22]

I wish to emphasize also that conceptions of the "educated person" or of "education" are always ideological. I mean by this that the good that a speaker refers to when he or she uses the term is bound up with his or her set of beliefs. This seems to me to be logically valid. The following comments appear to recognize explicitly this aspect of the concepts. "There are as many valid answers to the question 'What is an educated person?' as there are communities of values and interests," one writer has claimed;[23] and another noted that: "We are disagreeing most strongly when we talk about educational purposes, aims, ideals, objectives, expectations; these are fundamental questions."[24]

Also, if the term is normative, we know *a priori* that it is bound up with one's ideology. We can check this notion *a posteriori* or empirically by predicting what conception of the educated person shall emerge from this or that ideology. For instance, Lenin said that "The overall aim of bringing up young people today should be the teaching of Communist morality."[25] In 1937, Makarenko, Russian educational theorist, outlined his conception of the ideal Soviet citizen when he wrote that "We must send out from our schools energetic members of the socialist society devoted to the collective idea . . . ."[26] Jane Roland Martin wants a conception of the educated person that does not embody sexism. She has written that "The very definition of education and the educational realm adopted implicitly by the standard texts, and made explicit by contemporary analytic philosophers of education, excludes women."[27] Peters' conception[28] of education, like Hirst's "initiation into the seven forms of knowing"[29] is quite compatible with the beliefs of an English philosopher; he wants transmitting of the good; commitment; wide cognitive perspective; knowledge and understanding which are not inert and no methods which shortcut the use of or bypass reasoning. The point of the concept's being ideological is not that one can predict *a* if one knows *b*, but that it will be difficult to dialogue about conceptions of the educated person unless one realizes that such discussions have to do with ideals and ideologies, and not descriptions of concrete *realia*. Also, it is not likely that much agreement will occur among warring factions as to what constitutes education in edtail and what methods and content would be used, because of irreconcilable differences about what is true, good, and beautiful, unless there is explicit recognition among the discussants of the ideological aspects and a conscious attempt to overcome these mutual limitations.

One other usage I want to talk about is the use of the concept as a motivater, a galvanizer, or an energizer. This, it seems to me, is one of the functions of an ideal. It serves or may serve to energize people to communal action to solve problems, or to any kind of action, for that matter. The quest for the holy grail, among other things, is said to have motivated Crusaders, in their medieval wars in the Middle East. The cry of egalite, fraternite, and liverte motivated the people during the French Revolution. "Education as reconstruction" functioned as a catalyst in the educational history of the United States. Conceptions of the educated person embodied in the *Yale Report* of 1828, the *NEA Committee of Ten Report* and the *Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education* were all influential in American education for some decades after their promulgation. The models of the educated person today in Communist China and Russia apparently function exceedingly well as motivators.

In the seventeenth century, according to Adrian Berry, Sir Francis Bacon described a new type of person and society in his *New Atlantis*, and helped change the world from the Medieval to the modern and bring about a scientific

revolution as great as the Industrial Revolution.[30] "Three hundred years after Bacon published his writings," Berry has said, "and as a direct result of them, we have a new world. It is difficult to imagine the impact of Bacon's ideas. The educated men of 1700 were a different breed from those of 1600."[31]

Although there are many other uses of the concept of the educated person, which might be fruitful to inquire into in other contexts, the uses I have here listed seem to me to be associated with the concept of "the educated person" or "education." I would like to refer to some of these usages in my next section, which talks about various levels of usage.

Levels of Usage

I think that I have identified six levels or types of usage of the conception, the "educated person," or "education." The first level involves reification, the error of bestowing concrete reality on or of attributing concrete reality to that which is only verbal or mental. This is the Philosopher's error, according to Dewey, and fundamentally wrong, according to him.

An example of the first level seems to be to be the following: If one says that education is the development of the "truly human,"[32] or that education is the development of "man as man," this is not clear language. Education could not be the development of the truly human or of man as man, because education is good and human nature includes behaviors that are good and bad, so when educating, we would not want to develop the bad as well as the good. This kind of language is elliptical, and, systematically restated, means, "for us education is developing those aspects or behaviors of men and women we have come to believe are worthy." And use of the elliptical language *sans* recognition of the logic of the term involves the speaker in error, inaccuracy, or confused usage, which is not good for communication.

So, the concept of the educated person is not a value-free description of an objectively existing x or y. It is a statement of a preference, and as such is part of the ideological baggage each of us carries. There is the Roman Catholic version of the educated person, the Fundamentalist version, the chauvinistic or sexist version, the Islamic version and the Secular Humanist version. One's notion of an educated person is one's notion of the good and of the bad, or of human excellences.

If one uses this concept as if there were one true referrent, he or she looks for an empirical existent. It is a quest for a phantom. Such a reality does not exust, in my view. We are embarked, then, if we use the concept in this way, upon a search that is doomed to defeat. Along the way, too, in our dialogues with others, about what people should become, i.e., what the educated person is (or ought to be), we will not be receptive to conceptions of human excellence different from ours.

If speakers would not make this mistake, if discussants realized that talk of the educated person and of goals of education, human excellences, etc., were discussions of values, and not competing descriptions of concrete objects, they would move closer to clearer language and more fruitful dialogues.

The shortcomings of this kind of usage are boune out I think by this same author's claim that "in a debate with some Russians, nationally televised, we had to induce the Russians to transcend political, cultural, economic, and religious barriers, that separated us," else "no real discussion of human rights could take place."[33] This author evidently had no ideological barriers of his own to transcend; or at least, he did not mention them.

A second level involves the naturalistic fallacy by claiming that from certain alleged facts, or facts, one must conclude that model x is the correct or best model of the educated person, or of the human being. An example of this second level or type of usage of the conception of the educated person occurs in an article by Ashley Montagu. His is an attractive idea and a compelling argument, but one which seems to me to embody the naturalistic fallacy.[34] Dr. Montagu concludes that since science has learned that loving and being loved are of absolute importance to the development of the human being, education (i.e., in public schools), therefore, more than anything else, must show love for children and must teach the students how to love. The educated person would be a warm, loving person--one who is deeply involved in the welfare of others. Montagu does not pretend that this conception of the good person is merely his own idea of the good, his own value stance, wrapped up in his scientific naturalistic *Weltanschauung*. He seems to suggest that this conception *has* to be inferred--must be deduced, logically, from the latest findings in science. "We know now," Montagu says, "what human beings ought to be because we understand for the first time in the history of our species that the most important of all human basic psychological needs is the need for love."[35]

What could be wrong with such an ideal? First, it doesn't accurately describe the facts, and secondly, if his listeners don't agree with him, he may think they are illogical, since he believes his conclusion is a matter of simple logic. This will not aid dialogue. Other problems occur, also: love as a goal is much like education as a goal; it is very broad and just about everyone will agree on that statment of the goal, but not upon the particulars, nor upon the means necessary to reach that goal; and, as Peters has said, it is the means anyway that make the meaning of the goal clear.[36] For example, is prayer in schools a part of love or not? is homework? detention? corporal punishment? smiling? the "strictest discipline code in the country" (as a school board I know of proudly announced recently)? Also, loving is a desirable trait, but not the only one; e.g., we don't want loving ignoramuses graduating from our schools; we would prefer loving, socially responsible, moral, intelligent, learned graduates.

A third level of usage recognizes that the conception of the educated person is normative, but does not sufficiently take into account the historical-social context from which the conception is emerging and does not, therefore, adequately speak to problems peculiar to this context. The following claims seem to me to embody this level of usage. In a discussion of educational ideas, one speaker commented that "it seems to me that the educational proposals in the past which have proved most influential have chiefly put into words the values already implicit . . . at least in the more vigorous cultrual movements of their times,: and that "traditional models no longe r seem adequate."[37]

Following are four references to models of the educated person or of goals of education which are at this level of usage, I believe. They emerge from the context of our time, but because they offer no more than what was offered by former models, quite appropriate to non-cataclysmic times, seem archaic in light of today's problems, not relevant to critical tasks at hand, and not useful in my view for motivating anyone to concerted action. Meyerson's conception of education included general education, affective and cognitive components, knowledge of facts and of theory, studies of Eastern and Western culture, of modern, historical, and future times, studies of our own language and those of other nations, as well as sciences and mathematics.[38] Mortimer Adler spoke of the educated person as "one who acquires the tools of learning in school . . . and uses them the rest of his life for the fullest possible development."[39] Meyerson also envisioned the university as the "center for and guardian of complex learning . . . reaffirming its function of advancing knowledge and the inducting of the young . . . into the best that has been thought and known . . . and as proudly elitest."[40] One can recognize these descriptions as fully compatible with traditional goals of education that

have been enunciated time and time again. All these descriptions of the ends of education or of the educated person are high sounding, palatable, are brought from their social context, and are intended to deal with their social context. My criticism is that in these times of nihilism, models of the educated person must address more effectively particular problems of an era, than these that were useful in less dangerous times.

The fourth level involves awareness of the conception as normative, does not attempt to prove normative claims with descriptive statements, and produces conceptions that have some relevance to the special context whence they have emerged; e.g., Kohlberg's ideal of aiming to help people reach higher levels of moral reasoning so that the edials of democracy might be more and more carried out by more and more people in more and more aspects of life,[41] or of Butt's model of the educated person as one who has a civic education and participates intelligently and responsibly in a democratic society[42] seem to me to be examples of this level of usage, conceptions that may in the view of some or even many respond adequately to current conditions, but which, in my view, are not sufficiently relevant to the present cataclysmic context and are therefore, even though well argued, described and defended, not sufficient motivators or apt motivators, or we might say, hold up an inappropriate banner for these times.

A fifth level is the political use of the concept, that is, a recognition that the concept is normative, attempts no proofs of normative claims on the basis of descriptive claims, is sensitive to its historical and social context, and, although it is recognized that thorough ideological agreement may not be possible, dialogue is still carried on in an attempt to strive for harmony of action on the basis of partial agreement. The following claim seems to me to ignore the possibility of the political use of the term. Adler says, "If the point about the incompatibility of values is correct, isn't it impossible to proceed on the normative track? Because if we have to submit to irresolvable, irreconcilable incompatibilities in values, so then no normative questions can be answered, then we shouldn't even raise the normative question."[43] It appears to me that here is the lack of realization that political talks could still occur. Even though they may not be able to agree on all values, especially basic ones, or ideologies, might they not together have searched for plans of action that would benefit both or all? This is what occurs when the United States and Russia, e.g., agree on grain sales, or on cultural exchanges. They haven't come to agree on ideologies, but they agree on some common action for mutual benefit. This level seems to be embodied in the following claim: "To answer 'What is an educated person?' is to speak of process of consensus and alliance and politics; it is to inquire into the nature of changing values and of ideologies in conclict."[44]

A last level of usage to me would be the devising of a model, perhaps but not necessarily through political use of the language, that would be recognized for what it is, a value conception, an ideal, not warrantable empirically, but able to be rationally defended, justified, and so relevant to its context, and agreeable to so many forces, and motivating for so many people, that many are moved to action to solve critical current problems. Such a model could come from any source or through any process; what matters is that it be moral, intelligent, and that it motivate (like "Workers of the world, arise; you have nothing to lose but your chains."). An example of this kind of model would be, to me, education for Peace, Disarmament, and a Living World, with which the current issue of the *Teachers College Record* is dealing.

Conclusions

Today, *action*, not only understanding, seems called for. Enough people, in spite of relativisms, pluralisms, and conflicting ideologies, can agree I hope that life should be preserved (especially those of us who believe this is the only life we and our children will ever enjoy). We might agree on life as

a broad goal--like agreement on Skinner's notion of survival of the species--but can we agree on the means? Skinner proposed as a goal the survival of the species. Enough of us agree with him on that, but at least in the past, many did not agree with him that operant conditioning was a preferred means.

I suggest the goals like "The Renaissance man," the "Scientific man," the "democratic citizen," the "citizen of the world," the "morally autonomous person" or "one who is initiated into the seven forms of knowledge," seem feeble now and we reject them as stale rhetoric, proposing solutions that have not worked, and perceived as woefully inadequate in times when people, although they smile and laugh and talk about the weather, always carry with them the burden of fear that no one may live to see the dawn. When we are offered goals like "the democratic citizen," etc., these days, we think something is prior that can no longer be taken for granted, and that is the *living citizen, in a habitable world.* We have to fight now it seems to me for life; if we can achieve that goal, when we can work for those other goals which we have fought for in the past and made progress toward, but which now must be considered secondary, or as concomitant; I am not saying toss aside all other aims; the garden has to be plowed and the bread must be baked, but no aim seems more important now than saving the human race from nuclear destruction.

Old models won't do, not only because they may be predemocratic, but because they are pre-thermonuclear, and also because people realize that the production of innumerable pleasing and rational models have not spared us from today's too sidespread irrationalism and barbarism. In fact, their realization is so deep that they not only reject previous models but models as such.

If we can muster broad active consensus on this goal, saving the human species from annihilation, and keeping the spaceship earth habitable, then there are two methods that immediately come to mind--deterrence (and assured mutual destruction) through military might, or disarmament. The method resulting in arms races, which our leaders use currently, is recognized by enough people as apocalyptic and the other method, disarmament, as preferrable. It is to be hoped that, in time, we may be able to aim for the destruction not only of thermonuclear weaponry, but of all instruments designed to kill, and to aim then for demilitarization. And then, if the people succeed, instead of serving in the military, citizens can serve to build, heal, vivify, beautify, not destroy, kill, and scar; they can cover the fields and streets with peace, smiles, laughter, health, music, dancing, and friendship, not human blood and tears.

Instead of spending human labor and creativity and the vast wonders of technology on weapons to kill, we can spend these things on homes, parks, libraries, recreational facilities, help for the needy, education, population control, welfare programs, health, art, music, ecology, learning. Perhaps, as Condorcet said, "The time will come when the sun will shine only upon a world of free men (and women) who recognize no master except their reason, when tyrants and slaves, and their stupid or hypocritical tools, will no longer exist except in history or on the stage."[45]

If men and women can save the human race now, then we can continue working on other problems--senators and congressmen and cabinet secretaries spending poor people's tax money to travel luxury class, with their large retinues, around the world, fanatical fundamentalisms, super riches, the profit motive, indiscriminate and thoughtless human propagation, pooression, ignorance, injustices. We can devote ourselves to humane and rational religion instead of to ignorant dogmatism and dogmatic ignorance.

However, I am not sure how this educational aim might be incorporated into schools, or whether it would do any good if it were. Disarmament could be studied as a topic in high school or elementary school social studies, and, of course, in colleges and universities it may be and is studied, especially under the auspices of Peace Studies Programs. Writers in the

current issue of *Teachers College Record*, however, do not hesitate to recommend that schools at all levels deal with disarmament and related topics, and the issue is filled with excellent suggestions as to rationale and techniques; it contains as well, two articles that are striking in their graphic descriptions of two imagined days; one piece describes the last afternoon of civilization, and the other tells of the world-wide rejoicing by people of all races, creeds, and politics, from all over the world, as the World Disarmament Conference convenes.

More important than teaching about disarmament in schools, I think, would be for educators to take political action, as private citizens, outside the schools, along with citizens from many other walks of life, who currently are acting, to work for nuclear freeze, nuclear disarmament, total disarmament and finally demilitarization. It should be the first goal of every organization.

In a recent address to this society, J. Gordon Chamberlin quoted some words of Bertrand Russell's that I should like to close with. Lord Russell said, "There is, perhaps, one duty which falls specially within the province of philosophy, and that is to persuade mankind that human life is worth preserving."[46] Maxine Greene ends her article on Education for Disarmament by quoting a passage from Camus that ends with the words, "The important thing is not to despair."

What we need today is a conception of the educated person that will move many to act for a world of *living* men, women, and children in a *habitable* world. We may have such a conception in Education for Peace and Disarmament.

NOTES

1. I. A. Snook, editor, *Concepts of Indoctrination: Philosophical Essays* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 162.

2. Martin Kaplan, editor, *What is an Educated Person? The Decades Ahead* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).

3. Henry Steele Commager, in Kaplan, p. 35.

4. Allan Bullock, in Kaplan, p. 37.

5. Michael Scriven, *Primary Philosophy* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 197.

6. "Education" would be that process which is aimed toward developing the "educated person." Martin refers to Peters' conception of education which means "those processes directed toward the development of the *educated person* (italics not in the original). (Jane Roland Martin, "Excluding Women from the Educational Realm," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 52 (May, 1982), p. 139.)

7. *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, June 27, 1980, p. 7-B.

8. Walter Robert Corti, editor, *The Philosophy of William James* (Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), p. 270.

9. R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1966), p. 3.

10. As quoted in George R. Knight, *Issues and Alternatives in Educational Philosophy* (Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1982), p. iii.

11. Gary Seay, "Do Sophocles and Plato Have Nothing to Say to Students at Inner-City Colleges?" *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (August 4, 1982), p. 48.

12. Lionel Trilling, in Kaplan, p. 48.

13. Jane Roland Martin, "The Ideal of the Educated Person," in *The Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society 37th Annual Meeting*, ed., Daniel R. DeNicola, Houston, Texas, April, 1981, p. 3.

14. Jonas F. Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 5-7.

15. Diane Ravitch, "The Debate about Standards," in *Annual Editions: Education*, ed., Fred Schultz (Guilford, Conn.: The Dushkin Publishing Co., 1982), p. 74.

16. I am asserting here that contextuality *ought* to be a mark of current conceptions of education, just as Martin has claimed, and rightly so, I believe, that the currently accepted definition of education in philosophy of education (R. S. Peters' conception) is inadequate because it has been built on only "male data" and ought not be so, if the definition is going to aid philosophers of education instead of obstruct their work. (Martin, "Excluding Women," p. 147.

17. Martin Kaplan, in Kaplan, p. 121.

18. William J. Bouwsma, "Models of the Educated Man," in Kaplan, p. 30.

19. Mortimer Adler, in Kaplan, pp. 75-76.

20. Steven Weinberg, in Kaplan, p. 32.

21. Allan Bullock, in Kaplan, pp. v-vi.

22. Daniel Bell, in Kaplan, p. 34.

23. Martin Kaplan, in Kaplan, p. 9.

24. Alan Bullock, in Kaplan, p. 37.

25. William F Connell, "Moral Education: Aims and Methods in China, the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and England," in *Moral Education: It Comes with the Territory*, eds., David Purpel and Kevin Ryan (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1976), p. 31.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

27. Martin, "Excluding Women," p. 134.

28. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, p. 20.

29. As explained in Martin, "Excluding Women," pp. 141-142.

30. Adrian Berry, *The Next Ten Thousand Years* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1974), Chapter 2.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Theodore M. Heshurgh, "Liveral Education," in Schultz, editor, *Annual Readings*, pp. 19-21.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

34. Martin has spoken of a naturalistic fallacy embedded in Peters' conception of the educated person, insofar as he seems to argue, although not explicitly, that traits of the male are "held up as ideals for the whole species." (Martin, "The Ideal of the Educated Person," footnote #24, p. 18.)

35. Ashley Montagu, "My Idea of Education," in Schultz, editor, *Annual Editions*, pp. 38-39.

36. "The crucial question to ask, when men wax enthusiastic on the subject of their aims, is what *procedures* are to be adopted in order to implement them." (As quoted in Soltis, *Introduction to the Analysis*, p. 13.)

37. Stephen B. Graubard, in Kaplan, p. 36.

38. Martin Meyerson, "Educating the Educated Person: Three Themes on the Role of the University," in Kaplan, p. 64.

39. Mortimer Adler, in Kaplan, p.]72.

40. Meyerson, in Kaplan, p. 64.

41. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," in Purpel and Ryan, *Moral Education*, pp. 188-189.

42. R. Freeman Butts, *The Revival of Civic Learning* (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1980).

43. Mortimer Adler, in Kaplan, p. 34.

44. Martin Kaplan, in Kaplan, p. 12.

45. As quoted in Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx* (New York: Time, Inc., 1963), p. 68.

46. As quoted in Gordon Chamberlin, "How Green Was My Valley," in *Philosophical Studies in Education*, eds. William Brownson and John Carter (Terre Haute, Indiana: Indiana State University, 1977), p. 13.

BUILDING DIALOGUE ON WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN EDUCATED PERSON: A RESPONSE

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To build further dialogue regarding clarification of what it *means* to be an educated person is always a task which proceeds with consideration for both the substantive and the procedural dimensions of the meaning of "education." The "educated person", as a concept so stated, seems to suggest the achievement of some end or ends. In responding to this year's presidential address of this Society, my goal is to facilitate that generation of dialogue about *both* the substantive and the procedural dimensions of the question: "what it means to be an educated person?"

The study of conceptions of "the educated person" always proceeds within the sociology of knowledge of particular societal and cultural contexts and the ideological frames of reference which motivate and guide intellectual dialogue in those contexts as to the meanings of ideas. We have in the *idea* of the "educated person" what John Wilson and others have referred to as a "mixed concept"[1]--that is to say, one for which there exists more than one set of defining characteristics, or, as in the case of concepts like "culture" and "love", sometimes overlapping sets of defining characteristics. Professor Crabtree has attempted to extend the dialogical effort to ascertain, in what I believe to be an attempt to give a programmatic definition, the idea of "the educated person". His stated goal has been "to understand how this concept functions, and how its uses are related to times, contexts, situations, etc."[2] The substance of his paper consists of the description of and commentary on "six levels or types of usage" of the concept of an "educated person". The Procedural strategy he has employed to discuss these levels of usage is the following: (A) he begins by stating his purposes and then to raise four questions centering on the question as to what it means to be an "educated person" in "nihilistic times"; (B) he sets as a foundation for his argument seven propositions, the first four of which and the sixth and seventh of which are propositions regarding societal conditions in the Western world at present, and the fifth of which is a proposition that authority and criteria of knowing and valuing have been weakened;[4] (C) he then presents a brief discussion of the current "Weltschmerz" in our time, the sense of sadness and anger resultant from current world conditions which could result in the destruction of civilization;[5] (D) next, he proceeds to give several uses of the concept of "education" as it relates to the idea of an "educated person"; then (E) in the second half of his essay, he discusses the six levels or types of usage of the concept of an "educated person".[6] From this effort he concludes that "older models" of "the educated person won't do,"[7] for the reasons he states, which seem to the present reader of his paper to center around the idea that current "nihilistic times" require redefinition of the goals we have in view when we think of what it means to be an "educated person." Thus, his procedural strategy seems to be one of trying to build an argument which will emphasize the role of current states of socio-political affairs in the world in defining "the educated person." In what follows I will not attempt an exhaustive response to each point in his line of argument, but rather will respond selectively to certain of the points offered by Professor Crabtree, points which are of great interest to me and which I believe may generate interesting further dialogue. My interests in discussing his argument are both substantive and procedural.

I would like first to note that much of Professor Crabtree's argument is directed toward the end of ascertaining what *ought* to be the conception of an "educated person" in "nihilistic" or "critical" times. His argument clearly resounds with his belief that an adequate conception of what it means to be an "educated person" ought to be framed with reference to societal conditions which persons must face. If, for purposes of argumentation, we accept the proposition that the times are "nihilistic," we need to confront procedural questions about the extent to which the definition of the concept of an "educated person" should or should not be tied either to events within society *or* to generally accepted usages of the concept in *all* times? Professor Crabtree's argument emphasizes the cataclysmic nature of the times and the need to have educated persons for the times. Is the question "what

is an educated person" the same question as "what is the *best* education for people living in cataclysmic times"? In my view, no. They are different questions. The first question asks for a *descriptive definition* of what an educated person *is*; the second question asks for a *programmatic* definition of what might constitute the *best possible* education for people living in allegedly nihilistic times. Professor Crabtree has dealt primarily with the second question, although he had made a valiant effort to deal with the first question as it relates to the second. I applaud his effort, although I do not define the present world situation as any more cataclysmic than the period 1941-1945; even though the means of terror are more sophisticated, more cataclysmic now, then they were relative to the technologies of destruction in each period.

Professor Crabtree does well to note both the distinction of Jane Roland Martin that the concept of an "educated person" is "an ideal that does not exist *in concreto*" and Jonas Soltis' point that a concept like the one presently under review is a "contested" one. It is, or course, a contested concept because it is a mixed one. Thus, as in the case of all efforts to provide programmatic definitions, we need to assess the adequacy of the programmatic conclusion. Professor Crabtree's conclusion is:

> What we need today is a conception of the educated person that will move many to act for a world of *living* men, women, and children in a *habitable* world. We may have such a conception in Education for Peace and Disarmament.[8]

I still cling to the view that an "educated person" must possess, in terms of R. S. Peters' conception of "education," a sufficiently broad cognitive perspective to comprehend the empirical and ideological realities of his or her time. I agree that the concept of an "educated person" should encompass and uphold the ideal of "Wisdom" and ideal of a person in possession of sufficient cognitive perspective to make fair and accurate observations of his or her experience. Since the *substance* of conceptions of "educated persons" is so directly related to the sociology of ideas in particular socio-ideological contexts, there still exist in the world sharply contested *differences* regarding the *specific* "ideological substance" that "educated persons" should possess.

On the other hand, one can raise the question in response to this address as to whether any of the "old models" *can* work? And, if so, which ones? And why? Are conceptions of the "educated person" merely temporally contextual ideals? Or are there certain universal characterizing features of what it means to say that one is an "educated person"? Does the present allegedly cataclysmic state of the world *really* negate the utility of all the "old models"? I would suggest that we can conceive of a descriptive definition an "educated person" ready to meet the challenges of the times and that some of the "old models" can work. Professor Crabtree opens his concluding section with the suggestion that this is a time for "action, not only understanding." I believe that all times have been so. Further, a conception of what it means to be an "educated person" can be conceived in terms of certain descriptors which should help any person to live well in either times of peace or cataclysm. We need to ask as well what the role of goal statements such as "Education For Peace and Disarmament" would mean as we try to define what an "educated person" is. One further question comes to mind, one which I raise purely for the sake of gaining insight from critical reaction to it. Should descriptive statements which are proposed to guide our definitional work as to what constitutes an educated person be distinguished from the use of slogans as goals? How, by what means, do the goal phrases proposed in some definitions of an "educated person" contain more explanatory power than those it is proposed that they replace.

I would like to close with just one final point. Are all the "old models" "predemocratic"? Can some of them function well to deal with social conflict in a thermonuclear age? Could, for instance, Immanuel Kant's primary formulation of the Categorical Imperative "always to act as if your action was in accordance with a universalizable law always to treat people as end in themselves, and *never* as a means to your own ends" serve "an educated person" well in these times? I believe so. I believe that some of the "old models" can work; if we have the will to behave as just persons ought to behave toward one another in this or any other time. There are, of course, other great standards to guide our conceptualizations of what

humane "educated persons" ought to be like when we explore the programmatic options open to us. Could principles such as Kant's Categorical Imperative function now as a guide to reason in this as in other times? This is, as Professor Crabtree says, a potentially cataclysmic time. But not all of the "old models" are dead. There are principles of practical judgment and action wnich should and can guide the conduct of "educated persons." As Dickens said, "it was the worst of times. It was the best of times." As in 52 B.C., 1776, 1789, 1914, 1941-1945, and 1968, among others, the times will be what persons make of them; and "educated persons" will be those possessive of sufficiently rigorous standards of moral judgment and sufficient broad cognitive perspectives to rise to the demands of the times.

NOTES

1. See John Wilson, Thinking With Concepts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

2. Walden Crabtree, "Conceptions of the Educated Person", Presidential Address to the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society; Cincinnati, Ohio, November 19, 1982, p. 1.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSION

RISKING THE SPLIT OR SPLITTING
THE RISK IN WARFARE BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND
PHENOMENOLOGIST/EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHERS OF EDUCATION

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It has been argued that excessive disharmony within the field of philosophy of education hinders effective political action to counter various forces which threaten the existence of philosophy of education coursework in teacher education programs. If we are to seek greater harmony, our differences could profitably be examined. We may also benefit from scrutinizing some of the risks involved in moving toward greater harmony. The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, to elaborate on distinctions between analytic philosophers of education (hereinafter "analysts") and phenomenologist/existential philosophers of education (hereinafter "existentialists"). Second, to note problems in resolving the split between "analysts" and "existentialists." And third, to examine some risks involved in mending the split, and how contact can assist in the mending. It is understood that all of what is said reflects a "existentialist" bias.

Some Distinctions and Problems

Each of us wants to be clear about what we say. The differences in degree of clarity often lead the "analysts" to think that the "existentialists" are excessively fuzzy. The "existentialists" often thing the "analysts" are clear but what is clear is ofter inconsequential and not personally meaningful.

Besides clarity of expression, each of us wants to write about consequential and meaningful concerns.[1] The "analyst" does this by making distinctions and extracting clear meanings from the world. The "existentialist" notes his or her experience and endows meaning on the world or a part thereof.[2] The experience more often focused on by the "analyst" is public, objective and that which relates to the past.

"Existentialists" also frequently focus on an experience which relates to the past, but the "existentialists" are more inclined to pay attention to that which is going on, as it is going on. Leroy Troutner's[3] comments that we need to try to catch ourselves in the act while we are acting, and then describe that activity as it presents itself and only insofar as it presents itself, applies here. The purpose of such activity, according to Troutner is, to search for a model of being human that will illuminate how we can gain control over our own education by gaining control over our own self-becoming.

The recontextualizing that Pratte[4] states analysts should do relates to including the observer in statements about what is observed. The decontextualizing by "analysts" has led to an excessively objective self which focuses on the contents of awareness rather than on the self aware that "it" is aware. To "analysts" and western thinkers generally, a self observing himself or herself is not observable and therefore, little if any, attention is paid to such subjectivity. If one were to catch himself in the act while he is acting, and then describe that activity as it presents itself and only insofar as it presents itself, then some products of this kind of activity may at times be subjects without predicates or predicates without subjects. Such products may be the route one could profitable follow in order to gain control over one's self-becoming.

Gaining control over one's self-becoming is self-inventing. Talking about self-inventing, (what "analysts" are more concerned with) and self-inventing (what "existentialists" are more concerned with) are different. Talking about self-inventing may lead to self-inventing as self-inventing may lead to discourse about it. Perhaps the entry points in this circle are where "analysts" and "existentialists" differ. Because of the different entry points I expect that "existentialists" would use more of the verbs; am, is, are, seem, become, feel, look, taste, smell, grow and sound in the present tense. These linking verbs line. "Analysts" words lead to making distinctions (a de-linking) to clarify so that the linker can be more certain that what is linked in a mind corresponds accurately with what is in the world.

Some "existentialists" hold that nothing ever happened in the past and nothing will ever happen in the future. Everything that happens, happens now or happens not at

all. It is now that we remember the past and now that we anticipate the future. It is only now that we can choose. Deferring to choose until some later time is a present choice to defer.

A problem with the use of the present tense is that knowledge relates to past events. This is so because one's cognitive pole of intelligence masks mobility and duration. If our cognitive pole did not mask mobility and duration, events would continue to endure and one event would be indistinguishable from others. In a sense what is known stops (is statis) yet knowers continue. Hopefully the continuing is a continuing to gain control over their own self-becoming. This self-becoming can't be adequately defined and if in Western cultures we can't define something we are thought to be stupid about it. Yet we can be aware that we are aware. As Dave Denton remarked, we have the problem of seeing our own eyeballs. That which we are looking for is that which is looking. As knowledge relates to the past, awareness relates to the present.

An analogy to doing scientific research may be useful here. Once a scientist has a relatively clear hypothesis, scientific testing of the hypothesis can proceed. Similarly, analysis can be done on propositions that have been made. Science does not deal with hypothesis formation in the sense that logic or data by itself does not tell one what to hypothesize. The "existentialist" at times deals with hypothesis formation by expressing present experience even though his or her present experience, at times, includes subjects with no predicates. Hypotheses and much of the meaning we extract or create comes from blooming, buzzing confusions which emerges, at times, as subjects without predicates. The "existentialists" pay attention to this fuzzy stuff because it is from such unnamed stuff that meaning is generated. The "analysts" find no meaning in such nonsense and consequently pay little, if any, attention to it, until something is predicated about a subject, at which time analysis can determine the clarity and meaning of the statement.

The "analyst/existentialist" joining of forces, according to Pratte,[5] would be a shortcut to take the place of arguing it out. If we did argue about it, the argument would be like arguing about whether or not bubble gum is more pleasing than Cracker Jack. There are bubble gum devotees and Cracker Jack fans. Similarly, there are those among us who are, in a way that precedes rationality, predisposed to broad contexts and accept uncertainty and fuzziness as a consequence. Likewise, there are those among us who prefer greater certainty and must limit context in order to attain it. These preferences are neither right nor wrong. Differences exist and each type can be complemented by the other. "Existentialists" may say that we need each other for purposes other than to combat outside forces. Another purpose is contact. Some "existentialists" would say that it is primarily through contact with people that our higher level needs are met and, since having knowledge assists us in meeting our higher level needs, we could say that much of our knowledge is for making contact with people. If much of our knowledge is for making contact with people so is the buildup of knowledge. Philosophy and philosophy of education from this point of view, are, therefore, activities whose purposes are for making contact with people. Domination and control is a destructive kind of contact. Mutual exploration is a growth producing kind of contact. Awareness of contact as we contact is a precondition to contact.

"Analysts" would not agree with the above notion that philosophy of education has human contact as its purpose. Some "existentialists" would also disagree. Of course, contact has not been defined here so the notion of contact is very unclear. Since it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze or define contact, I will only say here that contact with a person can provide what one is provided when he or she is touched by a play, a poem, music, etc. This contact can provide more energy and is, at the same time, the outgrowth of energy. It can provide more awareness and can be conceived as a product of awareness. This circularity is similar to the circularity involved in A. N. Whitehead's proposition that the adventure or romance stage of learning leads to the precision stage of learning which leads to the generalization stage of learning which, in turn, leads to a new adventure or romance stage. Contact leads to energy, action, and awareness as awareness leads to energy, action and contact as being precise about something can lead to generalizations and new adventures. We can enter these circles at different points.

In the poem, "The Blind Men and the Elephant," you will recall that six blind men go to "see" an elephant so that each by observation might satisfy his mind. One One touches the elephant's side and says that the elephant is like a wall. The next

feels the trunk and says the elephant is like a snake, the next touches a tusk and says "spear," the next touches the leg and says "tree," the next touches the tail and says "rope," the last touches the elephant's ear and states that the elephant is like a fan.

Education may be likened to the elephant and each of us perhaps will agree that there is more education than any one of us will observe and ever experience. Will our views about education change as we see more of it? Perhaps, but according to the notion of selective perception, we perceive based on our needs and wants. We have needs for continuity and a reasonable amount of certainty. Views do not substantially change unless and until there is something to fill the void to diminish excessive discontinuity and maintain reasonable certainty. The "existentialists" have a noticeably lesser need for continuity and certainty than the "analysts" but, somewhat paradoxically, it may be said that the "existentialists" have a stronger need for continuity and certainty since they are willing to put up with such high levels of discontinuity and uncertainty to meet their needs for continuity and certainty.

To the "existentialists," this type of paradox is not doubletalk. Paradox is often their reality. The "analysts" may grant the sub-atomic physicist some leeway in making seemingly nonsensical statements about quantum physics because quarks are not directly sensed during our ordinary experience. But to grant nonsense to people who call themselves philosophers of education is another matter. To say that one arrives at more continuity through experiencing discontinuity needs much more support before the meaning is clear.

Even though I contend, as does Morris,[6] that what Pratte is asking us to negotiate is non-negotiable, in that the split between "analysts" and "existentialists" is normative and not cognitive, I believe that the two groups can move toward greater harmony. We can reach greater harmony by dialoguing and by granting that some of us prefer bubble gum and others prefer Cracker Jack and that our preferences are not distasteful. This open dialogue about our basic beliefs and propositions that arise therefrom is a type of contact.

Choosing the Risk

The greater harmony will help us avoid further risk-taking as we jointly combat outside forces that may destroy the variety of ideas and positions that we stand for. But the movement toward harmony will include the risk of falling into the category of ... "one born every minute." None of us wants to be a fool. We protect ourselves (our values, beliefs, assumptions and our propositions that arise therefrom) in a number of ways. The need to know, if excessive and fired by unawareness, can be a form of protection. The excessive need to know can prevent us from making contact with people, things and events. If we don't know how contact with another person will turn out for us, (know how we will feel and think during and after a contact) we may avoid the contact with the real world of people, things and events, and have, instead, the experience mainly in our heads. This "in head" experiencing is often the experience of predicting. Our knowledge helps us predict, and the purpose of prediction is to control. The major purpose of control may be for itself but more fruitfully, control assists us in our exploring. Predicting does not have as its major purpose more predicting whereas exploring is for more exploring. Mutual exploring is a form of contact which is nourishing and growth producing.

A way to risk cautiously is to experiment. An experiment may be as simple as doing some analysis regarding how a particular person will respond as you make contact with that person in your own reasonably open way. (One must be somewhat open regarding the outcome or the "Aha, I got you -I'm up - you're down syndrome" will operate. This is similar to the fear of domination and control.) One way of making contact is to say to a person what you are experiencing, and note the person's response as well as your response to that person's response. We may surprise ourselves to discover the degree of protectedness that we have about us wasn't needed after all. Experiment again and while we are at it, consider Sheldon Kopp's[7] admonition, "Learn to forgive yourself, again and again and again."

The either/or that Pratte spoke about can be modified, i.e. that compromise between "analysts" and "existentialists" was either reasonable or compromise shows that there is "one born every minute." Growth of groups as well as individuals

can involve the transcendence of dichotomies. What we do that is good for ourselves can at the same time be good for the society if we are less motivated by fear and more motivated by finding and/or creating meaning. But extracting and/or endowing meaning can be risky as is personalizing for "analysts" and impersonalizing for "existentialists."

It is agreed that genuine scholarship does not flourish in an atmosphere of hostility. If one experiences domination and control, there is a probability of a concomitant feeling of hostility directed toward the attempted controller.

If we try to tell each other how to do philosophy of education the correct or appropriate way, there is little hope for compromise and there is a likelihood of generating hostility. I expect that future reading of articles about analytical thought such as Pratte's Presidential address will continue to be illuminating for me. I did not know that Pratte and other "analysts" thought that the primary task of doing philosophy of education is to clarify his or her values and adopt a fitting method. It appeared for a moment that Pratte switched camps until his "analyst" bias emerged with the idea that we should avoid excessively vague and evasive value premises. The criteria for what is an excessively vague and evasive value premise stem from basic values which relate to varying needs for continuity and certainty.

I expect that the problems we face as a philosophy of education society, the split, the hostility etc. are akin to a group identity problem. A way to emerge more unified and more whole from an identity problem is through contact. The contact that we may need is not only between ourselves but also with those outside "forces" who seem to be exercising power over us.

As I have mentioned, contact is that which touches us. Since birth, each of us has become a separate being who seeks union with that which is other than ourselves. Our sense of union depends, paradoxically, on a heightened sense of separateness. It is the function of contact to synthesize the need for union and for separation. Contact is that touching of one's boundary with a boundary of something outside of oneself. If we do not make contact we can become lonely and our hostility may be increased as a result of some frustration that may arise from excessive and extensive loneliness.

Contact is the awareness of and behavior toward novelties that are capable of being assimilated. Contact includes the rejection of novelties that are incapable of being assimilated. We can't contact that which is pervasive (no contactable boundaries) or that which is always the same (no novelty). Once again, it is people, things, events and different parts of ourselves that we make contact with.

We often make contact when a need for change emerges. The change can be as trivial as the moving of a foot to a different position when one becomes aware of mild discomfort with his or her body position. The change can be very extensive such as the change made by many alcoholics and drug abusers when they become aware and do something positive about their substance abuse.

Doing something novel is one way of making contact. One novel acitivity that may lead to expanded boundaries, enchanced identity and therefore, to individual and group growth would be to organize half of an O.V.P.E.S. meeting around the idea of "existentialists" giving relatively serious papers but taking the "analysts" position. Some of these papers may appear somewhat humorous and that would be just fine. Attemps at subtle hostile digs at each other would need to be strictly forbidden. The "analysts" of course, would give papers from the "existentialist" point of view. On the surface, such activity would seem to help us look at our own values and at the same time, help us look at the values of the loyal opposition. In either case, It would be fun, and having this kind of fun is a form of contact. I believe we need to touch each other more in positive constructive ways rather than in negative hostility-producing ways.

Contact results in change. There is always the risk of destructive change but I believe there is a greater likelihood of constructive change. Constructive change is growth. Bones, trees, everything that grows, as far as I know, grows from its limits. We too, as individuals and as a group, grow from our limits. We can provide conditions for each other that will tend to help us get to our limits. Contact gets us to our limits.

Dialogue is a form of contact. If the dialogue focuses on topics removed from the present awarenesses of those involved in the dialogue, the dialogue will be less contactful. When our dialogue is less contactful, it is less instrumental in assisting us to our limits. When we don't approach our limits we don't grow. Conversely, if our dialogue focuses on our present awareness, the dialogue will be more contactful and more growth producing.

The primary test of doing philosophy of education from a "existentialist" frame of reference is the manifesting in one's life of what he or she values (self-inventing). The clarifying of what one values, while crucial to these ongoing manifestations is secondary to the manifesting. Adopting fitting methods to clarify values while also crucial remains subordinate to the manifesting. In a word, manifesting is for manifesting while clarifying is not for clarifying.

Yet "analysts" do this manifesting through clarifying their values and by adopting fitting methods. The result is that the clarifying of values and adopting fitting methods has, as its primary purpose, the clarifying and adopting more fitting methods for "analysts." One would not have a value by which to live if it weren't distinct from other values and that is why the process of clarifying is crucial.

Does one first value then clarify or do our values derive from clarifying and adopting fitting methods so that we know what we value? What difference does it make to make this difference? What risks do we take by making the difference and what risks do we take by not making the difference?

Both "analysts" and "existentialists" do analyzing. Both do synthesizing. Each does so to differing degrees with one camp emphasizing more of one than the other. According to David Nyberg,[8] analysis alone is never enough for understanding anything. Synthesis without some analysis is also rarely communicable. Good judgment, or understanding about fitting things together, according to Nyberg, is what he calls articulation. Nyberg adds that articulation presupposes analysis and supercedes it in that it is the certain way the distinct things are put together that account for articulation. The "certain way" that Nyberg speaks of implies a known configuration, arrangement or organization of parts that form a whole which can't be observed apart from the whole. I do not believe he is using the word "certain" in the sense of differing degrees of certainty and continuity that I previously mentioned.

Nyberg's suggestions may help us refrain from giving up our basic values and still be united in meaningful ways. Because of space limitations, I will rely on the old "if we can name it, we know it" trick. The name of the "analyst/existentialist" interaction is not warfare but antinomy which, as Nyberg states, arises "...when articulation becomes strained and its joints are ill-fitted. Some ideas ("analysts/existentialists" my note) cannot be joined with some others without creating an unsatisfactory compromise that confuses the particular virtues of each."[9]

Pratte's open criticism of "analysts" can be thought of what Nyberg describes as a hueristic of antinomy that can lead to lowering of dissonance. The lowered dissonance results from being reasonably certain that a sythesis between "analysts" and "existentialists" may not be needed to counteract those outside forces.

I would like to conclude with the following story.

During a recent battle between the "analyst" and "existentialist" forces, one of the "existentialists" lost his gun, so he went to his commanding officer and asked what he should do. The commanding officer said, "The great spirit 'existentialist' in the sky is on our side so grab that stick over there and when you see an 'analyst' simply aim the stick at him and devoutly say, 'gunny, gunny.' " So the "existentialist" advanced toward the front and when he came into firing range he aimed his stick at an "analyst" and said, "gunny gunny." The "existentialist" was surprised to see the "analyst" fall to the ground, so the "existentialist" aimed his stick at another "analyst" and again said, "gunny, gunny," and the second "analyst" fell to the ground. The "existentialist" was no longer surprised with the power of his stick after twice meeting success. He again aimed his stick at a third "analyst" and again said, "gunny, gunny." The third fell as a fourth "analyst" came moving toward him. So the "existentialist" took aim and devoutly exclaimed, "gunny, gunny." This fourth "analyst" kept moving toward him so the "existentialist" most devoutly uttered, "gunny, gunny" as he aimed the stick. The "analyst" continued to move forward and the "existentialist" kept on aiming and saying, "gunny, gunny." The "analyst" was only three feet from the "existentialist" and still moving toward the "existentialist" as the final aim and "gunny, gunny" was uttered. The "analyst" moved forward and as the "analyst" knocked over the "existentialist," the "existentialist" heard the "analyst" repeat,"tankity, tankity."

NOTES

1. Notice that I did not say "ideas" but rather "concerns." Ideas my be interpreted as those delineations of thought that are relatively clear and distinct and therefore separable from other clear and distinct ideas. Concerns can be interpreted as having looser boundaries, perhaps lying between dichotomies and/or including vague notions such as anxiety, alienation, etc.

2. Van Cleve Morris, "Living Without Bridges," Philosophy of Education 1980 (Champaign, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, University of Illinois, 1980).

   (AUTHOR'S NOTE) If we would move into the problem of the meaning of meaning, the "analysts" would dismiss the endeavor as being metaphysical, and conclusions based thereon would be incapable of being falsified and are therefore publicly meaningless. The "existentialists" would probably find the endeavor eminently worthwhile since their invention of themselves takes precedence over clarity of expression. Their search for personal unity and harmony relates to the saying that knowledge can be communicated but wisdom cannot, and one who attempts to communicate wisdom one always sounds foolish. The "existentialist" creates his own meaning. The "analyst" (from my biased point of view) will say what a person means by analyzing that person's linguistic constructions. The "analyst" holds that analysis is the way to getting meaing and the "existentialists" hold that there is more to their experience of meaning than they can tell about it. The "analysts" want to know how the "existentialists" know that and the "existentialists" often admit that it is known by some type of faith that is inadequatly expressed linguistically. Yet the "analysts" have a faith in analysis that is not fully supported, as per the lack of falsifiability of the verifiability principle.

3. Leroy F. Troutner, "Illich and Kierkegaard Combined: A Response to the Trap," Philosophy of Education 1978 (Champaign, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, University of Illinois, 1979).

4. Richard Pratte, "Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: Criticism of Something Called Analytic Philosophy of Education," Philosophy of Education 1980 (Champaign, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, University of Illinois, 1981).

5. Ibid., p. 20-21.

6. Van Cleve Morris, "Living Without Bridges."

7. Sheldon Kopp, "Eschatological Laundry List," Guru: Metaphors from a Psychotherapist (Palo Alto: Science and Behavior Books, 1971).

8. David Nyberg, "Thank God For Babel: Analysis, Articulation, Antinomy," Educational Theory, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 1981), pp. 6-10.

9. Ibid.

THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR IN EDUCATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF MARTIN BUBER'S I-THOU AND I-IT

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The relation of religious values to secular, non-religious values is a perennial issue in American education. Conflicting meanings of the terms *religious* and *secular* are both a result and a cause of this issue which is expressed in issues such as prayer in the schools, the teaching of Biblical Creation, etc. One well thought out conception of the religious and secular and their relationship is that of Martin Buber, the Jewish existentialist philosopher whose I-Thou and I-It concepts correspond to the sacred and the secular, respectively. In this paper, the relation between the religious and the scared in education will be discussed in terms of the I-Thou and I-It, but with the I-Thou (sacred) attitude separated from Buber's theology.

The I-Thou relationship, as conceived by Buber, is a basic life-attitude which is inextricably integrated with Hasidic Hebrew theology. However, for Maurice Friedman, interpreter of Buber, and author of *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*, the I-Thou *attitude* (which he refers to as *existential trust*) can be separated from Buber's thology. Friedman writes:

> The reality to which the image of man points lies deeper than the articulations of belief and non-belief. It does not have to do with metaphysical essences or theological creeds, but with that *existential trust* which enables one to stand one's ground before what confronts one and to meet it in a way faithful to its otherness and to one's own uniqueness . . . . It need not matter whether this *existential trust* is expressed in the atheism of Camus or the "theism" of Buber. . . The basic attitude of both is the same. (*To Deny Our Nothingness*, p. 372).

Friedman thus contends that the attitude of *existential trust* is the basic attitude underlying Buber's I-Thou, and Albert Camus' philosophy in *The Rebel* and his own philosophy expressed in *To Deny Our Nothingness*. Thomas Merton, a Catholic monk, recognized a clase affinity between his own life-attitude and that of Camus and Buber. The I-Thou attitude and its elements, described in this paper, is a synthesis of common elements from the ideal life-attitudes described by these four writers, each representing a different religious tradition. This basic life-attitude will be called the *Sacred*.

The relationship between the cognitive and attitudinal aspect of an individual's religion is always a close one, in the view of the person himself. But from the perspective of others, the two aspects may have little relationship or may be in conflict. It is common knowledge that people professing the same theology can have very different religious attitudes (life-stances). Conversely, people having very similar religious life-stances may have very different theological beliefs. The attitudinal aspect of religion, separated from the cognitive, theological aspect, is a basic, attitude towward man, nature, and self. It can be a Sacred (I-Thou) attitude, of loving identification and existential trust, or it can be the antithesis of the Sacred, here called the Demonic and characterized by mistrust, fear, hate, and alienation. There are other basic life attitudes which fit this definition of the religious; they may be thought of as representing a continuum between the Sacred and the Demonic, but each is basic, centered, and integrating. Such religious attitudes will here be called life-stances. A life-stance is an integrated set toward the self and the world which involves every socio-psychological aspect: perceptual, ideational, affective, motor, etc. Life-stances are much like what are called Ego States in Transactional Analysis. They exist on a continuum from the Sacred (I-Thou) to the Demonic, which is the antithesis of the Sacred. The life-stance continuum is the domain of the religious; every life-stance is religious by Paul Tillich's definition, since it expresses the ultimate concern of a person, his most basic way of feeling about, thinking about, relating to others and the world. A basic life-stance underlies particular attitudes toward different categories of people and things. It is an enduring disposition, not momentary or short-lived. A person may commit his life to achieving a *Sacred* life-stance, but much of this basic disposition is unconsciously acquired over a lifetime and cannot be easily or intentitionally modified.

Buber and Friedman repeatedly emphasize that an I-Thou relationship exists *between* one person and another or between a person and that which addresses him. It is not a characteristic of a single individual. However, people differ in their capacities to enter into I-Thou relationships; the life-stance concept refers to this capacity and tendency of an individual.

The *non-religious* is the absence of a unitary life-stance, the absence of an integrating commitment to any ultimate concern with a hierarchy of values. An infant is non-religious in that it reacts to every stimulus according to Freud's Pleasure Principle, attempting only to maximize immediate pleasure and to avoid immediate pain.

Martin Buber's philosophy is an existentialist interpretation of Hasidic Jewish theology and social philosophy and, as such, shares basic elements with other existentialist philosophies, both Christian and atheist. One of these elements is a rejection of all claims to absolute knowledge and absolute power, and a distrust of social/political systems based on such claims. A second element is commitment to personal authenticity which means acceptance of full responsibility for one's own actions, as contrasted with placing the responsibility on external forces or social role demands. As a corollary of the first two elements, existentialists stress the awareness of absurdity and evil, and personal commitment to opposing it both in one's personal life and in the larger society. Religious existentialism and atheist extentialism are two primary types when the focus is on metaphysics or theology; but when the emphasis is on non-theological elements, the most important difference(among existentialists in the view of both Friedman and the writer) is between individualists such as Soren Kierkegaard and those who like Buber stress the dialogical, social, communal. For the latter, the realm of the truly human is the realm of the interhuman or, in Buber's terminology, the dialogical.

Buber's conception of the I-Thou, the Sacred, may be rejected by some for its theology; but the basic life-stance of the Sacred can be integrated with other theologies such as the Roman Catholic theology of Gabriel Marcel and Thomas Merton, or with atheistic metaphysics, as in the writings of Albert Camus; or it can be described without reference to theology or metaphysics as in this paper. The remainder of this paper describes the two aspects of the secular I-It, (the Objective and Subjective) and three religious life-stances: the Sacred, Profane, and Demonic.

The Objective I-It (Focus on Control/Security)

Education and its supporting academic disciplines in the United States are committed to "objective" knowledge and "objective" skills aimed at efficiency of prediction and control in their areas of specialization. The professional organizations that regulate these disciplines are equally committed to increasing their own status and power and that of their individual members. These goal commitments correspond to what Buber calls the I-It *Objective* and to what Freud calls the Reality Principle.

When a person is oriented toward control, he perceives the world of things and of people in terms of their cause-effect relationships, and their use in increasing his own power, his security, and his ability to predict and control.

A focus on control involves "objective" knowledge; two of the most highly developed types of control are science and technology but also includes a focus on physical security and on satisfaction of physiological needs.

The control focus is commonly the dominant orientation in science, in social institutions or individual activities in which the aim is control of effects by manipulation of causes; it includes magic and religion, to the extent that these have control as their purpose.

The Subjective I-It (Focus on Experience/Pleasure)

Liberal arts and "humanistic" education are both concerned with the development of the capacity to experience life fully, to understand and to enjoy it apart from any motivation for security, control, or power. This kind of focus is what Buber calls the Subjective I-It; it closely corresponds to Freud's Pleasure Principle and is here called a focus on *experience*.

The Experience Focus strives to maximize pleasurable feelings and to minimize negative ones - physical pain, anxiety, guilt, etc. Experience is used here in the broadest possible sense including sensation, perception, thinking, etc. All activities, including those involving *control*, have some experiential quality; but the experience orientation exists when the *quality* of experience is the dominant focus and motive.

The creation of art and its appreciation are the products of an experience focus . . . although what passes for art may be the result of an objective I-It focus. This occurs when art is treated as a product to be used either by the "producer" of art or by the "consumer."

Mystical, ecstatic, or charismatic experience may be based on an experience focus, even though its rationale and motivation are couched in terms of the Sacred, the love of God. What people say they are doing (and why) is not always a true indicator of their orientation or their religious life-stance. The experience focus is represented by needs for love and for self-actualization. The here-and-now hippy youth culture of the sixties, the consumer orientation exploited and fostered by commercial advertising, and the glorification of physical exercise and health are usually manifestations of an experience orientation (although a particular behavior may be evidence of different orientations in different people and under different circumstances).

The Subjective I-It includes, primarily, affective, aesthetic or emotional pleasure/pain; but it also includes cognitive processes that are oriented to meaning rather than to prediction and control. Thus, the desire to *understand*, to place events in a wider cognitive context, which may involve religious or supernatural concepts, is one form of the Subjective I-It. Similarly, the concept of history and the social sciences (Wissenschaften) as aimed at understanding (Verstehen) is a cognitive form of the Subjective. When the Subjective I-It is in the foreground, the self-concept is hyper-individualistic and privatized with the meaning and purpose of every activity and of the world being to maximize pleasure and to minimize negative feelings and emotions. The world view of the Subjective I-It is solipsistic; things are what the "subject" experience them to be. There are as many real worlds as there are experiencing individuals.

The Sacred (I-Thou) Life Stance

The essence of the Sacred (I-Thou) life-stance is what Maurice Friedman calls existential trust; it could also be called *loving identification* with others and the world. Existential trust begins in the first stages of life which are described by Erik Erikson as the stages of Trust/Mistrust and of Autonomy/Doubt. In existential trust, there is a positive love and valuing of self, others, and all living things for their own sake, not for their use to the observer. Carl Rogers calls this Unconditional Positive Regard and Empathy and considers it an essential characteristic of all helping relationships; Albert Schweitzer calls it reverence for life; Christian theology calls it *agape*; and in the King James version of the Bible, Saint Paul calls it love.

The sense of *loving identification* permits and encourages uniqueness and differences. What others feel, I empathize with; but I maintain my own sense of uniqueness and separateness. The self is, thus, not only connected to other selves, it is integrated with them in a way that prevents a sense of alienation, a sense of being merely an object.

A *second*, closely related *Sacred* characteristic is the perception of self and others as *whole persons, not as mere social roles* or as the bearers of particular characteristics. Although not everything in the universe can or should be perceived as having personhood, the *Sacred* life-stance tends to perceive personhood, at least metaphorically, whenever this is not clearly inappropriate. The conception of God as Person is a way of perceiving the entire universe as person; animistic religions perceive trees, plants, rocks, and other natural phenomena as having person hood. The reverence for nature of the ecology movement generally includes this tendency to perceive and to value all living things as wholes in relationship to their environment. The perception of others as whole persons is often seen most clearly in intimate relationships of friendship, love, and family, where the other is perceived, valued, and loved as a whole person, unconditionally, not on the basis of specific useful, pleasurable, or admired characteristics.

A *third characteristic* of the *Sacred* life-stance is *authenticity and dialogue*. Authenticity is the absence of neurotic defense mechanisms that distort the perception of reality and hinder the true and clear expression of thoughts and feelings. Dialogue is encounter between two persons that is authentic. In authentic dialogue, each person is "present" (open) to the other and is completely honest in expressing his own thoughts and feelings. There is no attempt to impress the other, to use or manipulate, or to pursue a hidden agenda. There is an awareness and acceptance of differences, including social role differences; but these are not used to distort the expression and reception of thought and feelings.

In dialogue there is an upward spiral of growth and change so that each person becomes more aware of his own ideas and feelings as he expresses them in the receptive, accepting atmosphere provided by the other. Dialogue is the essence of any truly

"helping relationship" in the view of Carl Rogers; it is the essence of any real human encounter in Buber's view. The antithesis of dialogue is *monologue* in which each person has a fixed message to send and the purpose is to have an effect on the receiver that is useful to the sender.

A *fourth characteristic* of the *Sacred* is its awareness of and resistance to the Demonic. A person or community having a Sacred life-stance does not turn their gaze away from evil, suffering, fear, and threats to the existence or well-being of self or others; it does not deny the existence of the Demonic within oneself or one's own community, but neither does it identify the Demonic with individuals, ethnic groups, or nations. Resistance to the Demonic is accomplished in a spirit of loving identification with Persons. Anger at the Demonic and even at persons is not antithetical to the Sacred. But vengeance and hatred channeled into attempts to destroy and kill the "enemy" is not the same as anger. Violence toward persons cannot defeat the Demonic because it *is* the Demonic. The Sacred life-stance is the antithesis of Pollyanny optimism and also of quietistic passivity in the face of evil. It is, the life-stance expressed by Albert Camus in *The Rebel*. An "enemy" to someone with a Sacred life-stance is a person whose actions must be resisted, but he is a *person* and, as such, is of infinite value; he must not be used or destroyed. There is always hope that the "enemy" will be transformed by love into a friend.

A *fifth characteristic* of the *Sacred* is its attitude of *loving identification* with the outsider, the stranger, the poor, the oppressed. Identification means a sense of common origin, nature, and destiny, which accepts personal and cultural differences.

In dialogue there is an upward spiral of growth and change so that each person becomes more aware of his own ideas and feelings as he expresses them in the receptive, accepting atmosphere provided by the other. Dialogue is the essence of any truly "helping relationship" in the view of Carl Rogers; it is the essence of any real human encounter in Buber's view. The antithesis of dialogue is *monologue* in which each person has a fixed message to send and the purpose is to have an effect on the receiver that is useful to the sender.

A *sixth characteristic* is non-attachment to Freud's Reality Principle (control and power) and the Pleasure Principle. Although able to use power effectively and to enjoy the aesthetic or sensual pleasures, the Sacred life-stance is not committed to either; it is not compulsively, neurotically driven for control or for pleasure. This is expressed in a simple life style that renounces status symbols or conspicuous consumption; it is formalized in religious vocations by explicit vows of "poverty", which means non-attachment to the I-It.

The Demonic and Profane Life-Stances

Martin Buber contends that evil is the I-It with no I-Thou to modify it, but he does not differentiate two basically different kinds of (I-It) life-stance, both of which lack the basic elements of the I-Thou, and are here called the Profane and the Demonic. The Demonic life-stance is the antithesis of the Sacred life-stance. In place of the existential trust and loving identification of the Sacred, the Demonic life-stance is characterized by existential distrust and fearful alienation from others and self, including hate of one's own perceived weaknesses and imperfections. Others are seem as actual or potential threats, and differences cannot be tolerated. There is no sense of oneness or community with others except in a defensive alliance against external threat. Instead of perceiving others and self as whole persons, as in the Sacred, the Demonic perceives social roles, stereotypes, and abstracted characteristics. Individuals are valued only as they are of present or potential use.

In place of the authentic dialogue of the Sacred, the Demonic is characterized by inauthenticity and monologue. Psychological defense mechanisms that distort the perception of reality are used to minimize the experience of fear and anxiety, to maximize pleasure and control, and to hide one's own true thoughts and feelings.

Instead of the Sacred's awareness of evil and resistance to it, the Demonic avoids awareness of evil within oneself or one's own social group and projects it onto the "enemy." Instead of resisting evil with love, it identifies evil with persons and seeks to control or destroy the "evil enemy." The Demonic perpetuates itself by attempting to *destroy* the enemy; in so doing, it strengthens fear and the Demonic within its own group and among the enemy group. In order to relieve its own neurotic anxiety and fear, the Demonic tends to equate power with goodness, and to equate lack of power with evil. It justifies itself by perceiving the Demonic as the natural and realistic, the Sacred

as unnatural and unrealistic.

In the Profane life-stance, the I-Thou is absent, and the person is committed to the pursuit of pleasure and of control/security (the I-It Subjective and Objective). But there is no constant and overwhelming thrust toward violence, based on fear, hate, and alienation. Conformity, manipulating the system, "getting by" are the life-style of the Profane, although it can imitate the Demonic when that is the dominant social norm. The Profane life-stance is the normal neurosis of urban industrial society, as well as of functional personality disorders considered mildly pathological. In Demonic social systems an individual's conformist Profane life-stance can easily shift toward the Demonic. The Profane life-stance is not committed to anything other than security and pleasure for self which is perceived as an isolated self or as a conformist member of a collective group. In this life-stance, each individual sees himself and others not as whole individuals, but merely as players of pre-determined social role scripts.

Conclusion

American education is closely integrated with the rest of American society, and like its other major institutions is increasingly technological, specialized, bureaucratic, centralized, and evaluated by one-dimensional efficiency. These are characteristics of the Profane life-stance. If the Sacred life-stance were the goal of American society, American education would be developing invery different directions. Martin Buber's I-Thou(Sacred) attitude provides an alternate goal for society and for education which cannot be achieved by educational methods that are only I-It (secular). Although whole persons, dialogue, community and loving identification are sometimes claimed as long-range educational goals, they are usually considered unpractical for concrete policies and the allocation of money. Only the I-It Objective-(science, technology, facts, and skills directly related to money and power structures)-is considered practical, real, and common-sensical by school boards and legislatures. Love, whole persons, dialogue, and authenticity are generally considered the realm of the religious relegated by educators to the churches.

Most churches in America commonly cooperate in this separation of the Sacred from the Secular, interpreting their theology and doctrine in ways that confine the Sacred to religious liturgy, and to man's relation to God, but separate it from the everyday, the mundane, the practical world of the I-It. They emphasize *belief* in a cognitive theology, acceptance of the *authority* of the church to interpret the theology, and *behavior* in conformity with the church's interpretation. However, unless the Sacred attitude supports conformity with the church's system of belief, authority, and behavior, it is not emphasized. Loving one's enemies; identifying with the poor and oppressed; non-attachment to affluence, status, and pleasure; reverence for all life and the biosphere - these manifestations of the Sacred, are considered by most schools and churches to be utopian, unrealistic, impractical, except for saints and during Church services. For Martin Buber on the other hand, and for Albert Camus, Thomas Merton, Maurice Friedman and all who are committed to the attitude of the Sacred (the I-Thou), it must be combined with and expressed through the secular, (the I-It). Neither the I-Thou nor the I-It can exist alone. The secular I-It world, devoid of loving identification and existential trust self-destructs in chaos and violence.

Buber's conception of the Sacred and the Secular and their relationship raises questions which, if faced with courage and integrity, might save American education and American society from the ecological, economic, political, and military catastrophes which every day involve more of the world. Among these questions are the following:

1. What are the conditions (economic, educational, political, etc.) that foster the *sacred* (love, trust, authentic community, dialogue) and what are those that foster the Demonic (hate, mistrust, social chaos, propaganda)?

2. Which of these conditions can I/we influence or control and what are their probable costs in terms of the I-It--affluence, power, pleasure, etc.?

3. What will be the costs in terms of self-destruction and world-destruction if the conditions fostering the Demonic are not checked--i.e., nuclear holocaust, economic collapse, military dictatorships, loss of human rights and political freedom, etc.?

4. How can the Sacred life-stance values of love, trust, authentic community, whole persons, and dialogue be fostered in a society where the explicit goals of the dominant social institutions are either Profane or Demonic?

Martin Buber has not proposed detailed plans for achieving the I-Thou (the Sacred) in individual lives or in societies, but he has described the characteristics of the Sacred attitude in a way that rings true for many people with different theological and metaphysical conceptions. For educators, he offers a vision of what the goals of education should be and the belief that the I-Thou (the Sacred) is not an unrealistic utopia, but a necessary here-and-now condition if humans are to live in harmony in the Secular (I-It) world.

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PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

A REVIEW OF RECENT CRITICISM OF KOHLBERG ET AL. ON THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF MORALITY

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Among the criticisms of the Kohlberg to be considered in this paper are those of MacIntyre, whose argument may be taken as typical of those which deny the possibility of "objective" morality; Flanagan, who argues from a relativist perspective; and Schweder, who emphasizes collective preference. This paper will synopsize and assess these arguments and attempt to determine the adequacy of Kohlberg's own treatment of them.

I.

Before turning to actual criticism of it, a few observations about the Kohlbergian schema may be helpful.

Kohlberg's psychology of moral development assumes that

1) Morality is best expressed in action.

2) Cognition, as judgment or reasoning is a necessary basis for moral activity.

These assumptions are not difficult to accept. It is possible to challenge them, but the explanatory power they present makes one resistant to doing so. In the first place, they admit that morality occurs in several domains and is multidimensional. This should provide a sufficient response to those who think that Kohlberg's theory is too narrow in its focus upon moral reasoning. Secondly, as a psychological theory, these assumptions allow assessment of morality as it occurs in several domains and is multidimensional. This should provide a sufficient response to those who think that Kohlberg's theory is too narrow in its focus upon moral reasoning. Secondly, as a psychological theory, these assumptions allow assessment of morality as it occurs within the social dynamics of the lived world. Although Kohlberg stresses a moral judgment based upon reason, he does consider the manifold of relations among such processes as moral emotions and acts.

Criticism has been levied by Fowles and Gilligan that the Moral Judgment Interview and Kohlberg's work in general tends not to pay enough attention to feelings. Kohlberg admittedly does stress a judgment based upon reason, in his developmental analysis of cognitive structures. However, the attention his theory has recently given to other components of moral action, such as moral emotions, illustrates Kohlberg's intention to look at the complete picture with respect to morality.

Likewise, the theory also avoids problems of stimulus-response theory types of explanations of morality. A behavioristic view of moral action posits a culturally-based set of behaviors that serve some system-maintenance function. These behaviors are then positively reinforced or elicited in the face of conflicting or opposing behavioral tendencies. Thus, moral action becomes the set of traits that "win-out."

The two critical flaws Kohlberg et al. see in behavioristic accounts of moral behavior involve their necessary entailment of a cultural or contextual relativity of moral action and the fact that learning theories approach morality as *habitual behavior*. These habits may be viewed as drive-reducing acts or occurring as the result of reinforcement schedules. Similarly, fields such as sociobiology view moral behavior as that which fulfills adaptive or functional needs. What determines the habitually repeated "moral" behaviors here are instinctual mechanisms which evolve to serve the survival needs of the organism. There is nothing to hold the basis for morality constant as moral behavior occurs--it depends upon

reinforcement, psychological set, reinforcement of drives, or the like. Furthermore, there is no basis upon which to compare or delineate common structures from society to society. The absence of a language of principles prevents this. Surely we may assume, as in the case of psychoanalysis, that a superego (or some cluster of volitional components) presents competing urgings within a personality. But it is more difficult to consider this mechanism or any other behavioristic schema able to explain moral reasoning structure, even if the *mechanisms* of behaviorism do exist in all people. They key on too many factors that are societally and culturally (environmentally) bound.

It could be argued, at this point that question-begging is occurring with respect to Kohlberg's theory, in that it assumes that moral reasoning develops universally before attempting to posit the behavioral manifestations. For example, the claim is made that there are 10 culturally universal norms which have correlates of appropriate behavior at each stage. Furthermore these norms are assumed to be related to principles such as justice or freedom, which are broadly the same. At the higher, more "principled" stages they guide reasoning and produce greater interpersonal consensus about what is just or right. Following Piaget's developmental model of stage-sequenced cognitive growth, these higher stages represent more integrated and adequate structures.

Probably the best argument weighing against the notion that universal moral development is an arbitrary notion are the empirical findings. Likewise, they support Kohlberg's claims that higher stages are qualitatively better stages because they include more considerations, and discriminate more effectively between what's morally right or wrong. In a *Human Development* monograph (1982), Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer cite a monograph of the Society for (1981) Research in Child Development written by Colby, Kohlberg et al. which summarizes the 20 year longitudinal data gathered on a sample of 53 American males. The empirical confirmation of Kohlberg's theory and stage assessment based upon Piagetian schema is conclusive:

> In only 4% of the cases of repeated testing was there downward stage movement, mainly half a stage and less than the 15% downward movement found in test-retest data. There was no stage-skipping in the longitudinal data in the 3-year intervals of testing. The structured whole assumption of the stage notion was supported by the findings of a single general factor in correlations across issues and dilemmas and by the fact that on the average 57% of an individual's thinking was at a single dominant stage and the remainder at an adjacent stage.
>
> Cross-cultural validation of the stage sequence and of stage consistency was found in a Turkish longitudinal sample by Nisan and Kohlberg (1982), and in an Israeli Schibbutz sample of males and females by Snarev Reimer and Kohlberg (1982).[1]

The empirical confirmation summarized above can go a long way in answering criticism, such as that of Owen Flanagan. In his reply,[2] Kohlberg restates the case for a Piagetian structural analysis of moral development based upon a stage concept. It keys upon three consistent conclusions of the longitudinal data.

First, moral reasoning tends to develop according to an invariant sequence. The movement is undirectional. There is either a progressive movement to higher stages or a resting at one stage. Secondly, stages are not skipped. The absence of stage-skipping in the longitudinal studies is consistent with the Piagetian notion of hierarchy. Accordingly, people tend to prefer the reasoning of the highest stage available to them over prior ones. Finally, moral reasoning at various stages tends to be consistent. This holds true for all responses to all dilemmas, and leads Kohlberg to conclude that some kind of "intrinsic moral sense" is present at all stages in the same sense that cognition occurs on each level

> A factor analysis of correlation in stage used on various dilemmas and issues indicated a single general 'moral development factor' analogous to the general 'intellectual functioning factor' found in tests of cognitive ability and reasoning.[3]

The above seriously weakens Flanagan's questioning of the comprehensiveness or legitimacy of stage-sequenced cognitive moral structures. Those who doubt the adequacy of such a model to justify itself (by claiming that stages are merely behavioral "trends" and so forth) need to address the scientific research that validates the above hypotheses.

An issue Flannagan more persuasively argues is the contextual relativist perspective with respect to female moral reasoning: He cites Carol Gilligan,[4] who posited a responsibility orientation in the making of moral judgments by females, which understands feminine morality as being more loving and caring-centered. Ostensively, this makes their morality appear determined by the situation, or field dependent. Kohlberg et al. in fact maintain that principle-guided reasoning can take into account idiosyncratic features of a situation. In regard to R.M. Hare's differentiation between a moral rule, whose pronouncements always apply to a *class* of actions and a principle which is "a way of perceiving and selecting moral components of a situation, a *specification* of the moral point of view,"[5] Kohlberg argues that principled reasoning can take the specific situation into account.

Even those who accept that principle-guided reasoning is the correct basis for moral thinking or that principles are the product of mature rational judgment question why kohlberg stresses *one* principle above the others. Since 1980, he has admitted an additional component in situations involving moral choice. This was Carol Gilligan's responsibility concept, which is a mediating factor between moral judgment and action. Aside from this infrastructural change Kohlberg has not ceased constructing dilemmas that "pull" for responses involving reasoning about justice (the dilemma is usually posed as a situation where claims to rights are in conflict with each other).

In light of Carol Gilligan's claims that our present conception of justice is sexist, one possible response by Kohlberg could have been to substitute or amend his principle of justice.

II

In summing *Philosophy of Moral Development*, Shweder cites three of Kohlberg's central claims, namely that consensus is possible among different moralities as to what is right; that moral thinking develops according to an invariant sequence; and that it is demonstrable that the latter stages are qualitatively better than earlier ones. As a result of this, any historical or cross-cultural consideration should reflect agreement regarding what constitutes moral development in those domains. The same is true for the emergence and growth of moral reasoning abilities in individuals. What these perspectives share is a common belief that what constitutes morality is defensible according to tenets of deductive logic.

Shweder then takes the position that Kohlberg's enterprise fails, and uses Alasdair MacIntyre's argument in *After Virtue* to justify it. MacIntyre's thesis is that a) historically, deliberation over what constitutes morality has *not* produced consensus, indicating the impossibility of forming shared agreements, and b) competing sets of ethical beliefs cannot be reconciled because there are no means comparatively to evaluate them. There are even problems with such global conceptions as maximizing happiness, or with Stage 5 thinking, which he calls "utility" and with Stage 6 thinking, which MacIntyre considers to key upon "human rights."

Schweder[6] asserts that there can be no objective morality. Instead, moral statements about what constitutes right and wrong behavior express "personal" or "collective" preference. He demurs Kohlberg's claim that moral claims are impersonal and behoove all rational people to act in the same manner. Schweder's conclusion is that there can be no rational foundation for moral behavior. The language or morality is thus the interaction of ideologies or what he calls "mock rationality."

It is strange that Schweder, after having expressed all this, concurs with Kohlberg's criticism of emotivism. Without elaboration, it is not altogether clear how he can accuse Stage 5 or 6 reasoning of expressing individual preference and

then agree with the theory's criticism of emotivist explanations of morality.

But Schweder's biggest problem occurs when moral concepts become rational and lose their specificity, or content and become "impersonal." He assumes they then can't apply to individual situations and require nonrational assumptions, in order for a decision-making process to be possible. At this point one becomes very curious about what Schweder means by *impersonal*. Kohlberg has no intention of divesting his formal concepts of justice of relevance to specific social realities. In fact, the cognitive developmental approach promotes a reconstruction of social reality in a way that can make it meaningful for the participants. It is true that the higher stages describe behavior that is increasingly morally adequate and about which there is more consensus among people *at* higher stages. But this does not entail that subscription to a formal concept of justice strips the situation of all content issues. As I reported above, Kohlberg follows R.M. Hare in treating a principle as something that guides choice in any situation.

People will, however, disagree about the facts of a real-life situation, as in the case where different religious beliefs define life in various ways. But the point remains that moral reasoning at higher stages tends to include more considerations and makes more discriminations between what's right and wrong. Whether these considerations are "nonrational assumptions" as Schweder calls them, I'll have to pass. He seems to dichotomize "formal" conceptions of principles (such as justice) and the way they are applied in real-life situations. Schweder concludes that this approach, therefore, doesn't speak to content issues. This criticism might be better directed toward structuralists.

I say this because, although, an interactionist approach such as Kohlberg's does distinguish between form or structure of moral cognition and content or substance (issues specific to the moral situation or dilemma), the two are not mutually exclusive. Schweder seems to be presuming they are when, after invoking MacIntyre's formulation of the principle of justice (which means, ultimately, "treat like cases alike, and different cases differently"),[7] he concludes that there is no rational way to determine what our actions toward individuals should be.

The reader will have to judge whether MacIntyre's rendition of the characteristics of a principle that can mediate competing claims of rights is satisfactory. To concur with MacIntyre, he will need to conclude that culture-bound values or values in general constitute a domain about which we can only speak in nonrational terms. He will also need to decide whether the constraints of rationalism are overly strict here.

Kohlberg et al. follow Rawls' in tracing the development of principles as a progressive process reaching toward "reflective equilibrium."[8] As Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1981) report, this implies that methods for judging are *applied* in moral situations and dilemmas. Our "know how" with respect to what to do in the situation arises when principles interact with possible courses of action:

> Where there is a discrepancy between the principle and our intuitions about the right action in the dilemma, we can either reformulate the principle or decide our moral intuition was in error. Whichever we decide, we move on to consider other cases being open to change until we reach a 'reflective equilibrium' between our principles and our moral intuitions about concrete cases.[9]

The authors further clarify the salient features of moral principles by noting the following: a) moral principles are developmental constructions b) they are not a priori axioms c) they don't obtain from inductions about prior experiences. These points entail that the theory can be neither maturationist (making moral growth the unfolding of a priori prepatterned stages) nor behavioristic (making moral growth a result of reinforcement schedules). Instead the view is constructivist--intellectual functioning develops when the cognitive structures (schemata) of the person adaps to and organizes the environment. These assumptions of Piagetian psychology are the underpinnings of cognitive moral development, and together with Rawls' theory of justice do present a rubric in which principles are structured and which guide in specific ways the individual's adaption to and organization of the environment.

Schweder might be better off if he could see the self-chosen principles that

guide behavior at the higher stages as *nonpersonal* instead of impersonal. I say this because a full understanding of the Piagetian basis of Kohlberg's theory shows the implicit relationship of the development of ethical principles to the growth and activity of the individual. *Nonpersonal* is perhaps a better descriptive, because as a cognitive moral development increases, individual perspectives are increasingly integrated. That is, there is more unanimity as to what makes laws and social agreements valid. Moreover, as rational belief in the validity of universal moral principles increases, personal commitment actually becomes greater in an upwardly-spiraling movement toward consensus.

The remainder of Schweder's review involves his questioning of the reliability of the Moral Judgment Interview's techniques of scoring verbal responses in children. He suggests that young children, for example, could conceivably know something about the categorical imperative yet lack the language skills necessary to articulate this.[10] This is completely impossible, since the logical operations inhibiting or prohibiting complex verbal operations are the same mechanisms *needed* for Stage 5 or 6 Kantian moral judgment. In holding to the basic tenets of the Piagetian notion of invariant functions, it is logically impossible for the same organism to think at one level and verbalize at another. The function of organization stipulates that the individual will systematize its various processes in a cohesive manner.[11] This holds true for both biological functions, which systemize to regulate functions (breathing, etc), and the psychological processes of the mind.

Thus, we would not expect a child with "normal" learning abilities to be inarticulate in describing cognitive reasoning abilities involving understanding justice as reversibility. As Kohlberg states

> Justice is a matter of distribution, involving the operations of equality and reciprocity. Distribution is by equality (equity, distributive equality proportionate to circumstances and need) or it is by reciprocity (merit or desert, reward in return for effort, virtue, or talent), and each higher stage redefines these operations in a more reversible way.[12]

The upshot of this is that if a Stage 5 or 6 definition of justice as reversibility were present, the logical operation of reversibility would need to be present, necessarily entailing the presence of structures of formal operations. This would enable the *expression* of this "ideal role taking" or "3rd person" perspective, in language.

Finally, a critical questioning of the validity of some of Piaget's stages, such as Schweder proposes, should not be used to directly undermine the validity of Kohlberg-type moral stages. It is possible to work within a common paradigm, yet to recognize that components of the overall theory are problematic, questionable or incorrect. Thomas Kuhn, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, has shown that a revising provess, in which theories undergo continuous alteration to fit the facts is a typical phenomenon. Theorists such as Copernicus and Newton revised their theories to keep their explanatory powers consistent with factual findings; yet were able to keep the basic paradigms of the theories intact.

Those who find it problematic that theories aren't always able to explain phenomena or who feel impelled to reject theories when factual findings seem to contradict their assumptions, may not have an adequate understanding of what a theory is. As Philip L. Smith points out in *The Problem of Values in Educational Thought*, a theory is "a set of related arguments, implicit or explicit, intended to rationally resolve the problems that arise in connection with the substance of that theory."[13] Thus, a theory is a structure in which credible arguments may be justified by various means. In this fashion "A theory provides the framework within which explanations are formulated and appraised, it is *not* itself an explanation."[14]

Kohlberg et al. are clear about both what they intend the theory to explain and their readiness to alter parts of the paradigm in light of findings that counterindicate it or point to its inadequacy.[15] The assumptions of Piagetian cognitive developmental theory have not reached a crisis point in terms of their credibility, and arguments that rest upon citing certain shortcomings with particular aspects or components of it are missing the point.

Something similar holds true with respect to Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of modern moral philosophy. The entire paradigm is challenged in this case. Specifically, MacIntyre claims that moral theories such as Kohlberg's can be traced back to an "Enlightenment Project," which was based upon an attempt to justify morality on the basis of reason, by thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Kant Diderot, Hume, Adam Smith. Their overall ethical arguments keyed on the use of reason to construct (deontological) rules and standards that were rationally defensible. MacIntyre's contention is that these efforts and successive ones have failed.[16] Their claims, he maintains, can be reduced to relativist or emotivist positions. Overall, their theory and methods suffer from lack of cohesion and of singularity of purpose.

One can rejoin, however, that the paradigm is anything but dead. For example, new-Kantian deontologies, such as Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* attest to this. Furthermore, as Kohlberg notes, there are both shared forms of reasoning and common acceptance of basic moral questions among thinkers.

> In this paradigm, basic assumptions are shared by modern psychology which harbors large areas of agreement about assumptions and method of argument despite diversity of theoretical viewpoint.[17]

The paradigm "works," insofar as Rawls, Peters, Hare and others have found it useful to them. Kohlberg is justified in pointing this out. Sweeping their scholarship away with charges of relativism and emotivism is too easy to do in a context where absolute justifications are impossible. There are always philosophical bones to pick. Likewise, sociology of knowledge (cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*) suggests that bases of knowledge represent interest claims that tend to compete for dominance. When behaviorists or social learning theorists criticize cognitive developmental or modern moral philosophy psychology by using blanket generalizations (i.e., "expresses collective preference"), one can't dismiss the possibility that the essential concern is to protect and aggrandize their own ideological and theoretical structures.

Kohlberg et al., of course, are not removed from the rhetoric and appeal to authority that characterize a promotion of their particular position and knowledge base. But they are able to be both explicit about their position and remain amenable to revision. Regarding the position, Kohlberg's orientation as a moral psychologist is "to create a theory which is a rational reconstruction of ontogenesis, drawing jointly on philosophy and psychological data."[18]

In the same passage he goes on to note Habermas' (1981) observation that value neutrality is impossible. Developmentalists need to posit end points in order to measure advancement toward them. These are not necessarily fixed or absolute and can be revised or extended when necessary.

This holds true in moral psychology, where some definition of what morality is must be stipulated. As this paper has shown, the positing of a morality involving principled judgment or reason is vulnerable to attack. It could very well turn out to be impossible to verify scientifically an objective morality based upon rationally defensible universal principles. However, faulting Kohlberg for attempting this could turn out to be a questionable enterprise. Having an ethos that regards relativism and emotivism as anathema has positive consequences. Relativism could make no guarantee that what happened in Nazi Germany could not reoccur. Emotivist or "preferential" types of treatments can tell us nothing about *why* some moral decisions are better than others, only that people tend to make them.

Kohlberg, on the other hand, is concerned with moral behavior as it takes place in the lived world *and* with establishing a universal moral form which unfolds developmentally. As he states in "From is to Ought," commiting one form of the naturalistic fallacy has merit. This involves the assumption that any conception of what moral development should be relies upon some conception of what it already is. In this way specific values or issues can be framed in terms of questions raised from actual public or private occurrences. Moral psychology, accordingly, does not become a pastime for armchair rationalists who enjoy pointing out that anything is subject to logical refutation or that ultimately there may be no grounds for moral claims and statements.

Admitting a characterization of morality as it actually is practiced by post-

conventional theorists, or people in general, helps to insure that the everyday context of morality is not left behind. When these specific values or issues are made explicit it is then possible to delineate the underlying principles and attempt to justify them. This procedure must presuppose a Kantian-type fact-value distinction. Reasoning in this manner entails acting or being in accordance with norms that hold for all people.

The paper has suggested that this approach both fits the psychological facts and offers a sound philosophic conception of morality. The criticism surveyed really has done very little to weaken Kohlberg's theory, when one takes into account that the paradigms for Piagetian developmental psychology and stage-sequenced moral development are alive and well. If these critics had a better psychological explanation for the data, their criticisms would be more justifiable.

NOTES

1. "A Response to Critics in the Light of the Recent Status of Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development." For *Human Development Monograph*. In press.

2. "A Reply to Owen Flanagan and Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange," *Ethics* (April 1982), pp. 513-528.

3. *Ethics*, p. 517.

4. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*.

5. *Ethics*, p. 520.

6. Richard Schweder, "Liberalism as Destiny," *Contemporary Psychology*, Vol. 27 No. 6 (1982), pp. 421-424.

7. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Ind., Notre Dame University Press, 1981), p. 179.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Cf. Dan Candee. "How to Interview," unpublished manuscript. Therein the point is made that probe questions are highly reliable means to determine the *complexity* of thought.

11. *Promoting Moral Growth: From Piaget to Kohlberg* (New York City and London: Longman, 1979) Richard Hersh, Diana Paolitto, Joseph Reimer, pp. 20-22.

12. "Justice as Reversibility," from *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, Pete Loslett and James Fishkin (eds) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 265.

13. Philip L. Smith, *The Problem of Values in Educational Thought* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1982), p. 11.

14. *Ibid.*

15. In the Philosophy of Moral Development: ". . .if the facts of development do not indicate that individuals move towards philosophically desired principles of justice, then the initial philosophic definition of the direction of development is in error and must be revised." p. 234, v. p. 227.

16. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 49-60.

17. Gerwith, Hare, and others also work within deontologic-utilitarian frameworks which grew out of the "Enlightenment Project."

18. Lawrence Kohlberg, Classroom Handout, "Letter to Dr. Foss," (ed., *Contemporary Phychology*), July 13, 1982, p. 3.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONFUSIONS IN AN 'OTHER' MORAL EDUCATION

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I. Introduction

In the field of moral education, philosophers of education have, in recent years, focused attention on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, Matthew Lipman, and Louis Raths and Sidney Simon. Little attention has been given to the use of children's fiction in moral education. Although the potential of this 'other' source of moral teaching has long been recognized by persons in language arts and related fields, there has been little critical dialogue between philosophers and those who would use children's fiction as moral education.

Moral education theorists and program developers have recognized the potential of children's fiction in general, but have ignored the existing body of children's literature. Lipman, for example, asserts:

> Only literature has shown the delicacy and flexibility needed to penetrate and communicate the many-layered multiplicity of human relationships. Consequently the improvement of moral judgment will require for its effectiveness the construction of a special body of literary works that will embody and display the modes of moral awareness, the nature of moral integrity, the techniques of moral inquiry and the alternative structures of ethical understanding.[1]

Thus while recognizing the potential of children's literature, Lipman ignores the body of such literature which already exists and suggests that a "special body of literary works" be created.

The potential of the material ignored by Lipman is recognized by teachers, librarians, and scholars in language arts. The following comment is illustrative:

> It has always been an assumption of authors, critics, teachers, and other adults interested in the development of children that *books have the power to shape and influence the attitudes, values, and behavior of readers.*[2]

This sort of recognition of the moral potential of children's literature is often *not* demonstrative of any philosophical sophistication. In the literature on language arts there seems to be little awareness of the theoretical choices which are available to those who would utilize children's books to engage in moral education.

There is, in short, a formidable gap between philosophers, on the one hand, and language arts scholars and practitioners, on the other. The absence of intellectual dialogue has led to philosophical confusions and misapplications of children's fiction to moral education. In this paper, I will attempt to clear up some of these misunderstandings and to begin the philosophical dialogue needed for reducing this gap.

II. Children's Fiction As Stimulus Material

Language arts specialists are consistent in their view that children's literature can be used for moral education. A typical statement is that:

> Literature can play an important role in helping students grow in moral judgment if it [is] selected carefully and taught in a skillful manner; however, if literature is studied as a body of knowledge or treated as a reading exercise, it can offer little help in meeting life's problems. Students need help in ways of reading literary works

> with attention given to the moral dimension. Literature can be taught in a manner that will stimulate judgment without destroying the pleasures made possible through literary encounters.[3]

The premise that children's fiction is a ripe medium for moral discussion and for the improvement of moral decision-making is continually reiterated in the literature on language arts.

Critics of children's literature recognize that children's books can serve a variety of purposes, one of which is certainly moral education. For example, Hughes Moir notes:

> Authors of children's book might well respond with a mixture of concern for a book that will be a financial success, one that is of literary merit, and/or a book that honestly explores social or individual problems/issues. It is noteworthy that, in general, successful authors create books that have all these characteristics.[4]

Another critic, Cornelia Meigs, explains more fully the necessity of moral content in the "good" children's book:

> ...the fundamental questions of human life; good and bad; right and wrong; the recognition of true as opposed to ephemeral values. These are questions that are universally important. They are themes found in all great literature. To find them treated in this microscopic way does not lessen their importance; perhaps it even clarifies them and brings them into perspective.[5]

Statements such as these serve to encourage the use of existing children's fiction as a vehicle for moral education.

The use of children's books for moral education is far from being a mere contemporary fad. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century,

> ...almost all books had either a religious or moral content---and frequently both. Every aspect of the didactic output for children could be comprehended in those two words; even when the ostensible subject was geography, or history, or grammar, the text could be made to serve the purpose of the religious or moral educator.[6]

For instance, one need only skim through the most widely circulated series of books in the public schools from 1836 to 1920. Almost every story or poem in the McGuffey Eclectic Readers[7] contains specific moral lessons. This approach to children's literature changes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Sermonizing gave way to entertaining storytelling. Children's literature became basically "a pleasure ground"[8] rather than primarily, or at least in large part, a means of moral learning. For our purposes here, it does not matter what caused this change in focus from moral sermonizing to entertainment and pleasure. What *is* important is that while authors did begin to avoid moral *preaching*, they did not, and could not, avoid moral *content*. As one contemporary critic puts it:

> Though we may want to believe that these didactic themes and characteristics are no longer with us today in children's books---that the desire to shape conforming, "morally upright" future citizens is of another age or generation---such is not the case. "...the urge to instruct the young is deeply built into human nature. And if one looks at the 'quality' children's books of today...it is hard to avoid the conclusion that didacticism is still very much alive...Years ago we threw old didacticism (dowdy morality) out of the window; it has come back in at the door wearing a modern dress (smart values) and we do not even recognize it."[9]

The claim seems to be that although moral content may be less explicit in modern works, it is nonetheless present.

From these representative claims we can observe that language arts specialists

believe children's fiction contains moral content. We also observe that when discussion of children's literature and "moral education," "moral development," and so on, commence, that no inkling is provided as to what theory, program, or goals of moral development or moral education theory they have in mind.

Children's fiction does not necessarily morally educate, but it does *portray* the morality inherent in human relationships. Whether students acquire moral awareness from the reading of fiction will depend in part on what the teacher does with the literature, and the good teacher needs to select carefully from the literature available, for not every children's book facilitates moral learning equally well.

What emerges here are two important variables. First, there are the books themselves; their content and therefore both their implicit and explicit portrayals of morality. And second, there is the question of the goals of moral learning. That is, what *should* children learn from reading the fiction? And, more fundamentally, what does it mean for children to develop morally? What are the goals toward which the program strives?

> There are, then, examples of good as well as bad moral decision-making in children's literature. Children like to be entertained. Either there should be books written with realistic moral development in mind, or more careful selection of available material should be practiced so that children can be helped to grow morally. There are plenty of good books available, but they are placed too haphazardly into the hands of children...[10]

This would appear to be correct. Even a cursory examination of the literature reveals that children's books do contain myriad issues focusing upon moral concerns. Book characters live and discuss such issues as decision-making, fairness, honesty, justice, perception of rules, authority, and growing up. Yet not all books treat these issues similarly. Some books will obviously serve certain goals with more facility than others. With careful selection, books which serve identified moral goals better than others can be chosen . Unfortunately, this sifting process has not been thorough, and, more importantly, the goals for which the books are chosen are generally not made explicit. Thus, the particular use which this literature might have for moral education is confusing, and its application as a vehicle for moral education has been restricted.

III. Language Arts Specialists' Confusions

We have seen above that the literature of language arts receognizes the potential of the literary mode for moral education. The "moral education language" in this literature today appears to be basically Piagetian-Kohlbergian. For example, Perine comments that:

> If teachers are to involve students in literary works in a manner that will stimulate moral judgment, they must focus on processes that will aid boys and girls in experiencing and responding to the literature.[11]

Even more explicitly, Moir asserts:

> If we agree that moral development can be assisted and promoted through reading literature, and if we agree that teachers indeed wish to consciously plan activities and use materials that stimulate individuals to higher stages of moral reasoning, then using books to meet this purpose will require teachers to adopt additional criteria by which books are identified, and to plan new instructional activities that will promote effective use of appropriate literature.[12]

Further,

> Simply stuffing more and more virtues into ones personality bag is not a sufficient approach. It is more important to help people make reasoned choices that are consistent with their psychological/cognitive capacities at that point in their development.[13]

These scholars fail to recognize that they themselves accept, without question, a theoretical bias. They endorse the view that moral education is an activity aimed at encouraging moral development. This may be the result of the pervasive influence of Piagetian theory on the whole of early and middle childhood education.

In any case, the contemporary literature of language arts often seems to equate moral education with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. This is reflected in the numerous content analyses which have been conducted recently which relate Kohlberg's theoretical stages of moral judgment to popular children's fiction characters,[14] as well as in the absence of scholarly literature in language arts journals on non-Kohlbergian approaches to moral education. Whether this absence of literature on other approaches to, and conceptions of, moral education is intentional is unclear. My suspicion is that the omission is not an intentional one, since were it intentional there would probably be some sort of literature concerned with dismissing competing moral education programs.

If we turn to teachers' reports of their use of existing children's fiction and Kohlberg's model, we find that use centers on two ways of using the literature. The first focuses upon the fiction itself:

> Perhaps a child would be a "happier reader" when reading fiction when the moral reasoning of a protagonist was similar or one stage in advance of his/her production stage of moral reasoning. Prior to investigating this hypothesis, however, it is crucial to determine whether judgments of the protagonists' moral reasoning could be rendered in a reliable fashion.[15]

Thus, children's fiction is examined in order to identify the "moral stages" of the main characters. Readers are then to be matched with books which have characters at the appropriate moral stage. It is, of course, highly questionable whether appropriate labeling will be made---a point which will be discussed in more detail later.

The second use to which Kohlberg's model has been put is aimed at the reader and the classroom discussion:

> Children's literature is a rich source of examples of moral decisions for children to discuss in a relatively safe and nonthreatening environment. Teachers can use Kohlberg's stages and issues of moral development as a basis for discussing the moral decisions made by story characters. By examining these decisions through teacher questioning, children become more aware of moral thinking and can be encouraged to progress to higher stages. Moral thoughts are, after all, still thoughts and must be developed by interaction with moral dilemmas.[16]

In this case, no clear attempt is made to match reader and fictional character, but rather an effort is made to use the moral dilemmas in fiction as material for classroom discussion. Kohlberg's approach lends itself to both of these approaches.

Let us assume that Kohlberg's theory is justifiably chosen by language arts specialists as the best among the competing approaches to moral education. Even if this were the case (which seems doubtful),[17] it is clear that language arts scholars have dangerously misunderstood Kohlberg. Let us examine two passages from the language arts literature.

> It has been noted in actual practice (Gosa 1977) that children prior to ages 10-12 are rarely capable of Stage VI decision-making and discussions or well meaning stories that ignore this are meaningless for character development. However, for grades 5-7, decisions at any of Kohlberg's stages seem appropriate and higher level dilemmas are desirable.[18]

and:

> Children entering school are, in general, at the Pre-conventional level (Stages 1 and 2). The transition to conventional morality (Stages 3 and 4) tends to occur between the ages of ten to thirteen

> or grades 5-7. The transition from conventional morality to principled thinking (Stages 5 and 6) can occur during late adolescence, or grades 11-12 and into early college.[19]

Now, to what extent are these applications of Kohlbergian theory reasonable ones? For years Kohlberg has been claiming that movement into the principled level is not an inevitable development. Most Americans, he claims, "peak-out" at stage four.[20] Also, Kohlberg would not agree that movement to stage five occurs as early as grades 5-7, or indeed that movement to stage six will occur at all. Kohlberg claims only to have identified a handful of stage six reasoners in all of his many years of research.[21] In short, the quoted material suggests that there has been, by at least some language arts scholars, a serious misunderstanding of Kohlberg's view.

Given the Kohlbergian theoretical framework, much of children's fiction would not in fact be helpful for moral education. As language arts writers have themselves pointed out, much of children's literature has characters and dilemmas which exhibit either very high or very low stage portrayals.[22] Given the cognitive-developmental model, such fiction would not be morally instructive, for the "stage" of the characters would not appeal to most readers.

There seem to be, then, two major confusions in the language arts literature on moral education. First, there is little or no awareness of alternatives to the Piagetian-Kohlbergian model of moral development, and, second, the Kohlbergian model has been misinterpreted, and this misinterpretation has led to a use of children's fiction which is incompatible with the Kohlbergian approach. Let us now turn to an analysis of philosophers' confusions.

IV. Philosophers' Confusions

In contrast with the language arts specialists, it is not an easy matter to identify the source of confusion among philosophers about the use of children's fiction for moral education. In one way or another, all of the various contemporary approaches to moral education, either implicitly or explicitly, accept the view that literature can be useful in moral education. Kohlberg has invented fictional dilemma after dilemma to further the application of his theory. The "Philosophy for Children" program is entirely carried on through the medium of the fictional philosophical novel. Values Clarification advocates would not oppose the use of fiction as a means through which values and the valuing process might be explored. Even a Deweyan-oriented moral education program would use fiction as a means of addressing moral problems in the classroom. There appears to be, then, no question that fiction can be used for moral education. Yet theorists have paid little attention to some important questions regarding such use.

Moral education theorists have been engaged primarily in developing curricular materials which serve to further the goals of their respective theories. This is understandable. However, since philosophers have virtually ignored this existing body of literature, they have given those who would engage in the practice of moral education little guidance about the use of this literature in moral education programs. More specifically, there has been no attempt to show how existing children's fiction might be used consistently within the various theoretical approaches.

A second failure of philosophers is that they have not succeeded in acquainting language arts practitioners with the differing theoretical designs of moral education. (It could be argued, of course, that the responsibility lies with the language arts personnel to make themselves informed, but it seems to me that this interchange must be two-way. Moral education theorists have the responsibility to address these groups in particular.) This failure of philosophers to communicate with language arts scholars is also reflected in the fact that philosophers have not responded to the wealth of language arts literature on the role of this field in moral education. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that most philosophers of education are even aware of the existence of such literature.

My argument is not that philosophers are confused or misled concerning the potential benefits of using fiction in moral education, but rather, that they are misguided in their lack of attention to children's fiction and its positive or negative value for various theories.

V. Practical Realities and Recommendations

More and more, schools are being asked to engage in moral education. Both philosophers and language arts specialists recognize this. The problem lies in how moral education may be integrated into classroom practice. Teachers often believe that the curriculum is already overcrowded, and that adding more courses and more material creates, rather than solves, problems. This may be one reason why language arts personnel have turned so readily to children's fiction, which is already used for other purposes, as a vehicle for moral education. To the extent that moral education can be successfully integrated into the existing curriculum by using materials already employed, a major obstacle to moral education is overcome.

Existing children's literature, is filled with potential for allowing any theory of moral education to be put into practice. That *any* theory of moral education can make use of children's fiction is potentially both good news and bad. Moral educators need to recognize these dangers and potentials. Moral education theorists have been ignoring the body of children's fiction for too long. Those developing moral education programs should recognize that children's literature is a viable means to integrate moral education into existing curricula. If reasonable integration is to take place, there must be increased dialogue between moral education theorists and language arts specialists.

V. Conclusion

It has been my purpose here first, to introduce the 'other' moral education---children's fiction. Second, I have endeavored to outline some fundamental confusions about moral education existing between moral education theorists and language arts specialists. It is my hope that this initial investigation will encourage others to join this much needed area of critical appraisal. I firmly believe that if children's fiction is to be used as material for moral education in a reasonable fashion, language arts specialists and moral education theorists need to work to inform one another about the facts and fancies of their respective areas of expertise.

NOTES

1. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, "Can Moral Education Be Divorced From Philosophical Education?," *Growing Up With Philosophy* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 368. Without argument, Lipman and Sharp have endorsed a particular philosophical position regarding the value and utility of educating morally through literature. This implicit and necessary assumption could be questioned as has been done by many scholars within the field of aesthetic education. However, it is not my desire to examine such philosophical underpinnings. Rather, my concern is to explore a separate issue; one which is of interest not only to the philosopher or theoretician but to the practitioner as well.

2. Hughes Moir, "If We've Always Had Books That Taught All These Virtues, Why Is Our Society In Such Lousy Shape?," *Language Arts* 54,5 (May 1977), 522.

3. Maxine H. Perine, "Growth in Moral Judgment Through Reading Selected Literature" *Delta Kappa Gamma Bulletin* (Fall 1978): 13.

4. Moir, "If We've Always Had Books That Taught All These Virtues...," p. 523.

5. Cornelia Meigs *et al.*, *A Critical History of Children's Literature* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. 467.

6. Joyce Irene Whalley, *Cobwebs to Catchflies* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1975), p. 65.

7. Stanley Lindberg, *The Annotated McGuffey* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1976). See this work both for discussion of the individual selections and for documentation of the Eclectic Readers' influence.

8. Meigs, *A Critical History of Children's Literature*, p. 257.

9. Moir, "If We've Always Had Books That Taught All These Virtues...,: p. 524. Quotations within this quote are from J. R. Townsend, "Didacticism in Modern Dress" *Only Connect*, edited by Egoff, Stubbs, and Ashley, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 33-34.

10. Cheryl Gosa, "Moral Development in Current Fiction for Children and Young Adults" *Language Arts* 54, 5 (May 1977), pp. 535-536.

11. Perine, "Growth in Moral Judgment Through Reading," pp. 13-14.

12. Moir, "If We've Always Had Books That Taught All These Virtues...," p. 526.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 524-525.

14. See for example, Bernard A. Rihn, "Kohlberg level of moral reasoning of protagonists in Newbery Award winning fiction" *Reading Research Quarterly* 15, 3 (1980).

15. Perine, "Growth in Moral Judgment Through Reading," p. 13.

16. Kenneth Hoskisson and Donald S. Biskin, "Analyzing and discussing children's literature using Kohlberg's stages of moral development" *The Reading Teacher* (November 1979): 146.

17. See, for example, Brenda Munsey, ed., *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg* (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1980).

18. Jane W. Shackford, "Dealing with Dr. Doolittle: A New Approach to the '-isms'," *Language Arts* 55, 2 (February 1978), p. 183.

19. Gosa, "Moral Development in Current Fiction," p. 526.

20. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education" *Phi Delta Kappan* 56, 10 (June 1975), p. 674.

21. "Empirical research between 1968 and 1976 did not confirm my theoretical statements about a sixth and highest stage." (Lawrence Kohlberg, "Meaning and Measurement in Moral Development," *Heinz Werner Memorial Lecture* (Worcester, MA: Clark University Press, 1979.) "My longitudinal subjects, still adolescents in 1968, had come to adulthood by 1976, but none had reached the sixth state." (Lawrence Kohlberg, "Educating for a Just Society: An Updated and Revised Statement," in Munsey *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*, p. 457.)

22. For a number of related comments on this subject, see for example, Gosa, "Moral Development in Current Fiction for Children and Young Adults," Rihn, "Kohlberg level of moral reasoning of protagonists in Newbery Award winning fiction," or Shackford, "Dealing with Dr. Doolittle: A New Approach to the '-isms'."

DID SOCRATES BASICALLY KNOW THEAETETUS?
AN ANALYSIS OF A THEORY OF QUALITATIVE KNOWING

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George S. Maccia is one of the few philosophers of education to advance beyond ordinary epistemology into the arena of pedagogical epistemology. In his theory of knowledge, knowing is subdivided into qualitative, quantitative, and performative types. Roughly, qualitative knowledge is basic knowledge of a thing as a unique entity. Quantitative knowledge is nonbasic knowledge of a thing as an instance of a class of things, and performative knowledge is non-propositional procedural knowing. In this paper I will critically analyze Maccia's explication of the category of qualitative knowledge.

Professor Maccia accepts Lehrer and Paxson's definitions of basic and nonbasic knowing and defines qualitative knowledge as basic knowing--true belief that is completely justified and which justification does not depend on any other statement or belief.[1] Since justification depends on no other beliefs, no justificatory argument is needed. In fact, a justificatory argument would be superfluous because the truth of qualitative knowledge is manifested through the outcomes of acting on the basic beliefs.[2]

The objects of qualitative knowledge are unique entities -- namely, indefinabel, nonclassifiable, nonquantitiable persons, things, or universals.[3] It is because a unique entity exemplifies qualities and the qualities of an entity distinguish the entity as unique that Maccia calls basic knowledge, qualitative knowledge.[4]

Qualitative knowing is subdivided into three categories: recognitive, acquaintive and appreciative knowing. Recognitive knowing is the most basic knowing, because it serves as a necessary condition for acquaintive knowledge, which is a necessary condition for appreciative knowledge. This fact is seen more clearly in the tutorial conditions of qualitative knowing.

T know that *X* recognizes that *Q iff*

1. *X* believes that *Q*
2. *X* is completely justified in believing that *Q*
3. No other statement or belief justifies *X*'s belief
4. *X* selects *Q* from *not-Q* and *not-Q* from *Q*
5. *T* knows that conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold
6. and *Q* is a state of affairs

T knows that *X* is acquainted with *Q iff*

1. *X* believes that *Q*
2. *X* recognizes that *Q*
3. *X* is familiar with *Q* such that *X* selects elements $q_i \ldots q_j$ determinate of *q*; and relations $r_i \ldots r_j$ determinate of *q*
4. *T* knows that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold
5. and *Q* is a state of affairs

T knows that X appreciates that *Q iff*

1. X believes that *Q*
2. X is acquainted with *Q*
3. X selects the elements $q_i \ldots q_j$ appropriate of *Q*, and the relations $r_i \ldots r_j$ appropriate of *Q*
4. *T* knows that conditions 1, 2, and 3 hold
5. and *Q* is a state of affairs.[5]

In this paper I will attempt the following: to demonstrate that Maccia equivocates on the designation of *Q*, the epistemic object; to argue that Maccia's category of qualitative knowledge is a nonbasic form of knowledge; and to show

that Maccia fails to explicate the logical conditions for a teacher to know that a student qualitatively knows a state of affairs.

Analysis Of Q's Designation

Maccia writes that qualitative judgment can be employed with things, persons, or universals; however, in his conditions for qualitative knowledge, *Q* is a state of affairs.[6] Either Maccia is suggesting that things are states of affairs, that one can express qualitative knowledge of things in terms of states of affairs, or he is inconsistent.

Things are not states of affairs. Things are basic entities that either exist or do not exist and are designated by names. States of affairs are situations, complex entities, or "objects infected with syntax" that either obtain or do not obtain.[7] They are designated by propositions; namely, that - clauses or sentential gerundives.[8] Ontologically, states of affairs consist of things with properties and of relations; thus, states of affairs are structures of things in relation to each other.[9]

It is counterintuitive to suggest that we recognize states of affairs but not things; therefore, I will consider the possibilities of *Q* being a thing and of *Q* being a state of affairs. Let us consider the examples of Socrates recognizing, being acquainted with and appreciating Theaetetus. Let us also consider the instances where *Q* is represented by one of the following: '(the) person in front of Socrates', 'Theaetetus', and 'the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus', and 'the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus'.

If *Q* is 'the person in front of Socrates', then conditions 1 and 2 for recognition lack sense in the context under consideration. Condition 1 becomes, "Socrates believes that the person in front of Socrates", and condition 2, "Socrates is completely justified in believing that the person in front of Socrates."

If *Q* is 'Theaetetus', conditions 1 and 2 still lack sense for the context. What does it mean to say that Socrates believes that Theaetetus or that Socrates is completely justified in believing that Theaetetus? I think that in recognition Maccia intends for *Q* to be 'the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus', or some other statement expressing an identity relation. This renders conditions 1 and 2 meaningful, but if this designation for *Q* is substituted in the conditions for acquaintance, one is left with the nonsensical statement that Socrates is acquainted with the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus.

It could be that in acquaintance Maccia would designate *Q* to be 'person in front of Socrates', or 'Theaetetus', but then one would encounter a problem with condition 1 of acquaintance. It would read that Socrates believes that the person in front of Socrates, when clearly what is meant is that Socrates believes that the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus. Similar problems arise when one attempts to substitute for *Q* in the conditions for appreciation.

The uncertainty about the designation for *Q* may stem from the uncertainty about the function of the work 'that' in Maccia's epistemic conditions. In the conditions, either 'that' acts as a relative pronoun introducing an adjectival clause, or serves as an expletive introducing a nominal clause. *Q*'s designation depends on the function of 'that'.

Consider again the conditions for recognition. In "*X* recognizes that *Q*", it is unclear whether 'that' is being used as a relative pronoun, in which case *Q* becomes 'person in front of Socrates', or whether 'that' serves as an expletive, rendering *Q* 'the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus'. Condition 1 of recognition, acquaintance, and appreciation only makes sense if 'that' functions as an expletive. In other words, in our example, the only use of 'that' which makes sense in the context is seen in the statement, "Socrates believes that the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus." It cannot function as a relative pronoun because we are not concerned with whether Socrates believes something that Theaetetus says to Socrates.

In order for Maccia's theory to be consistent, *Q*'s designation must remain

constant throughout the conditions for qualitative knowledge. In order for Q's designation to remain constant, 'that' must function consistently; however, if we consider the following four statements from Maccia's theory it becomes clear that Q's designation cannot remain constant.

A. X recognizes that Q
B. X is acquainted with that Q
C. X appreciates that Q
D. X believes that Q

It has already been established that in D, 'that' must function as an expletive in order for our example to make sense. If 'that' serves the same function in A and C, no problem arises, although the sense of recognition and appreciation are probably not exactly what Maccia intends. A problem occurs when 'that' serves the same function in B. In our example, the resultant statement is, "Socrates is acquainted with that the person in front of Socrates is Theaetetus" (the problems arising when Q is 'the person in front of Socrates' have already been noted). Even if the extraneous 'the' is removed, the statement is problematical. It is clear that in B Maccia intends for 'that' to serve as a relative pronoun. But, if Maccia intends for 'that' to function as a relative pronoun throughout the conditions, then D must be reformulated. The reformulation might take the following form: X believes that Q is A. This condition must accompany a truth condition; namely, Q is A. The reformulation expresses the fact that X recognizes Q only if X has knowledge level justification for X's belief about the identity relation of Q to A.

Before proceeding to the next major point, I would like to examine, in more detail, condition 3 of acquaintance (and appreciation). The condition states that in order to be acquainted with a state of affairs one must be able to select the elements and relations constitutive of the state of affairs. It seems to me that selecting the constitutive elements and relations presupposes knowledge of the constitutive parts. What kind of knowledge could this be? According to Maccia's theory it must be qualitative, quantitative or performative. Clearly, Maccia isn't limiting it to performative knowledge. Consequently, one must either have qualitative or quantitative knowledge of constitutive parts. Maccia is engaged in a contradiction with either option.

If one has qualitative knowledge of the constitutive parts, then Maccia implies that one has qualitative knowledge of relations; however, Maccia limited qualitative knowledge to states of affairs and relations are not states of affairs. On the other hand, if one necessarily has quantitative knowledge of the constitutive parts, then quantitative knowledge becomes a necessary condition for qualitative knowledge, rendering qualitative knowledge a nonbasic form of knowledge at the acquaintance and appreciation level.

Recognition as a Nonbasic Form of Knowledge

Maccia's instances of basic knowledge, including Socrates recognizing Theaetetus, are in fact instances of nonbasic knowledge. I am not suggesting that there are no noninferential knowings. Several contemporary epistemologists; e.g., foundationalists and causal theorists believe that there are basic knowings. For example, Roderick Chisholm believes that there are self-presenting states of affairs; however, contrary to Maccia he does not believe that states of the external world are self-presenting.[10] Alvin Goldman believes that there are noninferential perceptual knowings, but he rejects that propositions about the external world are self-warranting.[11] Panayot Butchvarov distinguishes statements expressing knowledge of bodies (body-statements) from statements expressing knowledge about perceivings (perceptual-statements). He claims that body-statements do not express primary knowledge because they are not self-evidently true.[12] Maccia, on the other hand, believes that states of the external world are self-presenting, self-warranting, or at least directly evident.

Maccia's description of recognition resembles Chisholm's account of self-presentation. Chisholm defines self-presentation as follows:

> h is self-presenting for S at t $=_{df}$ h occurs at t; and necessarily if h occurs at t, then h is evident for S at t.[13]

If one substitutes 'recognized by' for 'self-presenting for' in the definition,

one obtains a definition of recognition similar to Maccia's account. Someone might object that Maccia does not suggest that *necessarily* if h occurs at t, then h is evident for S at t. Nevertheless, even if one holds that equating recognition with self-presentation is too strong, one must at least say that in recognition h is directly evident for S at t. This must be the case, because Maccia says that justification is superfluous in recognition. Justification is superfluous only if the state of affairs is self-presenting or directly evident.

If anything is directly evident to S in recognition, it is not that h (is A), but that for S it seems to S that (is A). In our example, what might be directly evident to Socrates is that it seems to him that he sees Theaetetus in front of him or that he is believing that the person in front of him is Theaetetus. It is not directly evident to Socrates *that* the person in front of him is Theaetetus. It might even seem to Socrates that he know that the person in front of him is Theaetetus, but the fact that the person is Theaetetus is not directly evident. Seeming and seeming to know differ from knowing. One must have evidence and be justified to move from what is directly evident to knowing that what appears to be is true.

If Socrates were to say, "I see Theaetetus walking in the garden.", Theodorus might meaningfully respond, "How do you know that it is Theaetetus?" Theodorus would not be asking Socrates for a justification for what Socrates perceives. Instead, Theodorus would be asking Socrates to justify his belief about what he perceives. An acceptable response would not be that it is obvious that the person is Theaetetus. Theodorus could ask how it is obvious. To this question Socrates would most likely appeal to other beliefs expressed in nonperceptual statements as justification for his belief that he sees Theaetetus. Such justificatory statements are as follows:

I know that Theaetetus is always neatly attired.
I know that Theaetetus usually walks here at this time of day.
I know that Theaetetus is of medium height and weight.
I know that Theaetetus has an aquiline nose, dark eyes and olive skin, etc., etc.

In other words, whereas perceptions need no justification, beliefs about perceptions do require justification if they are to have knowledge level status.[14] If Maccia's category of recognition includes instances of perceptual knowing, and it apparently does, then at least some statements of recognition must be justified by other independent nonperceptual statements. Consequently, Maccia's category of qualitative knowledge includes instances of nonbasic knowing.

One possible source of confusion is that occasions of recognition occur so quickly that it seems as though no other beliefs are appealed to for justification As Keith Lehrer suggests, we are so caught in a web of beliefs that some beliefs are not apparently, but are indeed operative.[15] For example, beliefs about the reliability of our senses in particular environmental contexts are operative in recognition although psychologically these beliefs may not be apparent.[16]

Another possible source of confusion is the conflation of recognition and perception. If one collapses recognition and perception, then either both are inferential or both are noninferential. Since perception is apparently noninferential, Maccia defines recognition as noninferential. It is more adequate to distinguish recognition and perception. This permits one to hold that perception is noninferential whereas recognition is the state of knowing resulting when a sound inference is made upon that which is given in perception.

The Adequacy of Maccia's Tutorial Conditions

Maccia's conditions for T to know that X recognizes that Q, or a teacher to know that a student recognizes a state of affairs, can be divided into two categories; namely, the conditions necessary for the student to recognize that state of affairs and the conditions necessary for the teacher having such knowledge about the student. Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 6 are held to be necessary conditions for the student recognizing that state of affairs. If condition 4 is a truth condition, it is also necessary for recognition.

But, what does Maccia really say about the conditions for the teacher to know that the student recognizes that state of affairs? Certainly, the student

must recognize that state of affairs. Thus, conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 act as truth conditions for the teacher's knowledge. In addition to these conditions all Maccia says is that the teacher knows that conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. In other words, all that Maccia has said is that a teacher knows that a student recognizes a unique state of affairs if and only if the student recognizes that state of affairs and the teacher knows that the student does. This is true but trivial. Maccia does not explicate the necessary conditions for the teacher to know is required if Maccia's epistemological theory is to count as a pedagogical epistimology.

I believe that even if Maccia's conditions for X recognizing Q were adequate his conditions for T to know that X recognizes Q are too stringent. In order for a teacher to know that a student recognizes Q, Maccia requires the teacher to know whether a student holds a belief that is completely justified in such a way that the student is not justified by any other statement or belief. Not only does Maccia require a teacher to know whether a student holds a completely justified belief, he requires the teacher to know whether the student is justified by any other statement or belief.

In essence, Maccia requires the teacher to leap beyond the student's behavior to grasp the student's actual thought processes. The teacher must be able to determine whether a student even fleetingly supports his/her belief with other beliefs. Clearly, such knowledge is impossible for anyone short of a mind reader. Consequently, a teacher can never know whether a student truly has knowledge. Thus I believe that Maccia's conditions need to be restated. One might begin by saying that T justifiably believes that X recognizes Q *iff*. The conditions following this phrase should be stated in behavioral terms avaoiding unobservable mental processes.

Conclusion

I have attempted to demonstrate the inadequacy of Maccia's explication of the category of qualitative knowledge in his pedagogical epistemology. First, I tried to show that there is an equivocation on the designation for the epistemic object, Q. Second, I argued that contrary to Maccia's assertion that qualitative knowledge is basic knowledge, his theory includes instances of nonbasic knowing. Finally, I pointed out that Maccia fails to explicate the necessary and sufficient conditions for a teacher to know that a student has qualitative knowledge of some state of affairs.

NOTES

1. G. S. Maccia, "Epistemological Considerations of Educational Objectives," paper presented at The Philosophy of Education Section, XV World Conference of Philosophy, Varna, Bulgaria, September 1973, p. 2.

2. Ibid., and G. S. Maccia, "Education for Humanity," paper presented at the Symposium of Education, Philosophical Society, SUNY at Fredonia, New York, October 21-22, 1977, p. 4.

3. Maccia, "Education for Humanity", p. 2, 4.

4. Maccia, "Epistemological Considerations", p. 2.

5. G. S. Maccia, "Tutorial Conditions of Qualitative Knowing," class handout in H650, Theory of Knowledge and Educational Process, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, Spring term, 1979-1980.

6. Maccia, "Education for Humanity", p. 4.

7. Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 31.

8. Roderick Chisholdm, "Defining Intrinsic Value," Analysis (March 1981: 99.

9. Gustav Bergmann, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 3-5. Also Jon Barwise and John Perry, "Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume VI: The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, eds. Peter French, Theodore Uehling and Howard Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 388.

10. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 20.

11. Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, eds. George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 143.

12. Panayot Butchvarov, The Concept of Knowledge (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 201-203.

13. Chisholm, Knowledge, p. 22.

14. Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 56.

15. Keith Kehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 188.

16. Timo Airaksinen, "Five Types of Knowledge," American Philosophical Quarterly (October 1978): 264.

REASONING OR EVIDENCE: WHAT DOES ONE POSSESS?

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Epistemology and education share an intimate relationship, since both deal with knowledge in one form or another: the former deals with various conceptual problems concerning just what is to count as 'knowledge', and the latter is concerned with the transmission of knowledge. So that educators may be clearer about just what is to be transmitted, mayhaps an important consideration lies in some of the conceptual problems surrounding the theory of knowledge per se.

Israel Scheffler[1] points out that various conceptions of 'to know' exist, e.g., knowledge of skill (knowing how to) and propositional knowledge (knowing that). The focus here will be on propositional knowledge, since in many ways it is a major concern for educators.

Much propositional knowledge that students are said to have is attained by testimonial evidence. And much of the evidence for their beliefs rests upon authority, e.g., the authority of teachers. Oftentimes, especially for younger knowers, testimonial evidence is the major source of their knowledge claims. We typically demand less direct evidence for a pre-adolescent's knowledge claims than we would of an adult who would make the same claims. But George Harman, in "Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess,"[2] argues that neither empirical data nor testimonial evidence alone is sufficient to justify one's knowledge claims when others of one's "relevant social group" have misleading evidence. His argument is of particular interest to educators since much knowledge is said to be attained in school, i.e., in the context of a particular social group, and much knowledge is based upon testimonial evidence.

Thus consideration of the social aspect of inquiry raises the issue about whether membership in a group has any bearing upon accepting conclusions as known. Harman argues that one's knowledge can be undermined by unpossessed counterevidence, evidence that is possessed by others of one's "relevant social group". Harman argues that being a member of a group of knowers (or non-knowers) may influence one's own knowledge. But is there this influence? If so, to what extent must one consider the group when accepting conclusions as known?

This paper will be an attempt to characterize Harman's principle, and to examine some problems that may be nested within it. Because of the pedagogical implications of his thesis, in my attempt to refute his principle I will include in my remarks reference to educational situations.

Harman's argument is based on two stated assumptions:

> P1. Reasoning that could in certain circumstances give someone knowledge is justified reasoning.
> P2. Reasoning that depends essentially on the acceptance of a false proposition does not give someone knowledge.[3]

On these principles, as he refers to them, he bases one of his major contentions:

> Q(b). It is essential to one's reasoning for a given conclusion that one accept the proposition that there is no evidence one does not possess, possession of which would make acceptance of the conclusion unjustified and which... is possessed by others in a relevant social group to which one belongs.[4]

To illustrate his principle, Harman offers the following situation as an example: Jane knows that Dr. K has been murdered, and she comes to know this based on an accurate newspaper account that she reads. In a slightly revised example, Harman claims that Jane does not know this same thing when other conditions obtain. In his modified case, another equally credible account is also released, reporting that Dr. K. had not been murdered. Due to the conflicting reports, those who receive both accounts do not know what to believe. Jane, however, has just the first account and is not aware of the misleading counterevidence.

Her "relevant social group" is aware of it, however, and is no longer justified in accepting the conclusion, C, as known. In this case, Harman argues that Jane also is no longer justified in accepting C as known.[5]

Elaborating, Harman's argument looks like this:

1. C is true.
2. X has evidence, e, pertaining to C.
3. X is justified in accepting C.
4. Group G has misleading e' pertaining to C.
5. G does not know what to believe about C.
6. X is a member of G.
7. X does not have e'.
8. X does not have C. (based on principle Qb.)

Since Harman is discussing the concept of 'reasoning', or 'inference', rather than 'knowledge', he rarely uses the term 'know'. He often refers rather, to "accepting a conclusion" and later to "accepting a conclusion as known". Perhaps he is equating 'knowledge' with 'acceptance of conclusions', as he says "... that we do know roughly what we ordinarily say and think we know."[6] And, although his purpose is to study reasoning, rather than to analyze knowledge per se, he makes certain claims about knowledge that are subject to further examination.

Much of Harman's thesis seems intuitively correct. Accepting a conclusion as known entails a certain responsibility on the part of a seeker of knowledge to justify and seek evidence for his or her knowledge claims. When what is often ordinarily referred to as 'common knowledge' is the issue, Harman's principle seems most plausible. For instance, in his "lava" example,[7] if S is a member of a community near a particular mountain M, then S is not justified in accepting the conclusion that lava at the foot of M came from M, when it is a well-known practice for the people of that community to rearrange lava at the feet of mountains. It would seem that the evidence of this fact could be readily available. On one hand, in that rearranging lava seems an odd circumstance, S, as a responsible inquirer, would not ordinarily consider the possibility that lava is rearranged, and would be justified in not considering such possibilities. On the other hand, S, as a member of this lava-moving community, would have easy access to the evidence of the activities of the community and would not be justified in ignoring such possibilities.

Must we, then, inquire after every tentative conclusion with respect to our relevant social group, if we are to be justified in accepting conclusions? Can we rely on our conclusion once we have done so? As responsible seekers of knowledge (or as referred to elsewhere in the literature, "veracious inquirers")[8] when accepting C as known, we would not want to dogmatically decide matters as settled for all time.[9] So settling would seem to end inquiry such that, in some contexts as least, no further scientific advances might be made. Consider for example, what today's physics would be like were Einstein, like many knowers before him, to have dogmatically accepted Newtonian physics as settled. Rather, when we implicitly accept C as settled, it is in the sense that further inquiry may be founded upon C, as in the case of physics. This sense of 'settled' accommodates the possibility (as happened when Einsteinian physics appended Newtonian physics) of future revision of conclusions when new evidence becomes obtainable. The responsibility of the inquirer in accepting C."[10] But the problem of searching within one's relevant social groups for evidence is not clearly dealt with by Harman.

Several major problems surface through a careful examination of Harman's argument: first, given Harman's principle, the possibility of never knowing at all exists; second, Harman is vague as to what counts as a "relevant social group" and exactly how one is to relate to this group; third, Harman does not deal clearly (with respect to one's relevant social group) with the notion of "misleading evidence" and what a member may or may not do with that evidence; and finally, Harman classifies knowers in the categories of authorities. Through modification of some of Harman's examples and the addition of a few of my own, I will elucidate these problems and attempt to offer for consideration, some refinements to his original thesis.

Modification of Harman's "Dr. K" example may illustrate some of the problems. Suppose Jane's relevant social group and Jane both have the justified true belief

concerning Dr. K at time t_1. Jane and her group both, therefore, know at t_1. Then, Harman's modification: misleading evidence within the group (excluding Jane) at t_2 means that Jane no longer knows at t_2. Does Jane know at t_1 but then at t_2? Suppose the interval was as long as three months or as short as thirty minutes. Does Jane have knowledge for a three-month or thirty-minute interval only? It would seem on Harman's principle, that Jane knows and then does not know; his principle cannot account for this conundrum. What seems, instead, is that Jane knows all along, and it is her relevant social group who is no longer justified in believing.

In another modification, consider: Jane's relevant social group consisting of fellow archeologists is off on an extended dig in the Olduvai Gorge in Tanganyika but without Jane. Again, Jane reads the initial, true accounts of Dr. K's demise. The rest of the group also receives these initial reports from their guide. Unbeknownst to Jane, two days after the group receives the original story, a Time magazine reporter encounters them and discounts the original, true version, so that the group now believes that Dr. K is not dead after all. This is a group to which Jane "belongs", but does it count as a relevant group when they are separated by a great distance?

Thus, the problem arises as to just what is to count as a 'relevant social group'. Is the notion to be so broad as to include the entire society to which one belongs? Or, more narrowly, perhaps one's relevant social group is that group with which one spends the most time. One would want to argue, perhaps, that a relevant social group is one which has the most influence on its members. (If so, the next problem would be with what counts as 'influence'.) Or maybe it could be viewed the other way around: a relevant social group could be one in which S, as a member, has the most influence. Either way, this sort of notion would bear on harman's principle. The latter two types, though, would be difficult to judge objectively.

It seems though, that one would want to be more precise as to what actually is meant as a relevant social group. It seems, too, that we adults belong to several kinds of groups, groups that form for different reasons and purposes: families, ethnic groups, co-workers, neighbors, bowling teams, old high school cliques, fellow worshipers, etc.; all constitute social groups relevant to each member in one way or another. Even as a youth, the groups to which one belongs are wide and varied, and perhaps entirely different from adults': classmates, a different group of friends at the Y, another in the neighborhood, or again, families and fellow worshipers. Each group may consist of a different set of members; the possibility arises that different groups might have conflicting sets of beliefs. Harman's principle, it would seem, would allow for knowledge changes and shifts as one passes from group to group, or even no knowledge at all, given a finite set of beliefs, each conflicting with a group or another.

This brings to the forefront, the idea of 'misleading evidence' and its effects on S's conclusions, C. To claim that Jane, in the earlier examples, does not know C seems problematic, for, unless we assume that she has the identical characteristics and properties of the group, why must we assume that, given the same evidence the group has, Jane will come to the same conclusion? Closely related to this issue is Thomas F. Green's argument concerning reasonable beliefs. He states:

> If it is to become reasonable for A to believe that Q, then what is needed is not that Q be true, nor that Q be known by someone, but that A have some reason to believe it himself. It is not enough that someone know the truth nor that the evidence be available to someone. It must be available to A himself.... What is reasonable for any particular person to believe is a function of the knowledge he has at his disposal and the evidence available not to mankind in general but to him in particular.[11]

Green's point concerning reasonable beliefs as it relates to Jane's case and others like it is that as responsible knowledge seekers, individuals must be allowed to look at the evidence themselves and assess it for themselves. Whether one come to the right conclusions depends upon several factors (psychological, cognitive abilities, reasonableness, etc.). Harman's principle does not allow

for these considerations.

Let us take another example similar to Harman's as an illustration. John is a second grader, and John has been given, via his parents, the true account concerning what actually happens at Christmas time, and he has been told that no such being as a Santa Claus exists. He believes his parents, has evidence for his belief, his belief is true, and so it would seem that John knows that there is no Santa. However, the rest of his second-grade class does not have this explanation, and they believe that there is a person, Santa, who performs particular tasks on Christmas Eve. This evidence, viz., their parents' iterations, keeps them from knowing that there is no such being as Santa Claus. Do we then want to say that John also does not know? If this were true, it would seem that no one -ould be able to accept any conclusions, while in the schoolroom context at least, if s/he were the first one to come to accept a conclusion that other had not as yet. Or perhaps, a certain number of the students had heard from one source that Santa exists, and from another, that he does not exist. They do not know what to believe; John, however, has weighed the testimonies, and arrived at the proper conclusion. We would not want to grant that he is not justified in his belief just because a relevant social group to which he belongs is undecided, or not justified.

On another excursion into classrooms, let us explore the notion Harman has of knower of authority. Suppose that Sal, Deb, Jo and Sue are all members of a neighborhood group of friends. Each of the four, however, attends a different school. At Sal's private school a, the creationism theory is presented as Scientific Theory that explains the existence of higher life forms. Sal accepts the conclusion that this is the correct explanation of the world. She is given no other alternatives at school a from which to choose or judge. Deb attends school b, where she is taught both the theory of evolution and the creation-science theory (as it is called there) side-by-side as competing theories. Deb does not know what to believe. Jo attends school c where she is exposed only to the theory of evolution and never hears mention of the creationism theory. Sue attends school d where she is exposed to the theory of evolution as a scientific theory and the creationism theory as a metaphysical theory, is shown the distinctions, and draws conclusions yet different from those of her neighborhood cohorts. If Harman's principle were correct, when the girls join each other and form their relevant social group, none would be justified in accepting her conclusion, not even Sue. But we would not want to admit that. However, Sue is related to her social groups, her responsibility is to assess the evidence herself. The questions, next, then, are what must each do with her evidence, what is each to accept, how does she judge, and on whom can she rely?

Through his principle (Qb), Harman is trying to capture the social aspect of knowledge by arguing (as J. L. Austin does) that when one utters, "I know P", one gives others the authority for accepting P also.

> "In accepting the conclusion that 'S is P' as known, one implicitly concludes that one can give others one's authority for saying 'S is P'.... One is justified in that only if one is justified in the implicit supposition that the others do not have undermining evidence against 'S is P'."12

So then, Harman would allow for personal conclusions, but also recognizes that we accept a good deal of our conclusions based on authority. Is a self-proclaimed knower always to be taken as an authority? I think not. A person's mere utterance of "I know P" does not make one an authority. Judgment that s/he is an authority must go beyond: s/he is an expert in the area, s/he is a known, reliable inquirer, s/he has been right most of the time on this particular subject in the past. The evidence issue springs to the forefront in this matter. Person A who utters "I know P" has different evidence from person B who comes to know, based upon the utterance of A. B's evidence for accepting P is from authority A, while A's is from something else. B's, then, is a much weaker knowledge claim, even if A is an authority in Harman's (and Austin's) sense. B's warrant is not A's warrant.

Authorities as sources of knowledge in the education system, can be viewed as hierarchical. Student S's knowledge is based on Teacher T's authority. And Teacher T's knowledge may be based on Professor P's testimony. Professor P's authority, in turn, is perhaps based on direct evidence (research) or another Professor Q's authority. When one begins to trace this back, one could perhaps

find mistakes at each level, and find that, theoretically, no conclusions may justifiably be had in this fashion, except perhaps, extremely weak conclusions.

Although the notion of authority is an important one for educators, the educator who can justify his or her conclusions based on evidence in addition to some other educator's authority will have the more warrant when he or she utters, "I know P." The justifications that the students have for accepting conclusions are, of course, different from the teacher's, and become in a sense "diluted" because of different warrants.

In the context of education, then, the epistemological ramifications may be those of developing the students' abilities so that they may appraise their conclusions along the standards of evidence that authorities hold. Thus, accepting conclusions as known, based on adequate evidence, also implies standards. Can we compare the student-knower to the authorized knower? An educator may justifiably argue that the standards by which we evaluate student-knowers should vary, based upon individuals' ages. Standards for appraising a child's knowledge should be more lenient than those for appraising an adult's. For instance, judging a 10 year old's knowledge of C, based upon the evidence he or she is able to supply would differ from judging a 16 year old's same conclusion. We expect more of the elder, because we assume his or her cognitive abilities would have matured. Appraising the student's knowledge claims entails marking his or her advance in the cognitive and reasoning ability. Those standards of appraisal will become increasingly higher as students develop a base of knowledge, and begin to develop their own warrants. Assuming that much of what students come to know is based on the authority of others, including teachers, part of our goal in teaching should be that students come to make proper evaluations of authorities. Such evaluations may allow them to distinguish veracious inquirers from pretenders. When the social group has counterevidence to knowledge claims, our students should evaluate this counterevidence apart from the fact that someone has it. When they cannot make such evaluations, they should not ignore the evidence.

NOTES

1. Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), Chapter I.

2. Gilbert Harman, "Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, V, ed. French, Uehling, Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), p. 163 ff.

3. Ibid, p. 165.

4. Ibid, p. 165.

5. Ibid, p. 166.

6. Ibid, p. 177.

7. Ibid, p. 180.

8. Kieth Lehrer, "Systematic Justification" in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. Pappas and Swain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 300.

9. Harman, "Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess," p. 168 and footnote 16. Harman discusses the point John Dewey makes in Logic concerning the ambiguity of 'settled'. Quoted by Harman, Dewey says, "... there is no belief so settled as not to be exposed to further inquiry.... what is to be taken to be settled, or to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is a resource in further inquiry; not being so settled in such a way as not to be subject to revision in further inquiry." (Logic, pp. 8, 9).

10. Harman, "Reasoning and Evidence...", p. 166. Harman is borrowing this notion from Karl Popper.

11. Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 101.

12. Harman, "Reasoning and Evidence...", p. 170.

13. Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge, p. 4.

EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AS IF COMMUNITY MATTERS

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The paper I read at last year's meeting of this society raised the question of what it would be like to think about educational improvement from the perspective of the community rather than the individual.[2] That paper offered the following argument:

Focus on the individual, when combined with centralization and standardization, operates to the detriment of the expression of local values and to the detriment of the inclusion of local values in policy formation and execution. The reform movement in school governance which began at the turn of the twentieth century shifted power from the local community to centralized agencies and professional educators and administrators who were receptive to the notion of standardization in education.

Standardizing measures take no account of particular individuals or of particular places. In addition to leaving individual victims in their wake, standard policies most often do not work when applied to non-standard situations. Educational theorists, including philosophers of education who consider themselves to be in the tradition of John Dewey and other progressives, contribute to and participate in the standardizing tendencies which have dominated change in this century. One conclusion of that paper was the need for consideration of ways to reverse the prevailing forces on standard treatments and think rather about educational change from the perspective of the local community.

Today I offer some suggestions for ways that researchers can pay attention to particular communities of people and thus counter the centralizing and standardizing tendencies of educational research and theorizing. I use parts of a research project in which I am presently engaged and results of a brief survey of this audience for illustrative purposes.

At this point ask your cooperation in an experiment. One of the elegant elements in many of Plato's dialogues is their reflexivity. Often the action of the dialogue itself provides an example of the theoretical question being discussed. I have no pretensions to Plato's level of elegance; but, to provide that reflexive element for this paper, I need your answers to a brief series of questions, as if this were a research site. I seek your answers as a way of relating to and learning about this particular community. Please raise your hand when your answer to a question is "yes".

Do you have research and writing interests which relate to the public schools?
Have you been in a public school for purposes related to your research and writing interests in the past year?
In the past two years?
In the past five years?
More than one time per year?
More than five times per year?
More than ten times per year?
Do you use the experience of your students, where they are teachers or administrators in the public schools, for purposes related to your research interests?
Always?
Usually?
Sometimes?
Never?
Do you use the experience of those students as contributions to classroom discussion?

Now obviously this paper was written before you responded to my questions. There are, to be sure, limitations to the work one can do with a community which gets together only once a year. But I can tell you that your answers have borne out my suspicions that this group would reflect the general gap between educational theorists and the practice about which they think and write. Any generalizations based on this information would have to be qualified because this group is self-selecting in so many ways. No matter how qualified the conclusions, however, I

I would be able to say that this concrete group of people at this time gave this set of answers. This puts us one step beyond presumption based on personal experience, anecdotal information, and knowledge about the history of the practice of philosophy of education.

In order to understand this quick collection of raw data I would have to know more about the history, background, and circumstances of each of you and of the settings in which you function. Perhaps even as I asked these questions some of you had the sense that the straight yes or no answers did not do justice to your situation. Imagine, then, that I have taken the opportunity to interview each of you on this topic, to suggest tentative conclusions and to incorporate your reaction to the tentative conclusions in forming further conclusions and in determining the direction of further research. This might get us nearer to an adequate understanding of the situation of this group on this topic. Since you are all wearing your scholar rather than teacher hats today, you are inclined to be receptive (I hope) to theoretical pronouncements. However, had I worked with you in such a manner you might be more receptive to any description or prescription I might then offer.

I am not about to advocate that philosophers of education simply adopt the apparatuses of the social sciences. The use of questionnaires and other field techniques as the basis for analysis provides no sure safeguard against overlooking local and individual concerns. Rather I am suggesting the need for using tools you already possess to pay attention to and understand a particular community or set of communities as a way of grounding theoretical questions in experience. Despite the specialization, compartmentalization, and departmentalization which are the hallmarks of contemporary academia, it is possible to ask philosophical questions using a variety of ways of looking at and thinking about the world.

I have simulated, in the barest manner, involving you in the consideration of my theoretical speculations. I will now list a set of nine working notions for grounding theoretical questions in education in particular communities. After setting the list out I will return to each item for further explanation and elaboration.

First, to understand any present situation we must be able to describe it in detail in a particular place. Second, to understand any present situation in a particular place we must be familiar with the historical development of that situation. Third, to understand any present situation in a particular place we must know something about the larger context in which it exists. Fourth, the history and context of a situation must be understood at least in part from the perspective of the participants. Fifth, understanding of a situation comes in part as a function of time--as we see the present develop, as we observe history unfolding. Sixth, theoretical questions, proposals for change, and initiated actions are best understood and evaluated in a particular place where extensive understanding has already been gained. Seventh, educational research is not an isolated or abstract function, but has obligations to those about whom it writes and to the larger society. Eighth, the preceeding notions combine to form a coherent perspective and a process for the conduct of research. Ninth, this paper is one part of the process of research. Now let me amplify this list of notions.

First, to understand any present situation we must be able to describe it in detail in a particular place. This may entail, at least initially, more modest goals for research and theorizing. Mainstream educational research has tended to want to describe the whole world, all experience, for all people, on a grand scale. Such goals imply that the truth, once found, can be handed to the consumer, like a bucket of paint to be applied to the barn. Such goals imply that general solutions or suggestions are applicable in some simple way to diverse situations, or that there is little diversity among educational settings. By contrast, this first point suggests the importance of describing one particular piece of the world in such detail that the example serves for comparison with similar situations. Individuals can then decide about the relevance of pieces of that description to their own situations and its applicability to personal and organizational decisions they face. The point argues for an increase in research and theorizing which are in some way connected to a concrete situation in a specifiable place.

Second, to understand any present situation in a particular place we must be familiar with the historical development of that situation. Here we are on more familiar ground for traditional research and theory. The point suggests that an idea must be set in time just as it is set in place.

Third, to understand any present situation in a particular place we must know something about the larger context in which a particular situation exists. Again, this is familiar territory, for traditional research is comfortable looking at and thinking about the larger picture. "Place" can be understood as beginning on a small scale and expanding outward in concentric circles. As with any research, limits must be placed, but this point suggests that regional, state, national, and perhaps international perspectives, where applicable, are necessary for understanding a particular situation.

Fourth, the history and context of a situation must be understood at least in part from the perspective of the participants. As I have suggested, today's exercise is a first step towards meeting that goal with this community. In the communities that serve as field sites for research in which I am currently engaged, we are concerned with the question of school-community relations. Interviews are conducted to gather information from school administrators, school board members, teachers, retired teachers, parents active in school-related activities, and other parents.

Fifth, understanding of a situation comes in part as a function of time--as we see the present develop, as we observe history unfolding. This point suggests the value of longitudinal on-site research. Observation, by members of our staff, of school board meetings, school events, P.T.A. and other parent groups, all contribute information about the ongoing process at each site. These contacts also provide the opportunity for formal and informal exchanges, and the fleshing out of written reports and records.

Sixth, theoretical questions, proposals for change, and initiated actions are best understood and evaluated in a particular place where extensive understanding has already been gained. The common denominator in all examples which illustrate the advantages of this approach is that a researcher sees the unfolding of a policy decision--whether mandate or suggestion--in a familiar setting which provides content to speculation. For example, when the state or federal government announce policy changes, each school system responds in a way appropriate to its special situation. Grounded statements can then be made about these responses; and the question of the effects of the policy--when announced, when implemented--can be answered with assurance about these particular places and set in the context of their present functioning and historical situation. The policy may have some similar and some dissimilar effects, all of which can be understood only with understanding of a particular place.

Seventh, educational research is not an isolated or abstract function, but has obligations to those about whom it writes and to the larger society.[3] On the face of it, this observation seems obvious. But consider. Most educational researchers work in the academic community, address the results of their work to the academic community, and listen to the academic community. People in the wider world--other communities--are intended to be the ultimate beneficiaries of their work, but the academic community is the first, the most important, and sometimes the only judge of the value of their work. In some circles, and in the opinion of some people, orientation to any community other than the academic indicates a lack of professionalism and perhaps the inability to compete in the academic marketplace of ideas. Thus addressing this group as fellow researchers is unexceptional, but using your experience as researchers and involving you in the process of forming notions about that experience is somewhat more suspect. Involving teachers or administrators who do not hold credentials also as researchers or theoreticians is even more suspect. And, of course, looking to ordinary citizens for guidance is often considered inexcusable. Despite this common bias, throughout the course of our project we have paid special attention to formal and informal sharing of information with residents of the field sites. Summaries of historical information about each school system were published in the relevant county newspapers. Reports and presentations were shared with those who had supplied information or opinions which contributed to the development of that information. Reactions to the information helped improve its quality and suggested directions for further work.

Eighth, the preceeding notions combine to form a coherent perspective and a process for the conduct of research. Although the preceding points have been separated for presentation, in practice they are all of a piece. No one part could be excluded and still leave as effective a program of research. Each part contributes to the others and gains from their inclusion. Throughout the project we have taken pains to document our own process in the hope that this example, taken as a whole, will prove useful as a guide to other researchers.

Ninth, this work is one part of the process of research. This paper is addressed to an audience of researchers and practitioners not as a final word but rather as an opening communication, an invitation to participate in a mutually rewarding dialogue.

NOTES

1. The author is Program Director and Principal Investigator, Rural Education Agricultural Research Program, Community Research Service Program, Kentucky State University, Frankfort, Kentucky. This material is based on work supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, grant number KYX1581000005. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

2. Kay, Steve, Education Against Community." in Philosophical Studies in Education (Bloomington: Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Association, 1982).

3. Mishler claims that mainstream social scientists, as part of adopting the model of the hard sciences, have attempted to analyze and understand social activity by stripping away the context of that activity and isolating events, or attitudes, or opinions, much as a physicist might attempt to isolate one factor for laboratory experimentation. He holds that social activity, on the contrary, can be understood only within its natural context, and that the social sciences have been impeded in their progress by ignoring this context. He recommends extensive contextual description. Elliott Mishler, "Meaning in Context: Is There Any Other Kind?", Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 49, No. 1, February, 1979.

4. A recent special edition of Rural Development Research and Education is devoted to "University Response to Community Needs." In one article the authors advocate a collaborative approach and suggest the need for researchers intent on using such an approach to be thoroughly grounded in the site and be willing to adopt alternative constructs for applied social science research. In their conclusion the authors call for case studies of the collaborative process. Other articles in the issue provide information about recent collaborative projects undertaken by Land Grant Institutions. See articles by Fear and Kanter, Schmidt and Murray, Beaulieu and Carter, Thomson and Martin, and Saterfiel, in Rural Development Research and Education, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall, 1979.

WEIGHING JUSTICE ON THE SCALES OF LIBERALISM

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In an article entitled "Weighing the Justice of Inequality",[1] Thomas Green explores once again the notion of equal educational opportunity. However, his comments in this essay move somewhat beyond the straightforward (putatively non-normative) analysis which is most typical of Green's published work. In fact, the tentative conclusion which Green draws -- i.e. that justice demands an educational system which is "less powerful, less necessary, less fateful in determining the life chances of an individual"[2] -- is an overtly normative one.

Green argues that the principle of equal educational opportunity is a "blank check" whose values are filled in within the policy-making process in our society. Determination of the value of "equality" consists in designating which instances of inequality are not unjust, i.e. which attributes are relevant or irrelevant to the distribution of educational benefits. Equality without qualification is not synonymous with justice in the realm of education. Other values must be taken into account, including (especially) the value of cultural pluralism. Since the present state of development of our educational system is such that it encourages an interpretation of equal educational opportunity (i.e. the "benefit view") which is in direct conflict with the value of cultural pluralism, justice requires that the capacity of the educational system to determine the future and value of individuals be reduced.

On its face, Green's argument is quite weak. However worthwhile of worthy of consideration may be his conclusion or the intuitions which motivate it, the argument rises or falls on the strength of its central premise, i.e. that cultural pluralism is *the* (or even *a*) critical value in decisions or justice in education. Green asserts but never defends that premise.

I intend to argue in this paper that Green's argument cannot succeed because it contains within itself seeds of contradiction regarding thought and feeling, description and evaluation, rules and values which are inherent in the liberal point of view. As a counterpoint for criticism, I will rely on Roberto Unger's critique of liberal thought in *Knowledge and Politics*.[3] Before exploring Green's essay further, it is necessary to lay out, in some detail, the relevant features of Unger's critique.

I

Knowledge and Politics seeks to be what Unger calls "total criticism." Says Unger, "Liberalism must be seen all of a piece, not just as a set of doctrines about the disposition of power and wealth, but as a metaphysical conception of the mind and society."[4] The liberal world view pervades philosophy, psychology and politics, and criticism of the adequacy of that view must be thorough-going enough to reach all three realms.[5]

Unger lays out his argument by considering, in turn, liberal psychology, liberal political theory, and the underlying philosophical unity of the two. He highlights what he calls the "antinomy" at work in each and demonstrates how these antinomies are destructive of positive human experience. Three principles or postulates mark the liberal psychology: (1) that there is a conceptual division between reason and desire; (2) that human desires are arbitrary from the perspective of the understanding; and (3) that knowledge is atomistic and, therefore, can be analyzed into elementary ideas/sensations and built up again. Unger suggests that, while these three principles do not logically entail one another, they imply one another in a relationship of appositeness (i.e. they tend to make sense in terms of another).[6] However, the "package" of these three principles says Unger, results in an inability to formulate an adequate understanding of personality or personhood.

Unger's consideration of liberal political thought is similarly structured. Again, three principles mark the liberal political theory: (1) that there is a conceptual division between rules and values; (2) that values are thought to be subjective; and (3) that society is an artificial aggregation of individuals. Once again, these principles are thought of as interdependent in that society must be artificial if values are individual and subjective, and values can only be individual if they are conceived of separately from rules as social phenomena. However, the interaction of these principles prohibits an adequate solution to the problem of freedom and order, i.e. to the problem of the interrelationship of private ends and public rules.

According to Unger, individuals wish to be entitled to the objects of their choices, especially such common values as life, comfort and honor. However, entitlements are only possible when there is a system of general rules that limits the wants of each in comparison to others. Rules and values are related but quite distinct. This is so because values are subjective, i.e. determined by arbitrary individual choice. There are no essentially communal values. Any convergence of preferences is merely thought to be a precarious alliance of individual interests.

Because values are subjective in this sense, there is a need for public rules to provide and maintain order and freedom. However, also because values are subjective in this sense and because society is an artificial collection of value-holding individuals, there can be no good theory of legislation and adjudication of such public rules, i.e. no standards for legislation and adjudication which incorporate the value of societal rules with the valuing activities of individuals. One is caught between attention to public rules and attention to individual goals, between formal and substantial justice.

Unger demonstrates the (philosophical) unity of liberal thought in the domains of psychology and political theory by maintaining that the antinomy typical of each is actually rooted in a basic metaphysical view of particulars and universals which has marked the liberal thinking of the past three hundred years. This is the view that *contrasts* universals with particulars, i.e. which acknowledges the universal (the idea) and the particular (the event) as two distinct elements in a dichotomy of being.

Further, says Unger, "(B)y reason of the contrast of the universal and the particular that underlies the antinomies of liberal thought and the liberal conception of parts and wholes, two processes recur constantly in all areas of thought. One is the evisceration of particulars; the other, the reification of universals."[7] Because particulars are essentially individual items, they cannot be spoken of in general categories, which is to say they cannot really be spoken of at all in any relational or explanatory fashion. Insofar as they are spoken of, they are treated as cases of some abstract entity. These abstract entities then take on a life of their own because they are the sole possible objects of thought and language.

It is this state of affairs which, according to Roberto Unger, makes liberal thought in any form or facet unacceptable, and which prompts Unger to suggest an alternative. Unger draws an analogy between ideas and events in the world and reflection and existence in consciousness to suggest that the essential dichotomy between ideas and events, between universals and particulars, is in error. Human experience of reflection and existence suggests that while the two elements are distinct, they are nonetheless linked in the critical category of meaning. The fond between outward existence and inner reflection is the root of meaning, where meaning "disrespects the dividing line between description and evaluation."[8]

Unger's alternative conception of the universal and the particular, then, is one which synthesizes liberalism and its opposite.[9] He wants to retain the universal and the particular as concepts and to maintain that they are, at once, the same and different. In this view, the universal becomes "an entity whose universality consists precisely in the open set of concrete and substantive determinations in which it can appear."[10] It is not abstract or formal, but, in a sense, hyper-particular.

In the second part of *Knowledge and Politics*, Unger rebuilds the thought about social life which he criticizes in the first portion of his work. He does so by offering a positive program of communitarianism based on his reconception of the relationship between the universal and the particular, and by situating his program in the contingent historical and social reality where "the truth about knowledge and politics is both made and discovered."[11] Desires and values are not thought to be arbitrary or subjective, but intersubjectively understandable in the common origin of personality and society. The principles of analysis and individualism give way to a theory of what Unger calls the organic group based on shared values and communion of purposes.

My hope is to use Unger's far-reaching critique of liberal thought to show that Thomas Green's argument rests on an intellectual framework fraught with "antinomies," a framework which cannot possibly take him where he wants to go.

To defend the above claim, I must make clear where I believe Green is trying to go with the article in question, lay out how he tries to get there and, finally, probe the weaknesses and contradictions in his pattern of thinking.

Thomas Green has, it seems to me, two concerns in "Weighing the Justice of Inequality." The first, and probably more obvious, concern is to outline a basis for defining and understanding the principle of equal educational opportunity. To this end, Green explores three factors at work in any consideration of educational values and politics to demonstrate how each alters the "amount" on the "blank check" of equal educational opportunity as a principle. That equal educational opportunity is a principle of educational equity, Green takes as fact. The whole exercise is a seemingly non-normative one. Green makes no overt judgment about which formulation of the principle is the proper one, although he does offer some comments about which best matches our intuitions. Throughout the major portion of this paper, Green's intention is to analyze the (empty) concept of equal educational opportunity so that we know clearly what sort of value content we may and must put into it.

However, in the last section of his paper, Green takes a normative turn based on some of his earlier analytic comments. Here his second, perhaps more urgent, concern emerges. That is to suggest strongly, if not formally to argue, that "the capacity of the educational system itself to determine the future and the value of individuals" must be reduced.[12] This is a normative conclusion. Whether or not this conclusion, or any *normative* conclusion, can result from the moves Green makes is a question which bears further discussion.

Green begins "Weighing the Justice of Inequality" with a discussion of some of our common intuitions about human inequality. He suggests that some educational inequalities are morally permissible if they are "educationally relevant," if they arise from, for instance, differences of choice, ability or virtue rather than from sex, social class, race or geography. Therefore, any interpretation of the principle of equal educational opportinitie must specify which inequalities are justified and why. Providing "cash value" for the principle of equal educational opportunity is a complicated and on-going task, one worked out "in specific cases and in a practical way."[13]

Green offers two observations regarding filling in the blanks of equal educational opportunity. The first is that values are given to the variables in the principle through the public policy process. Green notes, "Educational equity is a problem for public policy, but such issues are value issues and not simply technical problems."[14]

The second point is that each time the variables are filled in through the policy process, i.e. each time the principle of equal educational opportunity is given a (slightly different) interpretation, the relevant issues are transformed from issues of educational equality to issues of educational effectiveness, educational efficiency, or educational pluralism. Green is most concerned with educational pluralism. He suggests that thinking about equality can drive one to the notion that *everybody* should be excellent at *something*. This will require a redefinition of "ability" in pluralistic terms, "corresponding to the presence of pluralistic culture groups and differences of excellence

associated with those different groups."[15] Green seems to indicate that such a redefinition is a technical, rational task rather than an evaluative one.

Similarly, says Green, other questions about equality can be transformed from clear value questions to issues of efficiency and effectiveness. For example, is it more *efficient* to make the continuing pursuit of education a matter of choice, not of compulsion? Or, what is the most *effective* educational program that works so that unequal results turn out to be justified? Again, the implication is that these are questions which have rational answers, given some prior definition of educational equality.

This prior definition of educational equality can only be determined through the policy process according to Green. Therefore, we must attend to the kinds of political arguments which accompany claims for various interpretations of equal educational opportunity. "Just as some interests are stronger than others, it follows that some kinds of political arguments are stronger than others," and Green suggests the following rank order from strongest to weakest: (1) arguments of state interest; (2) those appealing to the aggregate of individual interest; (3) those appealing to the social good; and (4) arguments appealing to the advancement of educational benefits themselves.[16]

Arguments of state interest in behalf of equal educational opportunity must be arguments of civil rights, since other state interests such as national defense or domestic tranquility are not immediately relevant. Though not as strong as arguments based on national security, a civil rights approach is quite effective in a country which prides itself on its freedom and respect for the individual. Arguments aggregating individual interests can be quite strong if each believes that, for instance, a high school diploma is a desirable goal. However, in a time when that goal is not desirable but necessary, the argument is not really one of individual interests but of civil rights.

Green suggests that in comparison to arguments of civil rights to equal educational opportunity, arguments of social benefits are ineffective, in part because the benefits themselves are remote, and in part because they rest upon the debatable existence of a social interest. Arguments of educational benefits, says Green, are simply ineffective unless they are developed into arguments of individual interest.

While a definition of equal educational opportunity is being determined in the policy process, there is also on-going development in the educational system itself which alters the sense of what constitutes "education." As there are more and more schools, with more and more programs and more and more resources, there will be additional demands for equal opportunity to all of the system's benifits. Green suggests an irreversible, sequential development in the historical interpretation of equal educational opportunity based on the historical expansion of the schooling system. Equal educational opportunity is transformed roughly from (1) the attainment of equal access to some school, to (2) securing equal resources and curricula, to (3) securing equal educational benefits.[17]

Green ties the preceding together by suggesting that the "benefit view" of equality (#3 above) dominates our thinking today. However, in Green's view, the demand for equal benefits, if realized, is undesirable in that it would "wipe out the differential effects of families, regional cultures, and religious traditions." This would constitute a "profound loss to our society and culture" and would also involve "personal costs of alienation from family and friends" paid by children of the working class when they decide to reach for the highter status which increased education may provide.[18]

Green sums up: "As a matter of political choice and public policy, perhaps it is time to consider whether it is easier, more humane, and more desirable to make the world safe for illiterates than to make the whole world literate."[19]

It is plausible to argue, I think, that Thomas Green's thinking in "Weighing the Justice of Inequality" is an apt example of the intellectual framework of which Roberto Unger is critical in *Knowledge and Politics*.

I wish to show that this is the case. In doing so, I draw the same conclusion with regard to Green's intellectual framework which Unger draws with regard to liberalism writ large: that this way of thinking does not correctly reflect human experience of self and society, and ultimately does not allow the constructive formulation of an understanding of self and society.

I also offer a more pointed observation about the specific argument which Green makes for restricting the influence of the educational system. I suggest that there is, and can be, no consistent, compelling motivation for accepting Green's conclusion because there is, and can be, no adequate justification for introducing the normative premises which figure prominently in the argument.

Green's intellectual framework falls most clearly into Unger's discussion of liberal political theory. Green separates rules and values. The principle of equal educational opportunity is a formal, rational rule and, as Green states, "I believe that there are no arguments of educational equity -- either good ones or bad ones, either extent or still to come -- that do not appeal in one way or another to the principle of equal educational opportunity as I have formulated it."[20]

Equal educational opportunity is a public rule intended to bring order to disagreement in the area of private values. Green goes on, "On the whole, people do not disagree about the *principle* of equal educational opportunity. They do, however, disagree on the definition and practical identification of what will count as the *values* of its variables...."[21]

With this statement, Green indicates the conceptual division which he holds between rules and values. He further suggests that values are subjective, Unger's sense of resulting from arbitrary individual choice, since it is likely that individual persons desagree on what ought to constitute the value-content of equal educational opportunity as a public rule must be sifted and selected from the values of individuals through the political policy process.

Whatever the political policy process yields is the "appropriate" value-content for the principle. That policy process is a political one based on the notion of society as an artificial collection of value-holding individuals. The (aggregate of) individuals with the most influence determine the public values to be embodied in public rules. There is no attention to the possibility of common values or of common goals except as they occur as an accidental alliance of individual interests; in short, there are no standards for the legislation of public rules aside from the contingencies of individual interests. Further, there is no rationale (broadly speaking) basis upon which to persuade others of the appropriateness of any given value.

Elements of this framework are present throughout Green's article. For instance, Green speaks of the transformation which issues of educational equality undergo when the principle of equal educational opportunity is assigned value-content through the policy process. He suggests that value issues of equality become technical issues of pluralism, efficiency, and effectiveness. Here again, there is a separation of rules and values, of thought (which is publicly validated) and feelings (which are privately determined). Private values enter the public domain through the policy process. Once in the public domain in the form of a policy statement delineating equal educational opportunity, suggests Green, the whole question of equality is transformed into a series of rational, technical issues for which rational, technical (value-free) answers are, in principle, available. This view raises a host of questions. Are educational efficiency, effectiveness and pluralism really technical, value-free issues? Is there any such thing as a value-free issue? Is there any motivation for accepting the judgments resulting from the policy process and making judgments about efficiency, effectiveness, and pluralism which are consistent with it? Is Green's thinking backwards, perhaps? That is, perhaps educational effectiveness, efficiency, and pluralism are actually our root (value) concerns and equal educational opportunity is simply a slogan capsulizing the complex of these prior concerns.

Further, Green gives evidence of his background view that society is an artificial collection of value-holding individuals when he considers the types of arguments of state interest and those which are most appealing to the aggregate of individual interest far outweigh, in political effectiveness, those which appeal to the social good and those which rely on the value of educational benefits themselves.

For Green, the state exists to preserve an environment in which individuals may function in freedom and order, inspite of mutual antagnoism and disinterest. State interests such as national security and civil rights seemed designed primarily to enhance rather than to control or direct individual interests. Certainly, Green gives very little weight to the idea of some social good which can motivate politically, nor does he perceive a consensus on the value of educational benefits themselves. On this point, Green may be reflecting the widespread hold of liberalism and its correlate individualism as much as his own intellectual framework.

The cluster of the above elements, these principles of liberal political thinking, results in an antinomy which denies the possibility of a theory of self and society appropriate to human experience. Society can only be an artificial collection of selves; it can never be an outgrowth of a common, though individual, awareness of shared experience. Public rules can only be imposed; they can never grow out of the individual experience of shared values. Arguments like Green's casecase for the restricted influence of the school system can only be rhetorically interesting and appealing; they can never be rationally (broadly speaking) consistent and compelling.

Strictly speaking, Green's case for the restricted influence of the schooling system rests on one empirical premise and one implied action premise. The empirical premise is that the historical development of our system of schooling has resulted in an interpretation of the principle of equal educational opportunity which conflicts with the value of cultural pluralism. The implied action premise is that, for reasons of educational justice, any schooling system which creates situations which conflict with the value of cultural pluralism should be altered/restricted in influence. Green's action premise is implied by the evaluative premise that, for reasons of justice, cultural pluralism is a value which must be maintained. The above argument may well be logically valid, but the conclusion which Green draws is not compelling because, given the intellectual framework in which Green operates, there is no compelling reason, rational or otherwise, to accept his evaluative premise and the action premise implied by it.

Green's support for the premise that cultural pluralism is a value which must be maintained is weak even by his own standards. His first point in support of cultural pluralism is neither the strong appeal to state interest, nor even the appeal to the aggregate of individual interests, but the, according to Green, rather weak appeal to social benefits, to the "profound loss to our society and culture."[22] Green does appeal to the "personal costs of alienation" paid by the children of craftsmen, laborers and marginal farmers. However, he makes this appeal not merely to those for whom this might be an individual interest, but to educators generally who are thought to think about this in terms of a social interest.

Since interests and values are subjective, the only arguments which one can offer in their defense are rhetorical and political ones. One can appeal to another's interest; one can urge the adoption of a particular interest; however, one cannot compel an interest where none exists. There is no basis, except for personal inclination, upon which to weigh and choose among the arguments one encounters. Whether the arguments are politically effective or not, there is no way in which they can be compelling in a manner we would be willing to call rational.

Green seems to be aware of this and surrenders to it by accepting a kind of political conventionalism as justification for the values embodied in public rules. Whatever values emerge from the political policy process are therefore justified as the content of public rules. This position carries with it all

sorts of questions and problems. Is the political policy process itself just? Is there a need for a justification of the policy process in order to justify what comes out of it? Is such a justification possible, even in principle, given Green's assumption that values are subjective? And if such a justification is attempted, what is the view or standard of justice by which it is judged? Is Green ultimately forced to rely on arbitrary intuitions to justify the values embodied in public rules? Perhaps more constructively, is there any way to overcome the split between rules and values so that both rules and values, whether experienced as "objective" or "subjective", emerge from an intersubjective experience of self and society?

There may be. I believe there is But such a solution is not present in Green's intellectual framework.

III

The upshot of this essay is this: one cannot dichotomize rules and values, description and evaluation, and then expect either (a) moral argument to have any meaning, or (b) matter-of-factual argument to be meaningful. One will not be able to make sense of the former and one won't care about the latter. This is, of course, a challenge to philosophy at large.

For Thomas Green, it is a challenge to accept the implications of his admission that equality and justice are not synonymous. It is a challenge to shift the focus away from equal educational opportunity in spite of his inclination to hold it fast, and to refocus on the broad concept of justice as it correlates with what it means to live in society. This will require rethinking the relationship between the individual and society. Ultimately, it will require rethinking what it is to be rationale, since no simple dichotomy of rules and values seems adequate to human experience.

NOTES

1. Thomas F. Green, "Weighing the Justice of Inequality," *Change* 12, No. 5 (1980): 26-32.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

3. Roberto M. Unger, *Knowledge and Politics*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1975).

4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

5. Unger explores briefly what he calls "partial critiques": those which solve the contradictions of liberalism on one of the three fronts, but fails to see the importance of the contradictions on the other fronts. He cites, for example, Karl Marx as a theorist who has been critical of liberal political theory while continuing to hold to the tenets of a liberal psychology -- and therefore, ultimately unsuccessful. Cf. p. 10 He also cites the American pragmatists (Dewey and James) as exemplifying and attempt to surpass liberal psychology's fact-value distinction without also critically examining the liberal political theory which accompanies it. Cf. p. 301, n. 18.

6. Unger, *Knowledge and Politics*, p. 40.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

9. Unger warns against the temptation to avoid the analytic, individualistic thrust of liberalism by adopting the opposite tactic of synthesis and collectivism, i.e. by attempting to dispense altogether with the separation of the order of ideas and the order of events. He cites Marxist "realism" as the best example of this, although he also mentions structuralists such as Levi-Strauss as attempting the same sort of move.

Just as the principle of analysis makes it possible to avoid coming to terms with the merger of understanding and evaluation in consciousness by holding each *a priori* separate in the realm of being, so does the move toward synthesis avoid coming to terms with conscious awareness of their distinctness. On the first view, the whole is merely the sum of the parts with no independent existence; on the second, the part is merely the whole viewed from a certain place, again with no independent existence. Neither liberal thought nor its "upside-down" version can account for human experience of thinking, of the world, and of thinking about the world. Cf. p. 125 ff.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

12. Green, p. 32.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL EDUCATION: A FALSE PARALLEL?

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Bilingual-bicultural education, both in terms of its underlying theoretical premises and in terms of actual classroom practice, has become one of the most controversial educational innovations in the United States today. Philosophers of education have been involved in the debate surrounding such programs for many years, and have generally seen their role as one of clarifying and ellucidating the related concepts of 'cultural pluralism', 'cultural diversity', and the like.[1] For the most part, though, their analyses have ignored an interesting feature of the discussions about bilingual-bicultural education programs: the apparent conflation of the terms 'bilingual' and 'bicultural' in such a way as to suggest that the two concepts are either virtually synonomous or are in some sense logically interdependent.[2] In this paper, it will be suggested that each of these terms is used in a variety of different (and in at least some instances contradictory) senses, and that in the more defensible senses of the two terms, they are used in ways which are not only incompatible, but actually in diametric opposition.

The Meanings of 'Bilingual Education'

'Bilingual education' is an interesting term if for no other reason that the incredibly broad and diverse type of programs which can be included under its rubric. There are, generally speaking, four sorts of programs which might be considered to be 'bilingual' in nature: transitional, maintenance, rejuvenation, and enrichment programs.

Transitional programs (also known as "transfer" programs) are concerned with providing a *transitional* learning environment for children from minority language backgrounds, in order to aid them in acquiring language skills in the second (socially dominant) language as rapidly and efficiently as possible. Little if any concern is given to the development of language skills in the child's native language. It should be noted that the only sense in which such programs are actually bilingual is in that the child's native language is used as a means through which the second language (in the United States, English) is to be taught. The objective of transitional programs is *not* a bilingual individual; quite the contrary. This can be seen, incidentally, in the somewhat counter-intuitive usage of the term "bilingual child" in public school jargon: the child who is "bilingual," and who therefore merits placement in the special "bilingual class," is the one who cannot function in English, but who is limited to some other language or languages. As soon as the child is capable of functioning in English (and is, therefore, what most of us would term "bilingual"), s/he is moved to a monolingual classroom, on the apparent assumption that s/he is no longer a "bilingual child."

An often overlooked fact about contemporary U.S. bilingual education programs is that they are, by law, transitional in nature.[3] Programs which seek other ends are, in fact however desireable one might feel them to be, neither what the schools are required to provide, nor what most schools are concerned with providing.[4]

Maintenance bilingual education programs are those which are undoubtedly the most popular sort of program among bilingual educators themselves. Such programs are concerned with promoting not only the acquisition of the socially dominant language, but also with encouraging continued use of the child's native language. Defenses of bilingual education programs which rely on arguments about the need for foreign language speakers in business and government, and so on, assume maintenance-type programs. There is good reason to believe that for many minority language children, maintenance bilingual education programs are the most effective way of teaching English in the long run--but this is the "catch," since while transitional programs have generally been restricted to three years in duration, effective maintenance programs require five to six years.[5]

Rejuvenation programs[6] are becoming somewhat more popular among certain ethnic groups than they had been before the "rise of the unmeltable ethnics" in the 1960s,[7] but such programs remain at best a minor alternative both in the United States and abroad. These programs are aimed at reintroducing an ethnic language (e.g., Polish, Italian, etc.) among the descendents of immigrants whose first language is the socially dominant language. This is an interesting sociological phenomenon, and one which deserves further empirical study. Such programs remain, however, quite rare, and are nearly always conducted outside of the framework of the public schools.

Children from non-ethnic backgrounds, whose first language is the socially dominant

language of their society, and who generally come from the higher socio-economic classes, constitute the target population of the fourth type of bilingual education program. Enrichment programs seek to do exactly what their name suggests: to enrich the child's educational experience through the introduction of a second language. Such programs, where conducted experimentally in the United States and Canada, have been immensely successful.[8] Indeed, to a considerable extent the education of the elite in western societies has, through most of our history, entailed the acquisition of a second, "learned" or "cultured" language (Green for the Romans, Latin during the Middle Ages, French in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, German in the Nineteenth century, and English for most educated persons today).

All of these programs are in some sense 'bilingual', but they differ in very significant ways in terms of goals, teaching methodologies, target populations, and even in the extent to which the first and second languages are likely to be employed in the classroom.[9] Only in the first sense (that of transitional bilingual education programs), however, is the meaning of the term actually representative of the sort of educational program mandated by both the Congress and the Courts (as well as by numerous state legislatures). Although this usage is problematic in a number of ways, it nevertheless seems to me to be the only really defensible sense in which the term 'bilingual education' can be discussed meaningfully in the contemporary U.S. context. Any other sort of usage is likely to be misleading, and, as often as not, more likely to cause misunderstandings than to resolve them. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper the term 'bilingual education' will be used exclusively in this first, transitional, sense.[10]

The Meanings of 'Bicultural Education'

The concept of 'bicultural education' is one quite difficult of definition, and even a very careful review of the relevant literature about such programs will shed little light on its actual meaning. Broadly speaking, the term seems to be grounded in the notion that, as educators, we need to be aware and considerate of the minority child's cultural background and traditions. This is, of course, laudable. Indeed, any teacher who is otherwise might well be encouraged to find another occupation.

Clearly, though, more is generally meant when we talk of 'bicultural education' than simply recognizing and accepting cultural differences in students. At this point, I would like to discuss two of the senses in which the term 'bicultural education' seems to be most commonly used, and then to suggest possible reasons why the usage of the term (at least in either of these two senses) in the label 'bilingual-bicultural education' might be deemed problematic. Throughout the discussion which follows, it should be noted that the usage of the term 'culture' is the anthropological, rather than the aesthetic or intellectual, one.[11]

In both of its senses, 'bicultural education' needs to be understood as referring both to pedagogical *means* and *ends*. In its first, weaker, sense, the term has as its underlying base a view of American society as a mixture of various "hyphenated" ethnic groups. That is, our pluralistic society is seen as being composed of Intalian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Polish-Americans, and so on, with each group sharing with the others certain "core" characteristics necessary for existence in a common society (and also serving to demarcate each "hyphenated" group from the populace of its nation of origin--i.e., Irish-Americans from Irish, Italian-Americans from Italians, Polish-Americans from Polis, and so on). In short, in this sense the term 'bilultural education' is being used to describe the conception of social reality which Richard Pratte has identified as "modified cultural pluralism."[12]

The pedagogical practices which are implicitly being endorsed in this first sort of 'bicultural education' can be expected to emphasize:

> ...the unique cultures of blacks, Hispanics, native Americans, and other cultural minorities and their experience in American society.[13]

'Bicultural education' programs understood in this way, while granting limited access to the larger dominant society (through the shared "core" characteristics of the society), will nonetheless tend to emphasize the primacy of the individual's ethnic group identification. The end of such programs can be summarized as:

> ...to make students aware of the cost of being Americanized and to extoll the virtues of cultural diversity in terms of groups being modified over time in the United States.[14]

'Bicultural education', in its stronger sense, conceives of ethnic identification as being far more encompassing--the individual's identification, at least in the ideal, would not be primarily so much as *exclusively* with his/her ethnic group. The significance of this for educational practice is clear; in a necessarily diverse society, various sorts of ethnic studies programs would be included in the curriculum (directed not to all students, but rather to in-group members alone).[15] Further, whenever possible separate programs, schools, same-ethnicity teachers and/or aides, and so on, will be demanded. In this sense, the term 'bicultural education' ends up advocating an essentially "confederation of nationalities" approach to cultural diversity, in which the culture of each ethnic group is seen as essentially sancrosanct.[16]

While both senses of 'bicultural education' can be found in the literature on minority language and culture groups, the first, weaker, sense will be assumed in the following analysis. This is done for two reasons. First, if the argument holds for the weaker case, it will also logically hold for the stronger one. Second, the weaker sense of the term'bicultural education' is I suspect, closer to that entailed in the concept of 'multicultural education', which appears to be gaining popularity in many educational circles.[17] Our analysis of the label 'bilingual-bicultural education' may, then, apply to that of 'bilingual-multicultural education' as well.

The False Parallel

It was suggested at the start of this paper that the terms 'bilingual education' and 'bicultural education' refer to quite different--and, indeed, incompatible--sorts of programs. Various meanings of each of these terms have been explored here.

'Bilingual education', at least when understood in the contemporary U.S. context, is basically assimilatory in nature, and can be assumed, at the very most, to be neutral in terms of the minority child's retention (or, for that matter, loss) of his/her native language.

'Bicultural education', on the other hand, even in its weaker sense, maintains the fundamental primacy of the individual's ethnic identification (albeit an identification which is understood to have been altered in the American context). Further, the school is perceived as having an obligation not simply to recognize, but to support, this identification in terms of curricular and program design.

There is a potentially serious incompatibility which arises, then, in attempting to design an educational program which can be both 'bilingual' and 'bicultural' in nature--unless one assumes that it is possible for an individual to be both 'bicultural' *and* monolingual. This raises an important question: To what extent is it possible for a person to be bicultural but to have access to only a single language? Pratte, in an otherwise exemplary analysis of the notions of 'bilingualism' and 'biculturalism', suggests that such an individual may well be imagined.[18] His example is that of "the Jew who spends part of his daily life immersed in secondary relationships involving business with Gentiles, but whose home life and primary associations are spent wholly with other Jews."[19] This is an excellent example, and one which can be used here to demonstrate the problems with this claim. Let us begin by eliminating the quite likely possibility that such an individual would possess, at the very least, a rudimentary knowledge of Hebrew for religious purposes. Let us also grant that such an individual was raised in a home in which only English was spoken, and that this individual has never studied any language other than English, either formally or informally. This would certainly make the individual a monolingual speaker, and therefore make Pratte's contention that it is possible to be both bicultural and monolingual a reasonable one.

The problem here is that the notion of "language" is, at the very best of times, one difficult to make much sense of--indeed, the notion itself is a "non-linguistic" one.[20] Clearly this individual speaks a single language, but, like all of us, he will actually speak a number of language varieties and variations (the technical term is 'registers')[21]--some of which will overlap with those spoken by the general population of the society, and some of which will not. Specifically, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that a significant proportion of the American Jewish population speak, at least in certain contexts, a variety of American English which is distinct from other varieties in terms of both lexicon and syntax.[22]

A few examples may help to clarify this claim. Consider, for instance, lexical items such as 'book', 'telephone', and 'desk'. These are items which are common to virtually all speakers of American English, regardless of their religious, ethnic, social class, or racial origin. These may be contrasted with items such as 'chutzpah',

'kibbitz', 'miskait', and 'shelp', which *may* be found in all sorts of populations in this country, but which are *most likely* to be found in the speech of Jews (and especially in the cases of those Jews who choose to associate mainly with other Jews in their primary relationships). Similarly, two syntactic features which are found primarily in the speech of Jews[23] are "Y-Movement" (e.g., "A Cadallac he drives" or "With her boyfriend she lives")[24] and "psycho-ostensives" (e.g., "I should live so long" or "You should only be so lucky").[25] I would suggest that the use of such linguistic features would be considerably more likely by Pratte's bicultural, monolingual individual in his contacts with other Jews than in those which he has the Gentiles. Thus, although he may well be a "monolingual," this bicultural individual will nevertheless make use of different language *varieties* in each of the cultural spheres in which he operates.

In short, what is being argued here is that not only is it the case that 'bilingualism' and 'biculturalism' are interrelated and interdependent, as Pratte correctly notes,[26] but that a necessary precondition for 'biculturalism' may well be the possession of a diverse language repertoire by the 'bicultural' individual, with distinct language varieties for use in each of his/her cultures.

Public policies, whether educational, political, economic, or whatever, cannot seek conflicting objectives and, at the same time, be expected to achieve even a minimal amount of success. This would appear to be a "truism," and yet it is precisely what is being asked in the case of 'bilingual-bicultural education' programs. A less confused mandate would appear to be required. Are we to pursue a basically assimilatory approach, represented by programs such a 'bilingual education', or are we to embrace cultural diversity, and all that such a commitment would entail? An answer is needed, but it will not be found in poorly conceived, and even more poorly understood, labels and slogans.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Thomas F. Green, *Education and Pluralism: Ideal and Reality* (Syracuse, NY: College of Education, Syracuse University, 1966); Richard Pratte, *Pluralism in Education* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1979); Robert J. Skovira, "Cultural Pluralism, Categories of Identity, and Definitions of Ethnicity in Educational Discourse," in *Philosophical Studies in Education* (Terre Haute, IN: Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, 1979); and Nicholas Appleton, "Democracy and Cultural Pluralism: Ideals in Conflict," in *Philosophy of Education: 1982*, in press.

2. An important exception is found in Pratte, *Pluralism in Education*, pp. 182-185. Pratte notes that although the terms are interrelated and interdependent, they are not identical.

3. See Timothy Reagan, "Bilingual Education: A Reevaluation of Objectives," *Journal of the Midwest History of Education Society* 8 (1980): 15-25.

4. See Rolf Kjolseth, "Bilingual Education in the United States: For Assimilation or Pluralism?" in *Bilingualism in the Southwest*, ed. Paul R. Turner (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1973).

5. See Rudolph C. Troike, *Research Evidence for the Effectiveness of Bilingual Education* (Rosslyn, VA: National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education, 1978); and idem, "Synthesis of Research on Bilingual Education," *Educational Leadership* 38, 6 (March 1981).

6. See Ricardo L. Garcia, *Teaching in a Pluralistic Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982, 1982), p. 140. Garcia refers to such programs as "restoration programs."

7. Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

8. See W. E. Lambert and G. R. Tucker, *Bilingual Education of Children: The St. Lambert Experiment*, (Rowley, MA: Newbury House, 1972).

9. See Dorothy Legarretta, "Language Choice in Bilingual Classrooms," in (SUNY ed.,) *Teaching English as a Second Language: Perspectives and Practices*, vol. 6 (Albany, NY: State Department of Education, 1978), pp. 43-54.

10. I do not believe that this constitutes the use of a "straw man" argument. Despite the variations in kind found in bilingual education programs in the United States, it remains the case that only transitional programs have been mandated, and that the vast majority of bilingual education programs are, in essence, transitional in nature. See Kjolseth, "Bilingual Education Programs in the United States."

11. See Raymond Williams, "Culture and Civilization," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 271-276.

12. Richard Pratte, "Five Ideologies of Cultural Diversity and Their Curricular Ramifications," in Philosophy of Education: 1979 (Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1980), pp. 267-268.

13. Ibid., p. 272.

14. Ibid., p. 273.

15. Ibid., p. 271

16. See Isaac B. Berkson, Theories of Americanization: A Critical Study (New York: Teachers College Press, 1920).

17. For an excellent analysis of the meanings of 'multicultural education', see Richard Pratte, "Multicultural Education: Four Normative Arguments," unpublished draft.

18. Pratte, Pluralism in Education, p. 183.

19. Ibid.

20. See J. K. Chambers and Peter Trudgill, Dialectology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 5.

21. See, for example, Peter Trudgill, Sociolinguistics (Middlesex: Penguin, 1974), p. 104.

22. Mark H. Feinstein, "Ethnicity and Topicalization in New York City English," International Journal of the Sociology of Language 26 (1980): 15-24, is useful here. See also Alan Hudson-Edwards, "Sociolinguistic Reflexes of Jewish Identification," International Journal of the Sociology of Language 26 (1980): 41-74.

23. Feinstein, "Ethnicity and Topicalization."

24. See Scott Soames and David M. Perlmutter, Syntactic Argumentation and the Structure of English (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 237; and Feinstein, "Ethnicity and Topicalization," 15-17.

25. See James A. Matisoff, Blessings, Curses, Hopes, and Fears: Psycho-Ostensive Expressions in Yiddish (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979).

26. Pratte, Pluralism in Education, p. 183.

CAN WE LEGISLATE GOOD TEACHING?
A CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECT MATTER IN PUBLIC LAW 94-142

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In 1975, Gerald Ford signed into Law the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Public Law 94-142. This is the first law that clearly and directly defines an instructional planning process. Special educators and child advocates did not seem to fear this intrusion of the federal government into the affairs of local school districts. In fact, they sought it. The law is the culmination of court decisions and legislation directed by parents organizations and special educators who wanted to make school districts meet the special needs of handicapped children. Federal control, they hoped, would help them get help for their children.

Perhaps they were right. There is probably nothing wrong with using a federal law to reform local governmental institutions. But we should be careful that the reform is truly worthy of the name. My feeling is that the model of curriculum planning that is outlined in the Public Law 94-142 could not improve education for handicapped children or anyone else. It can not do this because those people who drafted the legislation seemed to hold a shallow conception of subject matter. The law does not specifically say what teachers should teach nor how teachers should conduct their classes. But in their outline of the process of lesson planning, the legislators implied that the material to be learned is separate from the interests of the child. The law seems to imply that the job of the teacher is to find the best way to get a body of skills and information across to the students.

Public Law 94-142 says that an individual educational plan must be drawn up for each child who seems to be suffering from a handicap. The law asks that, when a parent or teacher suspects a child may be suffering from a handicap that impairs his or her school progress, the school district send the child to qualified diagnosticians to help determine the causes of the child's problems. The intent of this requirement is to insure that no one test will become the basis of a diagnosis or educational prescription. Once the tests are completed, the teacher or special teacher, the parents, some school administrators such as the school psychologist or curriculum supervisor or principal sit down together and agree upon an educational plan for the child. The child may, in some cases, attend this meeting. This plan specifies the remedial work that the team believes the child needs to develop his abilities and, possibly, to catch up with his age mates. The plan states the yearly goals and short term objectives for the child in words that suggest how to measure achievement.

The way this placement team conference is arranged reveals the bias of the law. There are four factors within this conference that encourage the participants to view school life mechanically. These factors tend to make one view school as a place where one learns certain information and make it difficult for anyone to see the subject matter of any course as a tool to help people do things, a tool that constantly changes as people use it. These factors are a reliance on statistical methods of testing, a concern for the child's strengths and weaknesses, a demand for the teacher to be accountable, and an equal sharing of responsibility for developing the plan.

First, the use of statistical methods of testing encourages the participants on the team to see the subject matter as independent of the child. These tests compare the child's development with that of other children of the same age. Almost any parent who asks, "How is my child doing?" is looking for such a comparison. But when they do this they imply that all children should progress through their studies in a certain direct manner. They tend to think that students, for example, should be able to read certain things at particular ages. Or they feel that athletes should be able to throw balls or run at particular speeds depending on their personal development. To some extent this is an unavoidable way for anyone to think about a child's learning. But it is dangerous. It leads to the excessive pressure which coaches complain about in Little League baseball games. It turns elementary music performances into athletic competitions. And it takes the fun out of much of what people do.

Statistical tests have apowerful influence in any school. They appear to be more objective than a teacher's grades. Their apparent complexity can disguise their simple nature. That is, parents or teachers who complain about teachers' grades causing children to work at things they dislike may not see that these tests are similar. Worse, school

people may let these tests give a simplistic appraisal of a student's work. These tests give an accurate measure of the skills a child has acquired. Teachers can not document as easily the student's appreciation of those skills. Consequently, if teachers pay too much attention to those tests, they may end up teaching children to do things but never teaching students how to decide what should be done. For example, widely used measures of children's reading abilities may encourage teachers to think of reading as a body of decoding skills that have to be mastered by particular ages. The danger here is that teachers may forget that students have to learn how to decide what to read as well as how to read. And their lessons will simply be some form of skill development.

While statistical tests, like teachers' grades, can have a miseducative effect in any school setting, the danger these tests represent is greater in a placement team conference than in a regular classroom because these tests represent the educational diagnosis upon which the team is to build its individual educational prescription. Since the team members are supposed to look more closely at these test results than a regular classroom teacher might be expected to, the dangers these tests represent should be greater in a placement team meeting.

The second factor that invites participants of the placement team to view school life as rigid is the concern for the child's strengths and weaknesses. The danger here is that, once the child's deficiencies are pointed out, the usual solution is to reinforce those skills isolated from any other. This effort to break a complex activity like reading or mathematical calculations into constituent parts that can be taught independently seems to always devolve into some kind of exercises that are based on drill and repetition. This may occur because the aim of the activity is to practice a skill which can later be applied to achieve some goal.

Of course, drill and repetition can be a helpful form of learning as long as the student appreciates the end towards which the practice applies. But it is often hard for students to realize how practicing musical scales or learning number facts will help them play music or grow gardens. Teachers have known this for a long time. They try to make lessons meaningful by explaining that some day the students will thank them for any present discomfort, or they use word problems to show how number facts can be applied to real life situations. These are inadequate measures because one can be told the value of something and never appreciate it. Even though the placement team conference is supposed to tailor an individual educational plan to the child, the results go no further in reducing this difficulty. For example, a student may be a member of the team that is to decide his own I.E.P. He could realize that math skills are important to later success in other school subjects and agree to take remedial instruction in that area. But his decision can be as abstract to him as a smoker's admission is to himself, that smoking is ruining his health and that some day he will have to stop.

Furthermore, the fact that handicapped children are given remedial lessons to bolster skills they have only faintly acquired may lead placement team members to think of school subjects as separate from the child. For example, the teachers of these handicapped children try to make the lessons as interesting as possible. They use expensive equipment like computers to engage the child in mundane repetitive tasks. But this can make the teacher's job more difficult. As the child becomes inured by the imaginative ways lessons are presented, it will take progressively more involved and more elaborate lessons to capture his or her interest. On the other hand, if the child ever decided it was important to learn this material, the teacher's job would be simplified. Consequently, remedial instruction could make it harder for a student to appreciate the importance of any course of study and thereby increase the child's resistance to acquiring those skills. But when the placement team tries to deal with this resistance, they may end up limiting the way they view the problem. One way this can happen is if the team members step around the deeper question of interest and talk more of such things as preferred learning mode to make the remediation effective.

The third factor that encourages a mechanical conception of curriculum is the accountability it demands of the teacher. The teacher is one of the many members of the conference. The law implies some form of compromise between the parties will occur, and the team will agree on what the child should learn and how these lessons will be taught. When the plans are drawn in advance the role of the teacher, even when the teacher was most influential in setting up the plan, is to follow instructions and keep records. In this way, the teacher's role is severely limited. No longer is the teacher an individual who guides the child through activities that fit the child's developing interests. Such an ideal requires a level of faith in teachers that those who drafted the legislation did not have. Remember parents and special educators worked for P.L. 94-142 because they feared teachers were not willing to take the extra time or effort they felt their children

needed. In fact, the law tries to keep the teacher continually at work to meet the diagnosed needs of the child. Any objective as slippery as "meeting developing interests" is too vague to ensure the teacher is meeting his or her responsibilities.

The law's attempt to make a teacher accountable implies a static conception of subject matter because it seems to direct the teacher to plan intriguing lessons from which the child can profit. This accountability discourages one from holding a dynamic notion of subject matter. That is, one tends not to think of subject matter as a field of endeavor which the the student and teacher will explore if they have to meet certain short term objectives and long term goals. Rather, the desire to hold the teacher to the task causes one to imagine the subject matter to be something that can be logically and finally outlined as in a textbook and through which children can be marched although at different rates and in different ways.

The final factor in the placement team meeting that lends to a shallow conception of subject matter is the desire to be fair to all parties involved. Strictly speaking, everyone on the committee has equal opportunity to advance ideas or reject those of the other people. The law sets out a process of review or due process that is quasi-legal in nature. If any party feels the team's decision is bad, he or she can appeal to an impartial hearing officer. If the decision of this officer is not satisfactory, he or she can appeal the issue through the courts. This procedure of review affects the conception of curriculum planning for it ensures that all parties must be equally satisfied with the final plan. In order for this to happen, though, no one should be completely satisfied. In fact, no one may be completely responsible for the product.

The law does say that the superintendent of the schools will appoint someone to chair the meeting. But it does not say what the chairperson's responsibilities are besides ensuring that the parents are adequately informed, that the meeting is conducted in a language all participants can understand and that all information from the multifactored assessment is available. In other words, it would seem that the chairperson should try to ensure that everyone has an opportunity to participate in the planning process.

Supporters of the legislation say the law calls for cooperation between all parties. But a notion of shared responsibility, in this regard, seems to mean that the curriculum that comes from a team can be a patchwork of suggestions. Parents may think a child needs to learn to tell time or to tie shoelaces. A teacher may complain of a child's inability to sound certain phonetic combinations. A principal may note that the child does not pass quietly through the halls. The educational plan that comes from a team conference could simply attack each of these skills. It need not be a plan that has integrated objectives around activities that interest the children and will lead them from things they normally do to things they would not have imagined they would want to do.

An integrated plan of study cannot emerge unless someone is clearly in charge. A teacher has to take responsibility for pulling everything together. That teacher has to understand why the lesson was chosen, how it relates to others, and how it interacts with the child's desires or experiences. When teachers have such understanding, they can adapt or change the plans as they are employing them. On the other hand, if a teacher is simply doing what several other people said had to be done, that teacher's lessons may be so mindless that they make the effort worse than it would have been without the meeting.

Teachers and administrators who have been part of a placement team may say that I am exaggerating. They may say that while they consult statistical tests, they do not let these tests turn classroom activities into endless mind-dulling drill and repetition exercises. They may say that they write their short term objectives and long term goals in a way that enables them to do what they want to do. They may add that these goals are so vague that there is plenty of time and opportunity for students and teachers to engage in activities that interest them. Finally, they may add that they are not fair to all involved. That is, they may say that they think parents want professional educators to know what children need. These educators may conclude by noting that the teachers may get together and decide what they want for the student. When the parents come in, they are confronted with a completed educational plan which they can only approve or disapprove. As a result, the educators may say that the parents cannot actually help form the plan.

These practices go on because no one stringently supervises all schools. But the law should not be evaluated by its enforcement. The question before us is what direction is the law moving school people? My point is that P.L. 94-142 failed to revolutionize schools because it is reactionary in nature.

It may be that the shallow conception of subject matter that one finds on a close reading of the Public Law 94-142 arises, in part, because those involved in it thought of the school as a factory that produces learning. This is an old idea that comes out in the way the law tries to help handicapped students.

P.L. 94-142 is supposed to mandate mainstreaming. This is a misconception. But like all misconceptions it is based on a fragment of truth. The law calls for a child to receive the needed instruction in the least restrictive environment. The aim of this phrase is to end the tendency of schools to turn special education classes into educational Siberias. Special educators often complained that once children were labelled as needing special care, they were often sent to isolated classes and never returned to normal courses. By calling for the least restrictive environment, the law makers wanted to ensure that children who could profit from contact with other children did so by maintaining their progress in those school subjects they were able to. They wanted the child to return to normal classes as soon as any educational deficiencies were made up if this was possible.

Unfortunately, the image such a wish conveys is one of a school as a factory. The children are seen as moving along a conveyor belt introduced to bodies of knowledge. Those who cannot learn are removed from the procession, as a quality controller would remove some pieces from an assembly line in order to make minor adjustments before replacing them on the line.

This is not to imply that reformers actually had such an image of school life in their mind, when they drafted the legislation. Few educators would speak as coldly of their schools. But a model of school as a factory that imparts to all students certain skills or information is common. It has been and continues to be popular among those who wish to make teaching scientific. Franklin Bobbitt advocated as approach to curriculum in 1918 that made the schools a place where one learned information and skills that were not sufficiently attained outside of school. And B. Othanel Smith in 1980 called for a school of pedagogy that taught prospective teachers the skills that researchers show are effective in helping children master school subjects. While each of these men would object to anyone characterizing their ideas as derived from a factory model, there is a similarity. Given the popularity of such an idea, it is not surprising to find it in this effort to reform special education. The tragedy is that the law did not have to take such a turn.

If the teacher had been made the central figure of educational planning, the mechanical image of schooling and the separation of the students from the subject matter might have been avoided. This could have been easily arranged. For example, the placement team conference could have been designed to be a source of information for the teacher to use in coming to know more about the child. The trick in planning any good curriculum is finding the ways one can have the classroom activities interact with the activities the child engages in at home. Unless this occurs, the child will think that school work is separate from real life. When classroom activities are built on things the child normally does outside, he or she will see that school life is valuable. The placement team conference could have been designed to help the teacher achieve this interaction. Perhaps in some ways it does that now. But the law seems to pull the participants in another direction.

It is here that our ideas come full circle. I argue that we can avoid the dangers implicit in the law to help handicapped students by placing teachers fully in charge. Supporters of the law will point out that they wanted the law as it is because teachers ignored their responsibility to handicapped children. The dilemma is that we need the law when teachers are negligent but, when we call them to task, we set up conditions that violate the principles of good teaching.

What should we do? Perhaps nothing. It may be that through open discussion and debate about the benefits and dangers of trying to reform schools we ensure that everyone will act as intelligently and humanly as possible. At least, it is reasonable for us as intellectuals to express such a hope.

MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON TEACHING

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The topic of this essay is multifaceted and demands clarification as well as discussion--each of its several aspects must be sorted out before fruitful philosophical debate can proceed. The question of whether or not there are moral constraints on teaching is itself far too amorphous, and different answers will be appropriate to different interpretations, different versions of that question. Thus, although we might readily agree that immoral teaching techniques ought, morally, to be eschewed, we might well not agree that immoral instruction fails, by definition, to qualify as teaching. And, as we shall see, simple answers to the question, variously interpreted, hardly exhaust the interest of this topic; for even after it has been determined that moral constraints are in force, many important issues will remain about the character of those constraints and the reasons why they are needed.

In order to clear the ground for a serious philosophical treatment of the topic, it is worthwhile to begin by considering some all too obviously false as well as some all to trivially true versions of the claim that there are moral constraints on teaching. As we remove the under-brush, though, we may discover, in some cases, some unexpected benefits, some valuable clues to other lines of fruitful inquiry.

Perhaps the most obviously false claim about moral constraints on teaching concerns the content of the teaching, the subject matter being taught. In its baldest form, this claim is that one cannot teach immoral things. Would that it were true. But we all know of cases where people teach people immoral things. Or do we? One such case which comes to mind is that of Fagin, in Dickens' *Oliver Twist*. Fagin not only teaches pickpocketing to his hapless charges, he does so using still fashionable 'simulation-game' techniques. And we can, I think, safely ignore the fact that this example is fictitious, since Dickens, of all writers, is surely writing about things which could happen. Now Oliver Twist does turn out to be a less than promising student, whose scruples stand in the way of putting theory into practice. But should we take this as some sort of confirmation that immoral things cannot be taught--at least not to morally innocent individuals? If we do, then we'll have a lot of explaining to do about Fagin's apparent success at teaching Carley Bates and Jack Dawkins, the Artful Dodger who does befriend and feed the tired and hungry orphan, Oliver.

The example of Fagin may shed some light on the question of moral education. Consider, in this light, Plato's insistence in the *Meno* that virtue can only be taught if it is knowledge. The underlying assumption seems to be that only knowledge is teachable. And, while many of us may be skeptical that virtue is knowledge, most of us, I think, would have no doubts whatever that immorality *isn't* knowledge. So, it would seem that, on Plato's assumption, immorality can't be taught.

Of course it might be rejoined that, in being taught to pick pockets, Dawkins and company *have* acquired some sort of knowledge; for in terms of G. Ryle's familiar distinction between knowing *that* and knowing *how*, it can scarcely be denied that the young rouges have been taught, have come to know, how to pick pockets. And if we can be taught to do immoral things, like surreptitious thievery, then how can we deny that immorality is teachable? Well, for one think, there is a further distinction to be made between being taught *how* to do things and being taught *to* do them, which, in the present context, involves actually doing them. Notice, once again, that while Oliver is taught *how* to pick pockets, he really isn't taught *to*, doesn't actually pick any pockets--except as part of a simulated activity in which Fagin pretends to be an absent-minded window-shopper. But this is no cause for genuine optimism about human nature. Teachers can lead their charges astray, and what prevents Oliver from entering a life of crime is not mere innocence but pre-established moral scruples. Innocence can be corrupted by unscrupulous teachers, and one way of doing so is by teaching the innocent to do immoral things. When the success of these efforts is not hampered by the pupil's conscience, moreover, there is every reason to believe that the very development of that conscience will be adversely affected by, will conform to, the immoral teachings.

Now if immoral things can be taught, it seems obviously worth mentioning that, morally speaking, they ought not to be taught. (If immoral things couldn't be taught, there would be no point in proscribing their being taught: 'ought not' implies 'can.') But the issue of teachability is not so easily resolved. That issue has, on the face of it, a certain ambiguity. Thus, in suggesting that immoral things are unteachable, one might mean to say that if immoral things are conveyed from person, to person, the means of conveyance could still not be called "teaching." This would be a comment on our usage of the term "teaching," and that comment would probably strike most people as a trivial, purely verbal observation. But another thing which might be meant by suggesting that immoral things are unteachable seems far less trivial--namely, the idea that teaching involves some sort of rational persuasion which would be conspicuously absent in trying to convey immoral subject matters. Now if this latter suggestion is intended as a descriptive remark about our criteria for the term "teaching," then it really is no different than the former suggestion, which does, however, become less trivial in retrospect. But if the latter suggestion is normative in character, proposing some ideal conception of teaching, then the two suggestions part company.

Let's review the merits of these suggestions, variously interpreted. First, the verbal point: our use of the term "teaching" seems far too flexible to insist that it is imporperly used with reference to immoral subject matters. Besides, even if we do balk a bit at the idea that a morally conscientious person might be taught (to do) immoral things, we certainly can't deny that immoral people can be (said to be?) so taught.

Second, the descriptive claim about our criteria of teaching: it should be remarked here that rational persuasion would sometimes be unnecessary in cases of trying to foster someone's knowing *how*, yet we don't hesitate to describe such cases as ones of teaching. And if we wish to modify our criteria of teaching to suit these cases--say, by proposing the need for critically controlled techniques of demonstration--then we will probably have to give up on the idea that cases of passing on immoral things are not cases of teaching. After all, the master criminal who passes on his evil expertise could well be a critical teacher who fosters self-critical mastery in his eager pupils.

Third, the normative claim about ideal criteria of teaching might involve the proposal that rational persuasion--understood as the teacher's appeal to the independent judgment of the pupil--is requisite to all good and true teaching. And if we thereby deny that all cases of fostering someone's knowing *how* to do things are cases of teaching, we might nevertheless defend as an ideal our restricted and reformed notion of teaching. But what becomes of the insistence, based on this ideal notion, that immoral matters can't be taught? It now amounts to the claim that people can't be rationally persuaded that immoral things are right and proper. And if we subscribe to a Kantian view of morality as rationality in the sphere of action, this claim will seem neither surprising nor questionable. However, if we recognize the possibility of immoral but rational self-interest, then--all things considered--we may still deny this claim, still assume that immoral things can indeed be taught.

Another, quite different interpretation of the claim that there are moral constraints on teaching concerns the person doing the teaching. According to this view, a person who teaches must be a moral person. Now school administrators, parents and other concerned members of the community in which a teacher works will frequently agree with this view. But just what are they agreeing with? They surely do not mean to say that a person who is immoral cannot engage in activity which would be called, would qualify as, teaching. Apparently their understanding of this view is more normative in character, more to the effect that an immoral person *should* not engage in teaching--especially when those being taught are children.

Reasons for this viewpoint would include a justifiable concern that those who are immoral, who do engage in immoral pursuits outside of the classroom, are not to be entrusted with the care of the young and defenseless. Critics of this viewpoint usually make the rejoinder that what a person does outside of the classroom, outside of the teaching relationship, has no clear relevance to what goes on in the classroom. But I suspect that this rejoinder is often not made in good faith, is often based on the suppressed belief that what the allegedly immoral teachers do outside of the classroom is not really, or at any rate not seriously,

immoral. Thus, the teacher who drinks, is sexually promiscuous, or has homosexual proclivities, is not thought to be seriously immoral. Given this belief, tolerance seems a good idea. But unless some such belief lies behind the claim that a teacher's private life is his or her own business, that claim seems suspect. Indeed, since morality is chiefly a public matter, the very idea of private immorality may strike some people as absurd. But, of course, what's meant by private immorality is not something which only affects oneself; rather, it is something which only affects one's personal relations. And given this understanding of private immorality, it seems almost trivial to suggest that such immorality will not be relevant to the enterprise of teaching.

The seemingly tough-minded approach to this matter is the suggestion that a teacher should be assessed as a teacher only for those things which he or she does in the capacity of, in the role of, teacher. However, there are reasons to question the soundness of this approach. One such reason is the idea that teachers serve as models for their students and, so, ought to be model citizens, morally upstanding members of their community. Notice, though, that this reason is not exactly at odds with the idea that teachers should only be evaluated as teachers, but rather is a suggestion that the role of teachers extends to their lives outside of the classroom. Part of the reason is supposed to be that this extended role will eliminate that unfortunate hypocrisy of a teacher who tells the students one thing but does another. Ironically, however, when this view of things holds sway over a community, it seems to engender an even greater hypocrisy among parents and community leaders, who expect far more from the teachers than from themselves. Moreover, teachers who function in such a climate can end up trying too hard to be saints in the eyes of their communities, and this can lead to an overly narrow conception of moral behavior--a conception which hopes to satisfy everyone. Saintliness is, moreover, an unrealistic expectation for us to have about our teachers, and the probable outcome of such expectations is for us to end up with teachers in bad faith, teachers whose lives are inauthentic replicas of some impossible ideal. That such inauthenticity itself poses a serious moral problem is, of course, the final irony.

A somewhat better reason for deciding that immoral people should not teach children is the impressionability of children combined with the possibility that immorality is not merely an isolated compartment of one's life, but a subtlely pervasive feature of one's whole being: the sweet little old white lady who just happens to think that all blacks should be sterilized surgically is not really all that sweet. And if you are inclined to dismiss this reason out of hand, I ask you to consider whether you would trust a Charlie Manson to teach children ordinary school subjects, even assuming that suitable precautions are taken to ensure the physical safety of those children and to prevent the lessons from straying very far from the specified curriculum. This example is admittedly, rather extreme; but it does serve to highlight what is, I think, a legitimate concern. I observed earlier that tolerance of teachers' immorality outside of teaching may sometimes mask the belief that the alleged immorality is not so bad. That observation may have seemed more clinical than philosophical, but it is a possible interpretation of what's meant by the commonplace suggestion that private immorality has little to do with acceptable teaching. And the point of the extreme example just given is to force an issue into the open, to show the undeniable merit of moral constraints on teachers even when they are not teaching. We must avoid moral squeamishness and an all too narrow conception of properly moral behavior, but that doesn't mean we should tolerate grave immorality on the part of teachers, so long as they *seem* to behave well in the classroom.

Now it may be beginning to seem as though moral constraints on teaching are only plausible as straightforward moral injunctions to the effect that a teacher shouldn't teach immoral things and that, if teachers are to be forces for moral good, they shouldn't be chosen from among the ranks of the morally depraved. However, there may be more to legitimate moral constraints than that. Of course, I don't mean to minimize the importance of the aforementioned injunctions; rather, I mean to say that there may be another dimension in which moral constraints hold true. It may be, for instance, that immoral people not only *should* not, but also--at least in some cases--*cannot* teach. Here I am emphasizing, once again, some facts about *teachers*; so I am still examining my second interpretation of the claim that there are moral constraints on teaching, the interpretation which says that a person who teaches must be moral. However, I shall explore this

matter now with special reference to the *content* of the teaching. I shall examine the view that immoral people cannot teach certain kinds of things. Now obviously even Charlie Manson ought to be able to teach a child (who know the alphabet, etc.) how to spell the word "cat." And surely many immoral adults would be capable of teaching just about everything in our present public school curricula. But this doesn't mean that the view in question is patently incorrect. There may be certain special things which immoral people are ill-equipped to teach. The strongest candidate-subject-matter, which many of you have surely guessed already, is morality and virtue.

Of course many people might antecedently agree with Socrates' reservations about the very possibility of anyone's teaching virtue; so while they would also agree that immoral people can't do so, their agreement on this latter point would lose much of its interest. Instead of revealing any deep truth about the incapacity of immoral people to teach morality, the point becomes a mere corollary of some general skepticism about the prospects for moral education.

To keep things interesting, let's assume--*pace* Socrates--that virtue can be taught, and examine, on this hypothesis, whether immoral people are capable of teaching it. In the spirit of Socratic inquiry, however, we might ask ourselves, first, whether teachers of a given art have to be practioners of that art. But since it is easy to produce counterinstances of paraplegic gymnastics coaches, etc., we don't have to search far to support a negative answer to the question. And since teachers don't have to *do* but just have to *teach*, it may also seem fairly obvious that one doesn't have to be moral in order to teach morality. Granted that an immoral teacher of morality would be a hypocrite, trying to convince his or her charges to 'do as I say, not as I do,' it doesn't follow that such a teacher wouldn't be an *effective* hypocrite. Of course if we consider extreme cases of moral depravity, we might strongly suspect that the lessons would be lost in an atmosphere of evil. But, once again to keep things interesting, let's not argue from extremes. Suppose our prospective moral educator is secretly but genuinely immoral--the sort of person we might never suspect of any wrongdoings. Inscfar as the appearance of rectitude is concerned, this person's character might seem unimpeachable. Have we any doubts that such a person might well serve as a good example to his students, provided the truth about certain shabby behavior off-stage, so to speak, is never revealed?

But this example doesn't demonstrate that an immoral person can teach others to be moral, unless we assume that serving as a model of morality amounts to teaching morality. Such modeling may be intentional and even efficacious in producing students with a moral outlook, but it certainly doesn't measure up to the criterion for teaching mentioned earlier: such modeling, by itself, does not qualify as rational persuasion concerning the validity of a moral outlook.

Nevertheless, if we were to insist upon this criterion of teaching, there would be some grounds for supposing that immoral people couldn't teach morality, even if morality were in fact teachable. Now obviously one way of reaching such a conclusion would depend upon a Kantian conception of morality: an immoral person, on such a conception, would be an irrational person, at least in certain areas of practical reasoning; and how could an irrational person engage in rational persuasion on the very matters concerning which that irrationality manifests itself? But another way of reaching that conclusion does not presuppose a Kantian view of morality. This approach requires some philosophical preparations of a different sort.

I'm sure most teachers have heard it observed that one of the best ways to master a particular subject matter is to teach that subject to other people. As Seneca put it, "While we teach, we learn." I've also heard it said that one good way to get a person to change his or her mind on a subject is to get that person to defend the opposing view in a debate format. Both of these observations are empirically based, and I don't intend to rely upon them in my argument. However, both observations do suggest a more philosophical point: if one does rationally persuade someone else about something, one would be hard put not to be, thereby, rationally persuaded oneself. Of course, it might be objected that the art of racional persuasion depends not upon some ideal standard of logically adequate explanation, but rather upon what's needed, given the rational development of one's audience, to persuade that audience rationally. If so, then--the objection might run--the person doing the

persuading might not have the appropriate development to be persuaded by his or her own words. However, this objection seems rather implausible; since, if the person doing the persuading is in a position to tailor the persuasive remarks to the intended audience, that person would surely have a firm grasp on the sorts of things which would bring rational conviction to a wide range of different audiences. So it seems unlikely that that person himself o. herself would not lie within that range, would not have a grasp on the sort of things needed to persuade himself or herself.

It remains, of course, to spell out the exact implications of all this for the immoral teacher or morality: one is put in mind of the saying, "Physician, heal thyself." The point here is simply that anyone who rationally persuades others to accept a moral outlook would be hard put not to be thus persuaded himself or herself as well. As against this point, however, we ought to consider Shadespeare's words in the *Merchant of Venice:* "I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow my own teaching." These words are, of course, to humorous effect; so we might dismiss them as a species of non sequitur humor. But it seems to me more plausible that the words are meant to suggest that the teaching can't be followed in the first place, that the lessons don't achieve the goal of genuine rational persuasion.

Or is it possible that some people are so morally blind that they cannot see the point of any moral instruction, even their own, regardless of how rationally persuasive it might be? Such extreme moral blindness may indeed ' exist, but if morality is teachable, i.e., if people may be rationally persuaded to adopt a moral point of view, then this moral blindness must also be a rational blindness. And if one is blind to rational considerations, it seems evident that one can't very well engage in profering them to others, much less benefit oneself morally by doing so. Shakespeare does not seem to be denying any of this so much as to be playing off of certain aspects of it.

But let's return to a certain line of attack against the conclusions drawn above. Those conclusions depend upon the secondary assumption that one can't rationally persuade others without being rationally persuaded oneself either antecedently to, or while in the process of, rationally persuading others. But perhaps this lemma is shakier than we've been supposing. Teachers of philosophy are all too painfully aware of occasions when certain lines of argument, lines concerning which they have their own strong reservations, must be defended against their students' all too facile disputations. The outcome of such teachers' efforts may be said to be the rational persuasion of their students, say, that Plato shows how teaching is impossible, that Anselm proves the existence of God, and so on. How are we to describe such cases? Should we draw a distinction between rational techniques of persuasion and rationally adequate persuasion, suggesting that the students may have been convinced on the basis of rational techniques, but that their conviction is not based on rationally adequate persuasion? If we do take this tack, we could say that the philosophy teacher fails to be persuaded by the rational techniques he or she employes to persuade others, because he or she recognizes that these techniques are not wholly adequate to prove the point in question. But this probably overstates the case, since many such teachers may not actually *know* that the arguments advanced to their students are not wholly adequate, but merely have some vague suspicions about the soundness of those arguments. And those suspicions, which may even be unfounded, may suffice to make the teacher withold asent from the conclusions embraced by the students. Now this would seem to suggest the falsity of our lemma, suggest that one can rationally persuade others by using rationally adequate means, without being persuaded oneself. But the matter is still more complicated than it may seem, since it is hard to maintain that the students are *genuinely* persuaded rationally if their own teachers, who are bound to be more at home with abstruse argumentation than most college freshmen, are not thus persuaded. And it may well be that, although the means of persuasion are rationally adequate, the students' conviction is not based upon a proper understanding of the rational adequacy of those means.

In light of these complications, our lemma should, perhaps, be restated as follows: if a teacher can rationally persuade his or her students of something, *making sure in doing so* that those students are properly convinced on the basis of

rationally adequate considerations, then that teacher must also be rationally persuaded of that something. And if that something is a moral outlook, it follows that the teacher of it cannot possibly lack that moral outlook. This is what I mean by alleging that an immoral person cannot teach morality. It is either a deep philosophical truth or deeply sophistical, and the irony here is that I'm not altogether sure which it is.

The final interpretation I should like to consider of the claim that there are moral constraints on teaching is the most straightforward and, some would say, the most plausible. This version would have it that there are moral constraints on the *activity* of teaching. Understood as a direct moral injunction, this view is surely correct but not very illuminating with regard to the nature of teaching: *of course* teaching should be a moral activity, so should every other activity.

A far more interesting understanding of this view is the following: in order for any activity to qualify as teaching, that activity should be morally unobjectionable. But here there is still some possible ambiguity concerning the standards of teaching in play. If by "teaching" we mean nothing more than the ordinary acceptation of that word, then it is fairly clear that the claim in question is false. What comes readily to mind is the image of an enraged adult, with stick in hand, who says: "I'll teach you not to disobey your elders!" Or, even if we confine usage to the context of the more sober-minded, we hope, goings-on in a classroom, we could discover all sorts of cases where teachers purport to teach by means of modestly immoral practices--e.g., heaping verbal if not physical abuse on the student who answers questions incorrectly. And we may have to rely on moral precepts to forbid such practice, since they don't seem to be ruled out by the dictionary definition of the word "teach"--not that their being ruled out in that fashion would be of much practical significance anyway.

However, if by "teaching" we mean to imply some activity of rational persuasion, if our standard of teaching is more normative than the descriptive standard of ordinary usage, then the claim in question is not so obviously false. Thus, it might be argued that true rational persuasion demands an appeal to the independent, rational judgment of the person to whom the persuasion is directed. And since immoral techniques of would-be instruction are efforts to by-pass the judgment of the prospective pupil, those techniques would not qualify as methods of rational persuasion. To illustrate this point, we might consider the use of physical coercion boarding on torture. This might help students to get the point quickly, but surely its use is not a proper part of rational persuasion. And we can't be found guilty of arguing from in inappropriate extreme, since the same point would also hold true in more moderate circumstances. Thus, a much more mild physical coercion of students might raise a moral scruple or two and, still, would not amount to rational persuasion: it might be rational on the part of the student to avoid the physical consequences of not trying harder to get the point of a lesson, but it wouldn't be rational (*qua* persuasion) on the part of the teacher to threaten those consequences.

Nevertheless, there are some grounds for the suspicion that the alleged moral constraint on the activity of teaching does not hold true. If we explore the specific reasons why such things as physical coercion do not qualify as teaching--understood as rational persuasion--we find that those reasons do not directly concern the immorality of the coercion, etc. The chief difficulty which stands in the way of regarding such things as teaching activities is that coercion, etc., are used to by-pass judgment.

Let's investigate, in turn, whether the immorality of an activity employed for educational purposes is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for its being used to by-pass judgment. Is such immorality a necessary condition? Consider the case of the teacher who demands unquestioning acceptance of certain ideas. This is an attempt to by-pass judgment, but is it immoral? We would certainly look askance at the school teacher in Nazi Germany who demands this sort of unswerving allegiance, in word and deed, to the Third Reich; but we could possibly attribute our negative reaction to the fact that we abhor the immorality of National Socialism. However, we should do well to consider the possibility that we also ought to abhor a teacher's demand for unquestioning acceptance of other moral viewpoints, including our own. After all, such a demand

is quite of a piece with the authoritarian mentality we find morally objectionable in National Socialism.

But before we conclude that all instructional efforts to by-pass judgment are inherently immoral, let's consider another example. Hypnotism is sometimes said to be able to effect educational wonders. Let's assume that people can learn in consequence of hypnotic suggestion. The very suggestability of the hypnotic state would seem to be incompatible with an appeal to the independent judgment of the subject, and yet I don't believe that many people would condemn the instructional use of hypnosis on moral grounds.

Of course it might be objected that this case does not illustrate a willful attempt to by-pass judgment in the hope of 'putting something over' on the unsuspecting hypnotic subject. Indeed, the subject may have eagerly submitted to the experience in the hope of mastering some difficult subject. On the other hand, it might be argued, when the hypnosis is used as part of some deliberate effort to 'brainwash' the subject, then it does seem morally suspect and does serve to by-pass the subject's rational judgment. And if we are prepared to say that any instructional activity which serves deliberately to by-pass the student's judgment is, for that reason alone, immoral, then we are conceding that the immorality of any such activity is a necessary condition of its being used to by-pass judgment. Our moral constraint on teaching is thus a matter of suggesting that if we try not to appeal to the student's independent judgment, then we are behaving immorally and are not engaging in teaching as rational persuasion.

But what if our efforts not to appeal to a student's judgment are in the student's own best interest? The Kantian might well find such a thing morally indefensible, since we would be treating a person, the student, as a means rather than as an end (albeit as a means toward the betterment of the student himself or herself). So, once again, a Kantian conception of morality serve to underwrite a moral constraint on teaching.

However, that constraint is not as strong as it might be, since the immorality of one's instructional activities is not a sufficient condition of their failing to qualify as rational persuasion, of their not appealing to the independent judgment of one's students. And here a Kantian perspective helps to make a point for the other side: one effective way of appealing to a student's judgment might be to lie to that student deliberately, with benevolence of forethought. If the student is in a position to discover the falsehood on the basis of rational considerations, then the lie, used judiciously, may serve as an inducement to think the matter through rationally. Thus, I have heard it said that Jesuits tell their students about certain alleged disproofs of God's existence, in order to get the students to reason carefully about the matter in question. Now many people would insist that such lying is not really immoral, but Kant's well-known intransigence about not allowing exceptions to the moral law would argue that lying for any reason is immoral.

But we don't have to rely on Kant to make this point, since we can modify the example in such a way that we won't question the immorality of the instructional activity: Suppose that, in trying to appeal to the student's judgment, the teacher goes overboard, say, by using unjust measures in order to get the student to hate injustice, or by making up a lie which is so mean and spiteful that it rankles even after the student discovers its falsity by reasoning about the evidence for it. The immorality of such practices is surely not in doubt, but if we construe teaching as rational persuasion, such immorality does not suffice to establish that the teacher who employes these practices is not teaching.

Having surveyed a variety of possible interpretations of the claim that there are moral constraints on teaching, we have discovered some significant connections among specific moral constraints, a normative comception of teaching as rational persuasion, and a Kantian conception of morality. Of course, in the absence of sound arguments in support of the latter conceptions, our conclusions along these lines must remain tentative and hypothetical. But perhaps it is not overly presumptuous to end by suggesting that those philosophers who have insisted that there are moral constraints on teaching may, consciously or unconsciously, have presupposed some such conceptions.

EDUCATION, POWER, AND SELF-ESTEEM: A SCHOOL FOR MAGGIE AND TESS

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In "Education, Justice and Self-Respect: A School for Rodney Dangerfield," Kenneth A. Strike[1] addresses a problem of interest to educators and philosophers of education concerned with social and political change. The problem is the tendency of many students to base their feelings of self-worth on their ability to perform particular tasks in school. Strike provides a conceptual framework for examining the problem and a strategy for solving it. Strike's framework consists of two categories of self-worth, self-respect and self-esteem. Both self-respect and self-esteem are feelings of being worthwhile. The two feelings differ in their rational bases and in their relevance to entitlement to rights. Self-respect is based on recognition that one is a person and that as a person one is entitled to the same rights as all other persons. Self-esteem, on the other hand, is based on recognition that one possesses empirical properties that are valued by oneself and one's society. The sources of self-esteem, unlike the source of self-respect, are not related to entitlement to rights; that is, characteristics such as professional competence, wealth, social status, and political power are not grounds on which individuals are either extended or denied rights. Strike calls the ability to distinguish self-respect from self-esteem "an important survival skill" and suggests that it be taught in the schools.[2]

In this paper, I will argue that although the problem to which Strike calls attention is of special interest to individuals concerned with increasing feelings of self-worth among female students, the solution he proposes is at best utopian; at worst, counterproductive. I will first provide a more detailed account of Strike's position. I will then evaluate his distinction as a tool for increasing feelings of self-worth among female students. Finally, I will describe an alternative to Strike's views.

Strike's View

Strike describes self-respect as a "primary good..., a universal instrumentality ..., something a rational person wants whatever his or her conception of the good, because it turns out to be a prerequisite to achieving other goods...."[3] Persons who do not respect themselves are not likely to have the motivation necessary for pursuing their goals. In addition they are not likely to be willing to defend their rights. Individuals who do not respect themselves are likely to feel that they deserve to be treated badly. To illustrate this point, Strike uses "the institution of slavery where the assault on the dignity of the slave functions to justify slavery to the master and to the slave as well."[4]

According to Strike, the reason that people who are oppressed lack self-respect is that they believe that an individual's worth is based on what he or she is able to accomplish or on how he or she is treated by others rather than on his or her membership "in the class of person,"[5] which is based on properties such as rationality, a moral sense, a capacity for a sense of justice, and creation in the image of God.[6] Membership in the class of persons "makes one an object of value, an end in itself.... And to be an object of value, an end in itself, is to be deserving of respect",[7] hence, regardless of what one does or how one is actually treated, one deserves to be treated with respect.

For Strike, self-esteem has three attributes that distinguish it from self-respect. First, self-esteem is based not on recognition of oneself as a person, but on recognition that one possesses empirical properties that are valued by oneself and one's society. Self-esteem comes from recognition of what one can do. Its major sources are personal competence, the market value of one's skills, and the ability to lead a useful, productive life. Second, the properties on which self-esteem is based are relative to society's norms. Third, although self-esteem is a good, it is "probably not a primary good. It does not have the logical connection to rights that self-respect does...."[8]

According to Strike, the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem "is an important one for individuals to master, for failure to master it may result in a loss of self-respect where only self-esteem should be at stake."[9] He has in mind students who begin to doubt their basic worth because they fail at reading or math. He suggests that teachers master the distinction and then praise or criticize work in

waysthat let students know that superior or inferior performance does not make one a superior or inferior person. He also suggests that lessons on the distinction might be included in the study of morals or civics.

Before evaluating Strike's distinction as a tool for increasing feelings of self-worth of female students, it will be useful to clarify what it is that an individual who masters the distinction can expect to receive. As a basis for this clarification, I will describe another distinction similar to Strike's. The distinction is the one made by Rawls between liberty and the worth of liberty. According to Rawls,[10]

> liberty is represented by the complete system of liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the framework the system defines.

Examined in the framework of Rawls's distinction, Strike's view that an individual's empirical properties do not affect his or her entitlement to rights means simply that empirical properties are not grounds for either extending or denying individuals the rights of citizenship; e.g., the right to vote, freedom of conscience, and freedom for arbitrary arrest and seizure.[11] He does not mean that differences in professional competence, cognitive skills, wealth, or power do not affect an individual's ability to pursue his or her goals (i.e., the worth of his or her liberty.)

Evaluation

Strike's distinction has one advantage and two disadvantages. The advantage is that it provides students who do not excel at particular tasks in school with a reason to feel good about themselves. The first disadvantage is that it can foster a false sense of security, a belief that even though one lacks the skills and resources for taking care of oneself and pursuing one's aims, one will be taken care of simply because one is a person with intrinsic worth. The second disadvantage is that the distinction lends support to the notion that persons who lack resources and skills for taking care of themselves and pursuing their goals cannot acquire those resources and skills. With the concept of intrinsic worth to fall back on, educators may feel they can give up on student who have difficulty mastering certain skills. Students, too, might be less motivated to master difficult skills if they are constantly reminded that failure to master those skills does not diminish their worth as persons.

In the next section, I will examine the disadvantages of Strike's distinction as they relate particularly to female students.

Alinsky[12] reminds us that before we can change the world, we must understand it not as we would like it to be but as it is. In an ideal world, persons would be treated as ends in themselves regardless of the empirical properties they possessed or lacked. In reality, the treatment an individual receives and the opportunities he or she enjoys are heavily dependent on possession of empirical properties. Doctors receive more respect (and money) than nurses. Doctors' wives receive more respect than welfare mothers. Individuals with their own incomes have more opportunities to define and pursue their goals than do those who are financially dependent on either other individuals or the state. Persons who can read and write have better job opportunities than do those who are illiterate. Those who can read and write and do mathematics have better job opportunities than do those who can read and write but not do mathematics. Individuals who are strong are less likely to be physically assaulted than are those who are weak.

In terms of almost all the empirical properties cited above, women come out on the lower side of the comparison. More men than women occupy high-prestige, high-income professional positions. More women than men are poor. In fact, three out of five poor persons in the United States are women. The median income of year-round full-time women workers is less than 60 percent of men's. Although numbers of women and men enrolled in educational institutions at all levels are roughly equivalent, the number of years of mathematics coursework completed by women is significantly smaller than the number of years completed by men.[13] Finally, most women possess less physical strength than most men.

Women lack many of the empirical properties valued by society and needed for taking care of oneself and pursuing one's goals for various combinations of reasons

related to institutional sexism and socialization into the female role.[14]

In an ideal world, the fact that women lack empirical properties that enable them to take care of themselves would not be a problem. Respect for the intrinsic worth of persons would compel those who had more resources to take care of those dependent on them. In the world as it is, this is not what happens. Thomas Hardy's[15] Tess and Stephen Crane's[16] Maggie both depend on individual men to treat them fairly; yet when Maggie turns to Pete for help when she has no other place to go, he tells her to go to hell. Tess trusts Angel Clare to treat her fairly and to forgive her for her affair with Alex D'Urberville as she has forgiven him. Despite his professed rejection of many of the values of his family and the larger society, Clare is not able to apply the same standards to a woman's conduct as are applied to his own; hence, he tells her that forgiveness does not apply in this situation.

Until the night she set fire to the bed in which her husband was sleeping, Francine Hughes believed that love could make her marriage succeed. Francine had succumbed to Mickey Hughe's sexual demands and subsequently married him because, in her words,[17]

> I looked at this man who loved me so much.... I don't know really what I thought... but I felt a great need--a duty to fulfill his love. I thought he really loved me. No one ever loved me like that. It was a very powerful thing.

For 14 years, Francine continued to believe what she had been taught about life being what you make it and love conquering all. The man who claimed to love her and need her, the man who gave her life meaning, beat her, threw garbage on the floor, rubbed food into her hair, twisted a puppy's neck and smashed the toilet with a sledge hammer before Francine realized how much power he had and how much it limited her capacity to control her life. Not only was Mickey physically stronger than she, he also had the law on his side. As she picked up the garbage Mickey had thrown after the police officers left, she asked herself,[18] Why is this happening? Why am I so helpless? Why can he do anything he wants--anything--and not even the law can stop him?

Because neither the feeling nor the strong conviction that one deserves to be treated fairly can compel others to treat one fairly, Strike's approach is likely to promote not self-respect but pseudoinnocence, a type of innocence which, according to Rollo May,[19] makes

> a virtue of powerlessness, weakness, and helplessness.... This pseudoinnocence leads to utopianism; we do not then need to see [the]...real dangers. With unconscious purpose we close our eyes to reality and persuade ourselves that we have escaped it.

Pseudoinnocence is the basis of the astonishment, bewilderment, and disillusionment that Maggie, Tess, and Francine felt when they discovered that the men they trusted would not (actually, could not) treat them fairly.

Alternative To Strike's View

An alternative to Strike's view acknowledges the dangers of the assumption that recognition of oneself as a citizen/person is a necessary and sufficient foundation for feelings of self-worth. An alternative strategy for increasing feelings of self-worth, particularly among female students, must not only deal with the relationship between liberty and self-worth (self-respect), but also consider the relationship between the worth of liberty and self-worth (self-esteem.)

Educators who want to increase the feelings of self-worth of women like Maggie, Tess, and Francine Hughes have two possible courses of action. First, they can challenge institutional sexism directly. Second, they can help women develop the resources they need to take care of themselves and define and pursue their own aims.

The first strategy, that of challenging institutional sexism, is necessary but not sufficient for increasing women's feelings of self-worth. Various programs established in the past 15 years have increased women's opportunities to participate in the institutions of society. These programs have not only increased the number of opportunities women have, they have also expanded the range of choices an individual

is likely to perceive herself as having. Women who have access to day care facilities, for example, are likely to view raising a family while pursuing a career as a realistic choice. Women who live with abusive husbands are likely to consider the possibility of divorcing them if shelters for battered women and funds for retraining are available.

Regardless of what changes are made in laws affecting institutional structures and practices, however, these changes by themselves will not increase women's rational bases for feeling that they are worthwhile. They will make women equal citizens. But equal citizenship merely closes the longstanding gap between social values and social practices. To use Rawls's framework again, it increases women's liberty but does not increase the worth of their liberty.

Changes in social structures and practices, alone, will not increase the worth of liberty for two reasons. First, because many women are still unwilling and/or unable to take advantage of the opportunities that have been created thus far. This is exemplified by the failure of many women even to try a course in mathematics, despite the fact that the stereotypes of mathematics as a masculine activity are being eroded and the barriers to women's entrance to occupations such as accounting and engineering are being removed.

The second reason that changing institutional structures and practices without helping women acquire the resources they need for taking care of themselves and pursuing their aims is that such changes leave women dependent on others. This is especially dangerous when the man on whom thousands of welfare mothers and social security widows are depending is Ronald Reagan. But it is potentially a problem regardless of who is in office or what position a woman holds in society. Those on whom one depends cannot be expected to act in one's best interest at all times. This is partly because not all individuals on whom one depends are capable of taking care of others.

Pete, the bartender, was not in a position to rescue Maggie from poverty. Angel Clare's conflicts between the values he inherited and those he was trying to forge for himself made it impossible for him to support Tess psychologically. Mickey Hughes, with his lack of motivation and his twisted way of looking at the world, was not in a position to support Francine financially or emotionally.

Another reason that entrusting others with the worth of one's liberty is dangerous is that the "regulating [required to guarantee the worth of liberty] becomes the task of those needing regulating".[20] An example is protective labor legislation of the early and mid-twentieth century. This legislation was designed to protect women from health and safety hazards. Given the status and power of women in the work force, however, such legislation was used by employers and some union leaders as a basis for barring women from high-paying jobs. Abuses of this sort seem to be what Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley had in mind when he advised,[21]

> Don't ask f'r rights. Take thim. An' don't let anny wan give them to ye. A right that is handed to ye fer nawthin has somethin the matther with it. It's more thin likely a wrong turned inside out.

The remedy for lack of self-worth proposed there is similar to that prescribed by Alinsky, which is to teach individuals to turn "bad scenes" into "issues";[22]

> An issue is something you can do something about, but as long as you feel powerless and unable to do anything about it, all you have is a bad scene..., and all you can do is hope that something happens somewhere, somehow, sometime.

Part of the job of educators working with students who lack feelings of self-worth is to help them achieve the ability to do something about problems that make them feel helpless.

A foundation for a strategy for helping students overcome feelings of powerlessness is described in David Nyberg's book[23] Power over Power. According to Nyberg, being able to do something about problems that make one feel powerless requires freedom, knowledge about power, and autonomy, which he characterizes not as rights or goods but as achievements.

The Skills of Freedom

Nyberg begins his discussion of the skills of freedom with an account of the development of the concept of freedom within the framework of liberal democratic theory. He reminds us that the original liberal view of freedom is embodied in the position of John Stuart Mill, who claimed that the "absence of coercion is the sufficient and necessary condition for freedom." Since the nineteenth century this view has been enlarged to include, in addition to absence of human coercion, absence of natural conditions that prevent an individual's chosen activity, and presence of the "executive power to do that which one wishes."[24] Nyberg notes that the enlarged liberal view implies a "two-sided concept of freedom: freedom from...and freedom to...."[25] He claims, however, that this conceptual distinction is unnecessary since "all cases of freedom have *both*...attributes; they are head and tail of a single coin."[26] He describes freedom as a concept used to "indicate the status of constraints that are relative to a plan for action."[27]

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Nyberg divides constraints on freedom into two modes and three categories. The first mode is active (something that is present impedes achievement of one's aims.) The second mode is abeyant (something that is missing impedes achievement of one's aims.) The three categories are psychobiological, societal, and equivocal. These categories provide a framework for determining whether a constraint comes from "oneself, from another individual whose position is important to one's plan for action, from an identifiable but nonspecific 'social force,' or from a nonidentifiable source whose effects are subject to strong beliefs e.g., 'red tape,' 'the absurd.'"[28] Diagnosing constraints is not simply a metter of labeling and having an emotional reaction to them. Instead, it is an exercise in analysis and problem-solving. By analyzing constraints systematically, "one can generate a set of alternative hypotheses, test them, and arrive at a revised formulation of the problem which may lead to a more satisfactory judgment about what new plan for action is required for solving the problem of freedom."[29]

The analysis Nyberg proposes eliminates the need for the deemphasis of differences in empirical properties advocated by Strike; hence, it does not promote pseudoinnocence. It acknowledges that differences in empirical properties exist among individuals and that those differences are often accompanied by differences in individuals' ability to take care of themselves and pursue their aims. Because the purpose of acknowledging differences is to initiate not fruitless comparison between the resources one has and those others have, but productive comparison between the resources one has and the resources one needs to take care of oneself and pursue one's aims, it is not likely to lead to loss of self-worth.

The activity of analyzing deficits in resources and skills needed to take care of oneself and pursue one's aims is more likely to motivate students to look for ways to overcome those deficits than is the notion of the intrinsic worth of persons. Telling a student that her lack of skill in mathematics, for example, is not important because she is, after all, a person is not likely to encourage her or her teacher to try to find out what is preventing her from learning mathematics. She is likely to attribute her lack of achievement to a "nonmathematical mind" without trying to discover the sources of this 'nonmathematical mind." Is it due to an irremediable brain defect, the notion that mathematics is unfeminine, the belief that mathematics destroys the beauty of human experience? Is the person responsible to someone other than the student; for example, is the teacher incapable of explaining material in a way that is comprehensible to this particular student? Has the teacher's low regard for female students' ability

to learn mathematics become a self-fulfilling prophecy? Is the school underfunded so that teachers are unable to devote time to individual students who need extra help? Has the student been assigned to the wrong mathematics course because of a mix-up of diagnostic test scores or an error in scheduling? Once the student and the teacher understand the source of the problem, they can begin to take steps to solve it.

Female students can benefit especially from a problem-solving approach to freedom since socialization to the female sex-role excludes competency and problem-solving skills. Stereotypic feminine (i.e., emotional) responses will not increase one's chances of overcoming constraints. As Beach notes,[30]

> Women who respond to the discovery that they are paid less than a man doing identical work by pouring out their feelings of hurt, depression, and frustration on the shoulder of a friendly co-worker rather than by filing a grievance, or by confronting the supervisor with the salary inequity, are using female stereotypic dependent-expressive responses rather than the instrumental problem-solving skills. They may feel somewhat better after the emotional catharsis, but they will almost certainly not get their salaries increased.

Mastery of the skills of freedom, along with knowledge about power, which is described in the next section, will, more than abstract notions of personhood or fairness, help women to protect themselves and pursue their aims.

Knowledge About Power

According to Nyberg, philosophers of education from Plato to the present have posited a dichotomy between power and morality. He calls this dichotomy a "conceptual catastrophe..., which almost guarantees that the forces that favor morality in this world will never become powerful enough to contest successfully the forces that favor self-interest."[31] Strike's view of self-respect as distinct from, and more important than, self-esteem exemplifies the dichotomy between power and morality. The priority of self-respect is based on the assumption that because our Judeo-Christian values stress the belief that individuals *should* be treated with respect, they *will* be treated with respect, regardless of the empirical properties they possess. This is not always the case, and it will not be the case as long as the dichotomy between morality and power continues to influence the way those who favor fairness and equality look at human experience, since, as Engel observes,[32] "the exercise of power or what Laswell simply called influence is the central feature of social change. Without a serious consideration of it, the educator or anyone else does little more than wring his hands or talk."

Nyberg asserts that the view that "power is the doctrine of force and education is a (separate) matter of ethics"[33] has compelled many individuals to choose between the two. The dichotomy between power and morality, he observes, is based on the assumption that power is identical to force. Force, however, is only one of several forms of power, and neglect of the others has "beguiled educators into abdicating responsibility for teaching how to channel existing power constructively."[34]

This abdication is, according to Nyberg, inconsistent with the aims of education for two reasons. First because it substitutes wishful thinking for thinking. Second, because it "puts any design for democracy at risk."[35]

In Nyberg's framework, there are four forms of power: force, fiction, finance, and fealty Power in each of its forms can be viewed as the capacity to enlist the aid of others in the pursuit of one's aims: "The person who has a plan and someone else who can help carry it out is more powerful than the person who has only a plan."[36]

Force involves the use of actual or threatened physical harm to obtain "consent (obedience) from the otherwise unwilling."[37]

Fiction involves the use of language to "induce belief and cause commitment."[38] It includes efforts to obtain power for both noble and ignoble aims; for example, both the teacher who increases students' motivation by using words to indicate that he or she expects them to succeed and the demagogue who uses tales of jingoistic heroes and menacing enemies to rally citizens to support an unpopular war are using the fiction form of power.

Finance includes all efforts to obtain consent by offering rewards for the performance of desired acts. The reward may be money or something else valued by the person who performs the service.[39]

Fealty is faithfulness or loyalty that is based on trust and mutuality.[40] Fealty occurs when at least two individuals have one plan, each possesses all the information relevant to the plan, and each is able to trust the other(s).

The effectiveness of any form of power depends on the consent of the individuals over whom it is exercised. One of the criteria for distinguishing one form of power from another is the way in which consent is acquired and maintained. The forms of consent range from "acquiescence under threat of sanction" to "commitment through informed judgment." Between these two lie "compliance based on partial or slanted information," "indifference due to habit and apathy," and "conformity to custom."[41] Knowledge about power, then, is knowledge about the forms of power and the forms of consent.

Educators can help ensure that the power that obtains in the relationships an individual has with others is based on informed judgment and commitment to shared aims rather than force in two ways. First, they can help students develop skills for deciding which relationships with other human beings are likely to be in their best interests and which are likely to make them instruments or victims of someone else's plans. Second, they can help students acquire the resources they need to resist others' attempts to obtain power through force or to use finance or other forms of power in ways that are not in the consenting person's best interest; for example, an individual married to a man like Mickey Hughes is less likely to stay married if she has skills that enable her to support herself financially. A woman is likely to say no to a would-be rapist if she has self-defense skills that permit her to smash his kneecaps and, if necessary, his skull. Without such resources, many of the power relationships to which women consent are chosen from a range of physically and/or psychologically damaging possibilities.

Autonomy

The attribute that links freedom and power, as Nyberg describes them, is autonomy. Autonomy is the foundation of all rational aims. Defined as "an ordered structure of wants, purposes, and ideals,"[42] autonomy not only allows individuals to make rational choices from a range of alternatives, but also increases the likelihood that the goals they pursue will be their own rather than someone else's.

Nyberg reminds us that "autonomous means self-governing, or self-regulating."[43] The opposite of autonomy is anomie, "a defective condition in persons who have had no success at ordering their personal ideals, desires, intentions, and commitments into some sort of hierarchy."[44] Anomie makes individuals slaves to their own conflicting whims and desires. It also makes them susceptible to becoming instruments of other individuals' aims, since persons who lack their own ordered set of wants, purposes, and ideals have no reason for not giving consent out of habit or apathy or conforming to custom, even when custom is not in their best interest (e.g., the custom of treating men better than women, whites better than blacks, etc.).

The central role of autonomy in Nyberg's approach makes the approach especially useful in efforts to increase female students' feelings of self-worth, since, as Kolbenschlag notes,[45] women have been socialized to expect to be judged in terms of what they are, rather than what they are capable of accomplishing. This aspect of socialization has made women more susceptible than men to anomie:

> Fear of being judged, fear of autonomy--fear of having to assume responsibility for what one does--is the root of the success problem. Because of their "other-centered" conditioning, it is difficult for many women to focus on a goal other than pleasing someone's (everyone's) expectations. It is easier to conform to an "image" than to accomplish a task... Women typically do not internalize the identity of a doer, a worker, to the extent that men do.

Teaching students to think about constraints on freedom and reasons for giving and witholding consent as problems to be solved and as achievements is a way to remind them that they are persons not only because they *possess* rationality and are given rights, but also because they have the ability to *use* rationality as a tool for taking care of themselves and pursuing their aims.

The ability to diagnose constraints on one's freedom is itself an achievement that

can serve as a basis for feelings of self-worth. Moreover, it is a foundation for the acquisition of additional skills and resources for taking care of oneself and pursuing one's aims; hence, it is a source of an ongoing, self-renewable supply of reasons to feel that one is worthwhile.

NOTES

1. Kenneth A. Strike, "Education, Justice and Self-Respect: A School for Rodney Dangerfield," *Philosophy of Education 1979* (Champaign, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, University of Illinois, 1979), pp. 41-54.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

10. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 204.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

12. Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).

13. Data on enrollment in mathematics coursework can be found in Sheila Tobias, *Overcoming Math Anxiety* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978.) Tobias reports that a study of students entering Berkeley in 1972 showed that only 8 percent of the women had taken enough high school mathematics to qualify for entry to the calculus sequence needed for half of the majors offered by Berkeley. This meant that 92% of all entering women students were excluded from 10 of Berkeley's 12 colleges and restricted to majors in humanities, fine arts, languages, guidance, and elementary education. Data supporting other assertions are from U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, "Women with Low Incomes" (Washington, D.C., 1976).

14. Through socialization, an individual's behavior and personal attributes are modified to conform to others' expectations. A 1972 review of sex-role stereotypes showed that there are significant differences between couple's expectations for women and those for men. The major trait that is valued in males is competence. The major trait valued in females is a combination of warmth and expressiveness. See I. K. Broverman, et al., "Sex Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1972), pp. 59-78. As Beach observes, "the sex-role standards to which women are expected to match their behavior specifically exclude attributes of competency, leadership, and decision-making. However, such attributes are usually considered necessary in order to solve problems" (see note 30 below.)

15. Thomas Hardy, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (New York: Airmont Publishing Co., Inc., 1965).

16. Stephen Crane, "Maggie: A Girl of the Streets," *Stephen Crane: Stories and Tales*, ed. R. W. Stallman (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

17. Faith McNulty, *The Burning Bed: The True Story of an Abused Wife* (New York: York: Bantam Books, 1980), p. 52.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

19. Rollo May, *Power and Innocence* (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 49.

20. Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty," in *Understanding Rawls*, ed. Normal Daniels (New York: Basic Books, Inc., n.d.), p. 258.

21. Quoted in Alinsky, p. 124.

22. Alinsky, *Rules*, p. 119.

23. David Nyberg, *Power Over Power: What Power Means in Ordinary Life, How It Is Related to Acting Freely, and What It Can Contribute to a Renovated Ethics of Education* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).

24. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

26. *Ibid.*,

27. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

30. Ruth Beach, "Theoretical and Clinical Issues in Feminist Therapy" (Paper presented at the 1978 Conference of the Association of Women in Psychology, Pittsburgh, Pa.), p. 6.

31. Nyberg, *Power Over Power*, p. 33.

32. David Engel, "Power and Education: Considerations of the Politics of Epistemology" (Paper presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1973), p. 3.

33. Nyberg, *Power Over Power*, p. 69.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-50.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

45. Madonna Kolbenschlag, *Kiss Sleeping Beauty Good-Bye: Breaking the Spell of Feminine Myths and Models* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), pp. 91-92.

"THE PARTICULARS OF LIFE": RADICAL EMPIRICISM AND EDUCATION

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In *The Transformation of the Schools*, his study of the progressive movement in education, Professor Cremin devotes a section of one of his chapters to William James and shows James's influence on psychology and philosophy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century as well as how his biography interleaves itself with those of Dewey, Hall, and Thorndike. But James then fades from our view. It is Dewey and his pragmatist-instrumentalist thought which provides the synthesis of thought that undergirds the "thoughtful" branch of progressive education. It is Dewey who describes the failings of progressivist action. It is Dewey and his disciples who set the tone for schools to engage in progressive experiments. It is Dewey who provides the text to which contemporary progressivist thinkers turn for insight into current educational issues.

Dewey's pragmatic-instrumentalist branch of the "pragmatic revolution" is clearly that most fruitful source for modern progressive educational thought, as witnessed by the variety of contemporary educationists who trace (with or without justice) their roots back to that source: the moral educators: the social reconstructionists: and the mainstream educational researchers.

But the pragmatic revolution, like all revolutions, ramifies into many different branches. And the branch represented by Dewey does not exhaust the possibilities.

It will be aim of the following essay to examine another variety of pragmatic thought--that of William James--and to show how it has served to undergird educational thought and practice. It is no part of this aim to make invidious comparisons between the two traditions of pragmatism. The intent is simply to bring a little light to a hitherto dark corner.

A posthumous collection of James's pieces was gathered together under the title *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912). These pieces had been written over a period of years and together they represented the development of James's pragmatic thought. What 'radical empiricism' meant, James set forth in his "Preface" to *The Meaning of Truth:*

> It consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.
>
> The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist *ad libitum*, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.)
>
> The statement of fact is that the relations among things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.
>
> The generalized conclusion is that therefore, the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves part of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.[1]

Radical empiricism rests upon James's pragmatism. For James, our ideas lead us from one part of our experience to another. The "true" ideas are those which lead us most efficiently--we can "ride" upon them. The route which they lead us along is "itself a part of experience."[2]

The "empiricism" in Radical Empiricism is legitimate because it admits "to the discussion" only those things which we experience. It is a "radical" form of empiricism because of James's "refusal to differentiate between the objects of experience and its parts".[3] Most empiricists would wish to contrast the objects of our experience--those things which stimulate our senses into creating pictures in our minds--with our feelings and sensations about those objects. The lamp on the desk--its color, size, shape and

and odor--is an empirical fact. But James would also admit the connections between that object and the rest of the objects on the desk as empirical facts. An empiricism which does not admit such connections (and disjunctions) does not, according to James, go deeply enough into our experience. To be true to the richness of the universe, empiricism must admit experience "rich enough to furnish the entire world. Mind and matter, space and time, appearance and reality, all have to be constituted out of it".[4]

There are three consequences to which an admission of the radical empiricist assumption leads that are important in education.

First, James would eliminate the consciousness as an entity or as a separate kind of solvent into which our experience is dissolved. In other empiricisms, the consciousness is often viewed as a kind of stuff or substance. James describes this substance metaphorically as the ground or base into which the pigment of paint may be dissolved. Thus, like the paint, the base may be separated from the pigment--the two are capable of independent existence.

James denies such a complication of our experience. In place of this consciousness into which our experience dissolves, James would assert that there is

> no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is *knowing*.[5]

Consciousness-as-entity is replaced by consciousness-as-function. Knowing is thus explained as

> a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known.[6]

Knowing comes at the intersection of the internal and external processes.

Such a view of consciousness and knowing eliminates the traditional dualism between subject and object. As Perry suggests, James placed the mind in the world. "Physical knowledge is an act by which a mind somehow reaches beyond mind".[7]

By conceiving consciousness-as-function, James has enriched consciousness because now "knowing" must account for the whole of our experience and not merely those data that seem to fit conveniently into our conventional systems or schemata. Consciousness-as-function makes consciousness into a pragmatic concept. It thus can comprehend whatever serves to move us efficiently from one part of our experience to another. We ride upon it. Because of its pragmatic nature, it demands and facilitates a new open-mindedness about our experience.

The second consequence of James's "radicalization" of empiricism is that it restores to experience a sense of unity.

Radical empiricism shares with Hume's empiricism the priority of the parts, the elements, of our experienced world and "treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction".[8] But Hume and his descendants have always

> shown a tendency to do away with the connexions of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.[9]

The experienced world, therefore, comes to resemble a kind of randomly arranged dustheap. The objects of our experience maintain but a "loose and separate" relations to one another.

James hold to the definition of empiricism and suggests that the connexions, the "relations that connect experiences...(and) any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as real as anything else in the system"[10] The effect of this is to eliminate the apparent disconnectedness of Humean empiricism and prevents us from using the easy convenience of taking things as loose and separate, "as if they had no manner of connexion".[11]

This is not to suggest that James would introduce an artificial unity to the variousness of our universe after the manner of the rationalist. He is not emphasizing the unity of objects but the unity of experience itself. As we move through our lives, we experience both objects and the connections continuously. We experience a 'stream of consciousness' and not puddles of reality in between emptiness--as, for example, in the drought stricken riverbed. James's illustration of his meaning is found in his image of the mummified head

> with which the Dyaks of Borneo deck their lodges. The skull forms a solid nucleus; but innumerable feathers, leaves, strings, beads, and loose appendices of every description float and dangle from it, and save that they terminate in it, seem to have nothing to do with one another. Even so, my experience and yours float and dangle, terminating, it is true, in a nucleus of common perception, but for the most part out of sight and irrelevant and unimaginable to one another. This imperfect intimacy, this bare relation of *withness* between some parts of the sum total of experience and other parts is the fact that ordinary empiricism overemphasizes against rationalism.... Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to both the unity and disconnexion. It finds no reason for treating either as illusory. It allots to each its definite sphere of description, and agrees that there appear to be actual forces at work which tend, as time goes on, to make the unity greater.[12]

James would admonish us as Hamlet admonished Horatio about the number of things under heaven and earth often "undreamt of in philosophy". If we are to have commerce with such multiplicity and do proper justice to heaven and earth, we must be willing to accept as data to be reckoned with whatever we directly experience. We must work with the stubborn and irreducible facts and to see them whole.

Two important consequences must follow from this acceptance of the full range of our experience.

First, the convenient division of our experience into "fact" and "value" will now be seen as a distortion. The convenient fiction of the dichotomy is revealed for what it is, a fiction. As Perry noted,

> The realm of value is the realm of choice and of feeling. These attitudes themselves, and their emotional reverberations, are immediacies of experience; and in the end, where value is final and intrinsic, they are evoked by the immediacies of experience.[13]

In addition, other convenient fictions like that of "the real world" must disappear. The preservice teacher who takes his foundations course as "perhaps ok, but not a part of the real world" must now see the fallacy of his position. "The real world" becomes a narrow and artificial concept.

Second, the operationalism and experimentalism which must be admitted to be the dominant form of knowing accepted by educators now appear to give only a limited and arbitrary treatment to the world of experience. By reducing knowledge to signs and experimental relations such knowledge admits only that experience which admits itself of being so formulated. We find ourselves drifting into a new formalism. The formalism of the middle ages forced men to see their experiences as a reflection of the story of the creation, the fall, and the resurrection. The new formalism forces us to see our experiences as a reflection of abstract mathematical signs and logical operations.[14] Without denying the value of such operations, the radical empiricist demands that they be seen in perspective of our whole experience--the "floating feathers, leaves, and beads, that do not fit the new formal categories.

Radical empiricism may be seen as a call "to invite men to sense and feel their world".[15] As such it leads us to the third consequence of the radical empiricist assumption. Radical empiricism is the grounding for educational philosophy. The goal of this last portion of the essay will be to show the connection between radical empiricism and education by using the work of Jacques Barzun of Columbia a historian and teacher whose teaching exemplifies it.

In an autobiographical piece Barzun recalled the origins of his teaching "method". It came during the school year 1934-35 in a collaboration with Lionel Trilling. The

two young men were to jointly instruct a colloquium in the great books of the modern period to upper classmen at Columbia College. Trilling, recalled Barzun was interested

> in the great deterministic systems of Marx and Freud, which at that time were in the ascendant and still wore a fresh, beckoning look.

Barzun himself,

> inclined to the radical empiricism of William James. He was finding in James, Nietzsche...Whitehead--the Pragmatic Revolution generally--a set of ideas by which to reconcile respect for natural science with a watchful sense of its limitations, and to discern in all materialism and determinisms the illicit jump from empirical fact to arbitrary metaphysics.[16]

The two young "dialecticians: discovered "shocking things" about one another during the "hot discussions with their students" but out of these clashes emerged both a deep friendship and a *modus vivendi* including a "distinctive practice of joint teaching"[17] It is on this teaching that we will concentrate.

The most concise statement of Barzun's philosophic-pedagogic stance is to be found in the memoire just cited. There he describes the different styles or modes by which writers and teachers approached culture and its history. The reigning styles were the Southern and Marxist criticisms. There was also the 'old" criticism

> wedded to a humdrum study of literary genres and lives. Among historians, 'cultural criticism' was equated with German *Geisteageschicte* and dismissed as misty generalizing. That left only the history of ideas', which was cultivated by philosophical minds interested in technical relations of pure ideas within the sequence of great systems.[18]

The *modus vivendi* of Barzun and Trilling was neither a selection from among these approved styles, nor was it an eclectric gathering from among their elements. Their term for this new approach was "cultural criticism" and it is an application of James's image of the Dyak head to an understanding of our culture. Cultural criticism

> arose from a lively sense of the force of circumstance, balanced by an equally strong sense of the free life that ideas lead when hatched. It seemed clear to us that in order to know what books and works of art, philosophies and movements of opinion intend, one must learn their antecedents and concomitants *of whatever kind*; and to know how the ideas thrive and change, one must trace their consequences. Ideas cannot be reduced to simple products of their surroundings, or even to direct expressions of time and place; they are not resultants by necessity, like wind and tide. But--to follow the opposite extreme--ideas cannot be regarded as pure or unconditioned, and their meaning treated as self-contained, only by a temporary abstraction in thought. Making that abstraction may yield valuable findings, but they were not the object of our search.[19]

The "method" by which Barzun proceeded followed Pascal's *esprit de finesse*. Barzun himself called "the imagination of the real". It was an effort

> of the studiest imagination--the imagination which springs from fact and is hedged in by probability, the literal imagination....It is controlled divination. In such an inquiry no proof is possible, however thoroughly one delves. For 'sources' also record only the divination (assumption, imputation) of the contemporary observer, himself usually less than controlled.[20]

The teacher--speaking directly to a class or addressing a more distant class in his writings--faces a special task in imagining the real. Given the commitment to pure experience, he cannot fall back on all inclusive systems--arbitrary metaphysics of one kind or another--to organize the Dyak head into sensibility. In fact, he cannot even claim to be able to give a complete picture of 'external reality' to his students. His task instead is to

> discover and sort out for himself the signs of the distant reality

> and in assembling them to be sensitive without being impressionable. In the colloquial French saying, *il ne faut pas croire que c'est arrive'*. This habit of judgment is not simple skepticism; on the contrary, it opposes its vision of the object not only to the conventional description, but also to its revisionist counterpart, each too often tolerant of large errors while stressing the details of its own parti pris.[21]

He is thus attempting to accomplish that most venerable of pedagogical tasks, provoking thought.

Such teaching does not therefore aim at preparation in a particular discipline or skill. It is rather preparation for preparation--in brief--general education. The course which Barzun and Trilling jointly taught was a descendant of Erskine's famous Colloquium on Important Books.

Columbia (along with Harvard, Chicago, and other colleges and universities) was a center for the movement known as General Education which aimed at "the possibility of uniting some parts at least of history, philosophy, history and the arts in an intelligible account of our past as thinking beings".[22]

In the attempt to give an intelligible account of our human past, the radical empiricist is caught in the classic dilemma of the liberal. He wishes to enable his students to grasp the fullness of human activity, but he will lose what he seeks if he prescribes too strictly how that end is to be gained.

For Barzun, the way out of the dilemma is to be found in training the student's intellect. Intellect is

> the capitalized and communal form of live intelligence; it is intelligence stored up and made into habits of dicipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning and spurs to the emotion--a shorthand and a wireless by which the mind can skip connectives, recognize ability and communicate truth. Intellect is at once a body of common knowledge and the channels through which the right particle of it can be brought to bear quickly, without the effort of redemonstration, on the matter at hand.[23]

What intellectual training meant in Barzun's teaching may be seen in the Humanities A1-B1 course with whose development Barzun was intimately connected.

Daniel Bell praised the course as being

> one of the great courses in American education. For the past quarter of a century and more, it has been the keystone course of Columbia College. A recent survey of student reaction showed that it still had the power to provoke interest and excite the imagination.[24]

The course itself grew out of the realization on the part of Columbia faculty that

> while the American college often gave training of one kind or another it seldom educated in any real sense... very often the training itself was superficial or illusory, that it could be entirely side stepped by one adroit or the indifferent who thus wasted four years of their lives piling up disconnected credits...towards a meaningless A.B. If the word education meant anything it was high time to find out what it meant and to see to it that the college took steps to provide it.[25]

In 1934 a series of committee meetings addressed the question. The course itself emerged in 1937. It was a compulsory course for freshmen and sophomores. The curriculum would consist of a series of readings from "great" books beginning with the Greeks and taking the students through the nineteenth century. Each book would be whole or at least in a self-contained, healthy chunk. The course itself was to be taught in discussion sections.

In its appearance in 1937, Humanities A-1 was less a course than a set of readings. To begin with Aristotle's Ethics and to read through Tom Jones at the rate of one book a week does not allow for study in the scholarly sense. But then that was not the goal

of the course. The students were meeting the books, not as a means to a scholarly or professional end, but as a way to meet each book on its own terms. After all, Barzun argued, the author wrote the book so that he could talk person-to-person to the reader. And so it was the aim of the course to provide the student with the chance to meet the books according to that original desire of the author. The books represented some of the rich variety of thought and feeling in the west. The students were to meet that range, in the wild.[26]

Under the guidance of a dedicated faculty, the course was more than a series of random discussions. The students did learn first hand about the rich western tradition. Their knowledge of it was tested by weekly objective examinations, but the heart of the course was the discussion which

> reinforced, modified, and related the facts, the aim being to fuse information into knowledge. This knowledge was admittedly superficial with respect to each book, but it was real; it did not consist in memorized opinions about somebody's style nor in synopses of philosophical systems. It relied on a concrete sense of knowing which makes us infallibly recognize our friend in a crowd of strangers even though we may be hard put to state it in words how we know.[27]

Because the faculty members who led these discussions were teaching out of their scholarly area, questions were raised by the faculty themselves. To this Barzun and his confederates replied that if freshmen were to read and presumably understand both Moliere and Spinoza, then it should follow that a Ph.D. in French or philosophy does not disqualify its holder from understanding either. Although the faculty member had read more widely and more deeply in a special field than the student, the crucial issues of the course were located inside the covers of the books. The problems were as accessible to the teacher as to the student because each book was confronted as a statement of "individual and social problems that still occupy us".[28] The teacher is not a historian teaching other historians-to-be but a human being who is trained in the Western intellectual tradition and widely read; the student is untrained and not widely read, but his goal is to become so.

The goal of the reading and the duscussion was not to give the student a catalogue of certain knowledge but to honor the radical empiricist assumption of a world truly complex experience in which facts and values intermingle in such a way that the only skeleton key is live intelligence alerted and prepared by the intellect.

James's substitution of consciousness-as-function for consciousness-as-entity supports Barzun's argument for and definition of general education. Consciousness-as-entity presupposes a particular mode by which experience could be interpreted into human knowledge. Consciousness-as-function opens the possibility of many modes of consciousness. Consciousness (or mind)

> ...is equally at home in science and myth, mathematics and poetry, music and the plastic arts....Historically, it is the mind that devised the alphabet and the game of chess; that built the railroads and found the way to forge iron and temper steel, to ski, to fly, to swim by the Australian crawl; to teach the deaf mutes to converse and blind to read; that composed the Bhagavad-Gita and Finnegans Wake; that has accumulated gods and heroes, folklore, cooking recipes, medical knowledge, and the precedents of the common law; that solves crossword puzzles and the Japanese war code; that relishes the metaphysical poets and the clerihews of E. C. Bentley, that sees intellectual beauty in Chartres cathedral and architectonic beauty in Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica.[29]

James's radical empiricism, taken with the freedom he himself advised:

> ...if you can gather philosophic conclusions of any kind, monistic or pluralistic, from the particulars of life, I will say, as I now do say with the cheerfulest of hearts, 'Ring out, ring out, my mournful rhymes, but ring the fuller minstrel in',[30]

proposes a universe that accounts for the full range of being human. Barzun as teacher and writer about teaching works in the Jamesean tradition. His 'cultural criticism' and his general education practice point us toward radical empiricism as a way to free ourselves from intellectual imperialism of whatever kind and admonish us to take the world around us with the same freedom that men have ever had: the ways are blocked or

open in different places but judgment remains sovereign. It is then for the imagination of the real, fashioning practice after it has found understanding, to work with what is and what was, and so make its way to what it would.[31]

NOTES

1. A. J. Ayer, The Origins of Pragmatism: Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Pierce and William James (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Company, 1968), p. 215.

2. Ibid., p. 216.

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4. Ibid., pp. 216-217.

5. William James, "Does Consciousness Exist" in Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. John J. McDermott (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 4.

6. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

7. Ralph Barton Perry, In The Spirit of William James (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, Midland Books, 1958), p. 95.

8. James, "A World of Pure Experience", p. 22.

9. James, Ibid., p. 23.

10. James, Ibid., p. 22.

11. James Ibid., p. 23.

12. James, Ibid., p. 24.

13. Perry, The Spirit of William James, p. 116.

14. Ibid., p. 122.

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16. Jacques Barzun, "The Imagination of the Real," in Ar , Politics, and Will: Essays in Honor of Lionel Trilling, eds. Quentin Anderson, Stephan Donadio, Steven Marcus (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. Ibid., p. 4.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

20. Ibid., p. 5.

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22. Jacques Barzun, "Cultural History As A Synthesis," in The Varieties of History, ed. Fritz Stern (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 391.

23. Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 4.

24. Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 224.

25. Jacques Barzun, "The Humanities -- The Porper Study of Mankind." The English Journal 33 (1938: 638.

26. Ibid., p. 642.

27. Ibid., p. 643.

28. Ibid., pp. 643-644.

29. Jacques Barzun, Science: The Glorious Entertainment (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 291.

30. John J. McDermott, "Introduction" to Essays in Radical Empiricism ed. John J. McDermott (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. xlviii.

31. Barzun, "The Imagination of the Real", p. 26.

EXPERIENCE AND PURE CONSCIOUSNESS: RECONSIDERING DEWEY'S AESTHETICS

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I. Introduction

John Dewey's aesthetic theory is an anomaly. While it has been praised as the "centerpiece" of his philosophy, it has also been criticized as inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.[1] One point, however, is clear: we should not underestimate the importance Dewey placed on aesthetic experience. Indeed, he suggested that it was "to esthetic experience that the philosopher must go to understand what experience is."[2] Such a statement is quite noteworthy, especially when we consider the significance of the concept of experience in Dewey's philosophy in general and his educational theory in particular. Notwithstanding, Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience remains a peculiar feature to his philosophy.

In recent years, however, there has been an accumulation of scientific research and theory that may now provide a means for more fully assessing Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience and its pedagogical implications. This new work in psychology, physiology, and even physics, has significantly advanced our understanding of the nature of human consciousness - especially that portion which Dewey appears to have described in the context of "esthetic experience." Some of this research has been on the human brain, but a significant portion of the relevant inquiry has been conducted on the physiological effects of meditation - in particular the Transcendental Meditation (TM) technique.

In the east, meditation has, of course, been traditionally conceived of as the pedagogical means of cultivating intuitive insight or mystical experience, thereby, "expanding consciousness." In this century, however, sustained scientific research on the psycho-physiological effects of meditation has opened for public inspection the systematic study of "consciousness expansion." Consequently, scientists have been provided an opportunity to gain a more precise understanding of what consciousness and the development of consciousness means. Could it be that the research and theory that has been generated in this field is providing insights into the nature of aesthetic experience as Dewey described it? I believe that it is.

In this paper, I will advance a thesis concerning the relation between Dewey' concept of aesthetic experience and the concept of pure consciousness - or *samdhi* in Sanskrit - that stems from research and theory on the Transcendental Meditation technique - an ancient technique derived from the Vedic tradition of India. Essentially, I will argue that there are compelling parallels between the two concepts, and that we may begin to envision a more precise formulation of Dewey's theory of aesthetic experience.

II. Pure Consciousness and The Vacuum State: The Meeting of East and West

Drawing parallels between Dewey's work and eastern thought is not new. Essays by Harold E. McCarthy and Victor Kobayshi over twenty years ago exemplify this same theme.[3] Kobayashi's essay in particular, discusses the resemblance between the Zen concept of *satori* (or "awakening") and Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience. However, contemporary work on the relation between physics and human consciousness has provided a basis for renewing this discussion.

In recent years, a number of theorists have suggested that physics may be able to contribute to a scientific understanding of human consciousness as discussed in the east and the west.[4] This integration of psychology and physics was anticipated over fifty years ago by Bertrand Russell. In *The Analysis of Mind* he suggested that if scientific knowledge were adequate to the task, it could state causal laws which would be applicable to psychology as well as physics, thereby "achieving what metaphysics (alone) has vainly attempted."[5] In that same volume, Russell noted that while the scientific study of human nature (as conducted primarily by behaviorists) was producing a conception of mind that was becoming less mental, the field of physics was simultaneously developing a conception of matter that was becoming equally less

material. In fact, he observed that there is hardly any similarity between "matter" of modern physics and the traditional material substance of classical or Newtonian physics. Because of this, Russell added, physicists such as Einstein describe our world as one consisting of "events," from which "matter" is deemed a "logical construction." In a similar manner, eastern mystics view macroscopic objects as *events* in consciousness, without an existence independent of consciousness. Consciousness is thus deemed the fundamental reality of the universe; both individual mind and matter are secondary events or "fluctuations" in an interconnected "field" which extends throughout the space-time continuum. Significantly, Dewey also described our universe as an interconnected series of *events* in an experiential continuum - as opposed to Newtonian matter "interacting." In *Experience and Nature* he wrote:

> To see the organism *in* nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be *in*, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never finished process.[6]

This view of nature is now becoming more explicit in the writings of a number of physicists, and as suggested, its implications for the study of human consciousness has begun to be explored.

The contribution of physics to the dialogue on consciousness has come from both relativity theory and quantum mechanics. The most important point about quantum theory - as physicist John Wheeler has written - is that it destroys the notion of the world "sitting out there" separated from the subjective observer. As he wrote: "In some strange sense, the universe is a participatory universe."[7] This participation includes the subjective awareness of the individual. Such an idea, of course, involves a radical departure from a view of the world that many people would consider "obvious" or "natural." However, writing in *Scientific American* three years ago, Bernard d'Espagnat underscored this very point and indicated that physical reality does not appear to exist independent of human consciousness or awareness.[8] In this respect, physics describes the universe as a "field." The field concept abolishes the notion of fundamentally separated objects and thus, as Capra writes, it depicts the universe as "an interconnected web of relations whose parts are only defined through their connection to the whole."[9] An examination of the relevant works of Dewey, indicate that the particular significance of aesthetic experience is that it affords us a perception of the unity or integration of this continuum of events; in addition, this is reportedly the special significance of the experience of "pure consciousness" and the practice of meditation.

At the time he wrote his Analysis of Mind, Russell doubted if scientific knowledge was adequate to the task of stating causal laws which would be applicable to psychology as well as physics. Yet, physicists are becoming increasingly more interested in, and adequate to, this very task - a conclusion affirmed by Nobel laureate in physics Brian Josephson.[10] Josephson singles out the work of physicist Dr. Lawrence Domash as particularly significant in this endeavor. Essentially, what Domash suggests is that the subjective experience of "pure consciousness" induced by the Transcendental Meditation technique represents a macroscopic quantum state in the brain. That is, he argues that there are clear parallels between pure consciousness and the "quantum fluctuations" predicted by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, especially that component of the fluctuations which is said to be present in "empty space" - what physicists refer to as the "vacuum state."

Domash points out that under the sanskrit term "samadhi," the state of pure consciousness is clearly described in the Vedas and Upanishads of ancient India. Drawing from this body of literature as well as personal experience Domash explicates parallels between the pure consciousness state and quantum mechanics - parallels which bear a remarkable resemblance to Dewey's own descriptions of the aesthetic-imaginative dimension of life. But first, let us consider the significance of the pure consciousness state.

In approaching the study of human consciousness Domash suggests that a physical scientist would, after his habit, ask whether it is possible to find for the sake of study a simplified state of consciousness which preserves the essential elements of consciousness in their most accessible form. By comparison, he has pointed out that

physicists would still be troubled over the nature of atomic structures had they begun and sustained their inquiry with an examination of, for example, the uranium atom which is by comparison to many other atoms, hideously complex. Fortunately, the hydrogen atom provided an example of atomic structure in its simplified form, thereby opening an avenue for the study of the structure of all atoms. Domash suggests that the state of pure consciousness provides scientists studying the mind a similar model and thus may be termed the "hydrogen atom of the mind." That is, pure consciousness is a state of human awareness which is less active and less complex than the ordinary waking state, and yet (unlike sleep or dreaming) preserves the element of conscious inner awareness. One implication this model holds for education is the possibility that our lack of a coherent, generally agreed upon learning theory may well be due to the fact that learning theorists have been grappling with a form of human awareness which parallels the uranium atom - an extremely intricate and complex phenomenon.

Since it is the TM technique which reportedly induces the state of pure consciousness, it will be relevant to our undertaking to consider briefly the nature of this meditation practice and how it induces pure consciousness - the "hydrogen atom" of the science of consciousness. Domash offers a succinct description.

> The technique is a mechanical one involving the actual dynamics of the thought process and is not concerned in any way with meaning or logic;...the process is nearly involuntary and 'goes almost by itself.' By contrast with other practices which are sometimes associated with the name 'meditation,' the Transcendental Meditation technique does not involve contemplation, concentration or any attempt to control the mind; indeed, 'effortlessness and spontaneity is the key to correct practice.'[11]

Subjectively, the technique reduces the "general level of thinking activity." Physiological research has distinguished the state induced by this procedure as different from sleeping, dreaming or simply sitting awake with the eyes closed. Among other changes, breath rate and cardiac output are reduced. Accompanying this physiological state, Domash writes, individuals report momentary "intervals of silence with fully alert conscious awareness but without thought activity." This state of affairs tends to grow into longer intervals with continued experience of the TM technique. Domash concludes that it is to these intervals within the twenty minute meditation session that the name "pure consciousness" is given.

The fundamental parallel which Domash draws between physics and the study of consciousness is the resemblance between this state of pure consciousness and quantum fluctuations which are said to present in "empty space" - what physicists have termed the "vacuum" or "ground state." The ground state of a physical system is always viewed as the "least excited" state of that system. That is, least excited with regard to physical activity. Domash points out that our thoughts may, by analogy, be viewed as excitations or fluctuations of an underlying field, and the pure consciousness state may be seen to correspond to the ground or vacuum state of that field. In this instance, of course, the "field" is the human mind.

The first time I read Dr. Domash's paper on the TM technique and quantum mechanics I was struck by an interesting parallel which I perceived between that paper and Dewey's attitude toward what he alternately termed the aesthetic or imaginative dimension of experience. As stated, Domash proposed that pure consciousness may well represent the "hydrogen atom" of the mind and thus provide a model for the study of human consciousness in general. A close examination reveals that Dewey held the same attitude toward the aesthetic dimension of experience. Dewey indicated that we might even refer to aesthetic experience as "pure experience" or "experience in its integrity." That is, in his words, aesthetic experience is "freed from the forces which impede or confuse it" or "subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself."[12] As Domash would say, it represents a state of "least excitation of consciousness," unobstructed by excitations which would confuse or distort it. In describing aesthetic experience as "experience in its integrity" Dewey also directed inquiry to proceed toward this area of study, concluding it is "to esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is." In essence, by directing the philosopher to the aesthetic-imaginative dimension of life, Dewey, in his own way, was also directing us to a simpler, more integrated state of human experience, a simpler state of consciousness, so that we could see

(once again in his words) "what experience is in its very movement and structure."[13] Not surprisingly, there are other very important qualities shared by the aesthetic-imaginative dimension of experience (or "pure experience"), pure consciousness and the vacuum state - each of which provide an important insight into the nature of human consciousness. But before these can be elucidated it will be necessary to consider the nature of pure consciousness more closely.

In examining the state of pure consciousness in the light of quantum mechanics, Domash draws an important lesson from the study of thermodynamics. He suggests that the TM technique may be expressed as a physiological and analogy of the Third Law of thermodynamics. In this law, a state of lower physical activity or excitation in a system is associated with lower entropy or lower disorder in that system; and a state of least excitation (corresponding to temperature absolute zero) is associated with zero entropy and perfect order. The TM technique, Domash adds, seems to be a means for the systematic de-excitation of the human nervous system - and hence a lowering of the "mental temperature" by virtue of reducing mental and physiological activity, thereby inducing pure consciousness - the ground state of the mind. The result, then, is a correspondingly more ordered state in the mind and nervous system. The effectiveness that has been attributed to the TM technique as a means of neutralizing stress can be understood as one of the implications of allowing the nervous system to periodically "de-excite" itself, and establish a state of increased order. Stress, of course, has in recent years become understood as a major contributor to disease - a most demonstrative example of disorder (entropy) in the nervous system. It is this state of orderliness in the nervous system that gives rise to the subjective sense of "expanded consciousness" during the practice of the TM technique. Domash concludes:

> Just as the physical Third Law guarantees zero entropy at absolute zero temperature and yet phase transitions to states with a true zero entropy component (such as superfluids) occur even at finite temperatures, so here in this physiological analogy we see the onset of an extremely highly ordered state, which may be described as the ground state of the mind, occurring even while some minimum degree of metabolic activity continues.[14]

What distinguishes pure consciousness as a highly ordered state aside from the reduction of metabolic rate, reduced stress and subjective experience is the coherence of brain waves found in studies involving the electroencephalograph (EEG). EEG studies have revealed that the sense of "expanded," extended, or increased consciousness experienced in the pure consciousness state is associated with increased electrophysiological long-range spatial coherence. The nature of this kind of physical phenomena has been the subject of extensive study in the field of physics. For this reason, Domash suggests that consciousness itself may well be considered a quantum wave function phenomenon, and the pure consciousness state induced by the TM technique may thus represent a phase transition to a macroscopic wave function in the brain.

Drawing from Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's interpretation of the study of consciousness found in the Vedic tradition of ancient India, Domash points out that there are many intriguing parallels between this tradition and quantum field theory. Most important, both theories may be completely knowable in terms of the properties of the underlying ground state of a field - a field of least excitation. Domash writes:

> In relativistic quantum field theory, which is the most successful conception in the history of science, the vacuum state of the field, containing no real matter, light or excitation, occupies a unique position. The vacuum state alone among states of the field is unique, unbounded in space and time, Lorentz invariant (same for all observers), and of truly zero entropy.

Paralleling this, Domash adds, the pure consciousness state, as experienced subjectively and as described in ancient sources, is said to be "eternal," "universal," and the "source of perfect order." In addition, and perhaps paradoxically, the quantum vacuum state is said to be "empty" (of excitation) and yet full in the sense of pure potentiality. That is, it contains "virtual" (non-physical) representatives of all possible modes of matter and excitation in the form of "vacuum fluctuations"

or "virtual particles." Thus, Domash concludes, the silent, empty vacuum is, nonetheless, lively and is a necessary impetus for spontaneous change in nature - such as the emission of light by an atom.

By comparison, the pure consciousness state is described as "perfectly silent" and "beyond change," yet it is said to contain "impulses of intelligence which are the unmanifest aspects of all that can exist." Thus pure consciousness is seen as the "source of all change," the "source of creativity" containing "all possibilities" - that is, all possible configurations of thought and matter.

Domash draws yet another important parallel between the Vedic tradition and the so-called "Reconstruction Theorem" of modern physics. This theorem suggests that from complete mathematical knowledge of the vacuum state - its dynamical quantities one can specify the possible measurable values of real physical fields. The theorem implies, as Domash adds, that an entire theory of nature can be recovered or reconstructed from the complete knowledge of vacuum state alone. This, Domash continues, parallels the Vedic descriptions of the pure consciousness state. This perspective views pure consciousness as "the ultimate constituent" of both thought and matter and thus the basis or "home" of all knowledge, as well as the basis or home of all the laws of nature - those discovered and those yet to be discovered by science. Direct and regular experience of pure consciousness not only cultivates the kind of intuition which scientists such as Einstein deemed essential to their work, but it also cultivates in the individual a state of "Supreme Knowledge" or enlightenment. Domash concludes that:

> If the pure consciousness state is intrinsically quantum mechanical on the basis of macroscopic phase coherence, then it is possible to imagine that Vedic cognitions of the elementary structure of nature are derived from direct inner experience (as opposed to mathematical analysis) of the physical vacuum state.[16]

At this point we may now turn to a closer consideration of the relevant work of John Dewey.

III. Pure Experience and Pure Consciousness

As already noted, Dewey described aesthetic experience as "experience in its integrity" or "pure experience," and thereby recommended that it is "to esthetic experience that the philosopher must go to understand what experience is." Thus, the first parallel which we find between Dewey's aesthetics and pure consciousness is the idea that there is a quality of human experience which may be seen as the common denominator to all experience. To understand aesthetic experience (as Dewey conceived it) or pure consciousness (as outlined by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi) is to gain a basic insight into every other phase of the constituent parts of our life. It is not surprising, then, that Dewey should observe that aesthetic quality is "implicit in every experience."[17] Yet, and perhaps paradoxically, Dewey also wrote that this quality of experience generally 'fails to become explicit"--at least for most individuals. In a similar manner, while pure consciousness is described as "the ultimate constituent of both thought and matter" and thereby implicit in every phase of life, it is readily recognized that this dimension of experience will fail to become explicit and appreciated unless the individual cultivates pure consciousness in his awareness. It is in the practice of the Transcendental Meditation technique that the individual effectively isolates that factor which is normally only implicit in our daily experience, i.e., pure consciousness. Through the regular and systematic experience of pure consciousness the individual gains the ability to experience the quality of pure consciousness in activity and our ordinary experience outside of meditation - as Dewey appears to have described it. In the Vedic tradition of ancient India, a distinction is clearly made between the regular or periodic experience of pure consciousness, or *samadi*, which is had in meditation, and that state of human development where pure consciousness never fails to be explicit in the individual's awareness. The latter condition is referred to in sanskrit as *nitya-samadhi* - a condition where, Dewey might have suggested, aesthetic quality is explicit in every experience.

In considering Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience, it is important to recognize that he often used the term "imaginative" in a manner similar to "esthetic." Despite his alternation of the two terms, they both indicate essentially similar concepts with similar functions. Dewey's notion of imagination is different from

ordinary conceptions of that term. He wrote that imagination is not necessarily the imaginary or unreal. Rather, "imagination," he stated, "is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole."[18] In a similar manner, Dewey suggested that "no experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality."[19] He called an experience "anesthetic" in so far as it is a discursive disintegrative, or an unconnected experience. Dewey, then, used the term aesthetic to describe the sense of integration, unity or "connected whole" in our experience - a quality also shared by the function of imagination.

As already suggested, this experience would appear to confirm the view of the universe emerging from theoretical physics. That is, we live in an interconnected "field" of events, an "experiential continuum." This continuum bespeaks a state of unity or integration between the individual and the environment. With regard to aesthetic experience, Dewey went so far as to suggest that an experience "is esthetic in the degree in which organism and environment cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears."[20] Likewise, we have already seen that this integrative quality is characteristic of any experience in which pure consciousness is explicit. In addition, it is by virtue of this quality of integration, wholeness or unity that pure consciousness is seen to parallel the orderliness and state of zero entropy characteristic of the vacuum state described in quantum physics. Dewey underscored his same aspect of the aesthetic dimension of experience when he indicated that aesthetic experience is free of disorder, because it is a dimension of experience that is "free from the forces which impede or confuse its development as experience; freed, that is, from factors that subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself." It is for this reason that Dewey suggests that we might term aesthetic experience "pure experience." In a similar manner, Domash points out that pure consciousness, as the mind's "least excited state," is, like the vacuum state, characterized by zero entropy, zero disorder and perfect symmetry - giving rise to the subjective sense of expanded consciousness. The orderly, integrative quality of the aesthetic experience is again strongly underscored by Dewey when he suggests that contact with this dimension of life "solves more problems which have troubled philosophers and resolves more hard and fast dualisms than any other sphere of thought."[21] It is thus not surprising that he should direct the philosopher to the aesthetic experience in order to gain a better understanding of what experience is. Similarly, the experience and understanding of pure consciousness is deemed by the Vedas of ancient India as fundamental to the comprehension and full appreciation of anything. However, unlike Dewey, the Vedic literature includes the philosophy of yoga which specifies techniques for developing pure consciousness and thereby resolving the problems of philosophy.

Dewey did not, however, stop here in his account of the aesthetic-imaginative dimension of experience. For Dewey, imagination also denotes the manner in which things unrealized or "unseen," in particular, ideal ends or values - stir or move us to activity. In *A Common Faith* he wrote:

> ...the reality of ideal ends is vouched for by their undeniable power in action. An ideal is not an illusion because imagination is the organ through which it is apprehended. For *all* possibilities reach us through the imagination (emphasis in the original).[22]

Curiously, pure consciousness and the vacuum state have been described in similar terms - as fields of "all possibilities." As already considered, while the quantum vacuum state is said to be "empty" of excitations, it is nonetheless described as "full" in the sense of representing "pure potentiality." This is, it contains "virtual" (non-physical) representatives of all possible modes of matter and excitations in the forms of "vacuum fluctuations" or "virtual particles." In a similar manner, pure consciousness is described as a field of "all possibilities" since it is viewed as the essential component of the individual's inner creative potential. Contacting pure consciousness through the TM technique is said to enable one to express more of his creative potential. This, of course, parallels Dewey's observation that "all possibilities reach us through the imagination." Cultivating our imagination in Dewey's terms places us in contact with our "subconscious fund of meanings."[23]

Finally, it is significant to note that Dewey believed that the aesthetic-imaginative dimension of experience is not one which is induced or cultivated through the exercise of will or any other effort. As he wrote, the function of imagination

is "not voluntary in the sense of an act of special volition;" rather, it is seen as originating in "sources beyond conscious deliberation."[24] As already observed, Domash states in a strikingly similar manner that "the Transcendental Meditation technique does not involve -omtemplation, concentration or any attempt to control the mind." "Indeed," as he continues, "effortlessness and spontaneity is the key to correct practice."

In their essay on Dewey's aesthetics as "experience in education," Landvoight and Eisele indicate that according to Dewey, the goal of aesthetic education is to help the individual "interact in a fulfilling way with his environment."[25] If recent thinking in theoretical physics is correct and our environment is a *field* which integrates objective and subjective aspects of reality, then a most direct and intimate contact with our environment may be had during the experience of pure consciousness and hence in the practice of Transcendental Meditation. This conclusion is certainly not inconsistent with Dewey's own view on aesthetic experience.

IV. Conclusion

In this brief paper I have outlined several noteworthy parallels between the concept of pure consciousness and Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience or "pure experience." The significance that this dimension of experience holds for education as clearly recognized by Dewey. He wrote "that every subject at some phase of its development should have an aesthetic quality for the student."[26] Yet, he lamented that "education proceeds by methods so literal as to exclude the imagination."[27] With the introduction of the TM technique we may now be able to envision not only a reliable means of cultivating the student's "imagination," but a means for studying ever more precisely what this means for the individual. Already, research on this meditation program indicates that this technique may provide a means for promoting a variety of beneficial effects relevant to schooling. Besides the psycho-physiological benefits (such as reducing stress by virtue of promoting the functional integration of the nervous system) initial studies have also indicated that the TM technique may have a positive effect on learning rate, memory, academic achievement and self-concept.[28] These would certainly seem to be among the signs of an individual who was "interacting with his environment in a fulfilling way."

Prior to the work of Domash and other scientists, the study of consciousness had for many years remained obscure, paradoxical, and the domain of metaphysicians. Today, this dimension of life is becoming much more than mere metaphysical speculation. Rather, it is being subjected to systematic, scientific study and is thereby, as Russell predicted, "achieving what metaphysics has vainly attempted." Dewey may also be seen to have anticipated this new field of research when he wrote that "one would be bold to the point of rashness who asserts that intimate personal experience will never come within the ken of natural knowledge."[29] It would appear that a significant aspect of Dewey's philosophy may yet reveal its bearing on the "practical or actual conduct of schooling."

Notes

1. Charlotte Landvoight and Christopher Eisele, "Dewey's Esthetics as Experience in Education," *Philosophical Studies in Education: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society - 1980* (Indiana University, 1981): 39-47; C.M. Smith, "The Aesthetics of John Dewey and Aesthetic Education," *Educational Theory* 21, 2 (Spring 1971): 131-45.

2. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Minton Balch, 1934), p. 274.

3. Harold E. McCarthy, "Dewey, Suzuki, and the Elimination of Dichotomies," *Philosophy East and West* 6 (April 1956): 35-48; Victor Kobayashi, "The Quest For Experience: Zen, Dewey, and Education," *Comparative Education Review* (February 1962): 217-222.

4. E.g., Kenneth R. Pelletier *Toward a Science of Consciousness* (New York: Delta Books, 1978); Fritjof Capra, *The Tao of Physics* (New York: Bantom books, 1977).

5. Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 306.

6. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Norton, 1929), pp. 295-96.

7. John Archibald Wheeler, "From relativity to mutability," in *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, ed. Jagdish Mehra (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1973), p. 244.

8. Bernard d'Espagnat, "The Quantum Theory and Reality," *Scientific American* 241, (November 1979), p. 158.

9. Fritjof Capra; "Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism," *The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* 8, 1 (Winter, 1976), p. 26.

10. B. D. Josephson, Letter to *New Scientist* 74, 1057 (June 23, 1977), pp. 733-734.

11. Lawrence Domash, "The Transcendental Meditation Technique and Quantum Physics: Is Pure Consciousness a Macroscopic Quantum State in the Brain?," in *Scientific Research on the Transcendental Meditation Program: Collected Papers Volume I*, ed. D. W. Orme-Johnson and J. T. Farrow (West Germany: Maharishi European Research University Press, 1976), p. 666.

12. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 274.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

14. Domash, "The Transcendental Meditation Technique and Quantum Physics," p. 669.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 674.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 675.

17. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 12.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

21. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 392-393.

22. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 43.

23. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 275.

24. Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 19.

25. Charlotte Landvoight and Christopher Eisele, "Dewey's Esthetics as Experience in Education," p. 42.

26. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: MacMillan, 1966), p. 249.

27. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 347.

28. Michael C. Dillbeck, Arthur P. Aron, and Susan Levin Dillbeck, "The Transcendental Meditation Program as an Educational Technology: Research and Applications," *Educational Technology* 19, 11 (November 1979): 7-13.

29. Dewey, *A Common Faith*, p. 35.

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

COMMODORE ROOM
STOUFFER'S TOWERS HOTEL
CINCINNATI, OHIO

November 20, 1982

1. The meeting was called to order by Walden Crabtree, President of the Society at 11:00 a.m. November 20, 1982.

2. A report was made by Dennis Senchuk, editor of the Proceedings. The costs of the proceedings have escalated greatly. The 1981 issue will cost $5.10 per copy to produce. The price to individuals will be $6.50 and $8.00 to institutions. There will be no charges for typing. This has been taken care of by various individuals at their institutions.

3. It was moved and seconded that manuscripts be chosen by blind reviewing. An extended discussion of reviewing followed. The motion received a tie vote. The president voted against and the motion failed.

4. Due to the resignation of president-elect Eleanor Roemer the nominating committee for 1981 was reactivated. This committee was David Engle, cahir, Walden Crabtree, Richard LaBrecque and Gerald Reagan. The following persons were chosen:

Keith Raitz	President (to take office immediately)
Conrad Pritscher	President-elect
William McKenney	Secretary Treasurer
Dennis Senchuk	Editor of Proceedings
Robert Skovira	Associate Editor
Jack Willis (Replacing Keith Raitz)	Executive Board (to 1983)
Richard Angelo	Executive Board (to 1984)
Ron Zigler	Executive Board (to 1985)

5. Gerry Reagan moved that the Society become one of the sponsors of the annual Philosophy of Education Society meeting in Cincinnati in April 1983, by donating $100 if funds were available. The motion was passed. It was followed by a discussion of the difficulty which the society is experiencing in obtaining funds.

6. It was proposed that letters of appreciation be sent to persons who had served the society for the past year. Persons designated to receive such commendations were: William McKenney, Ron Zigler, Program Coordinator, members of the program committee; Bonnie Hume, chair, Bernard Gendreau, and Jerome Popp.

7. It was proposed that letters of appreciation be sent to Indiana State University and the University of Akron for moneys donated for the publishing expenses of the Proceedings.

8. It was propsoed that a letter of appreciation be sent to Eleanor Roemer for her contributions to the Society and to wish her well in her new situation.

   Dennis Senchuk suggested that Bob Skovira, Associate Editor of the Proceedings should be recognized for his contribution to the publication.

9. Dick Pratte remarked that it has been the custom for the President to go to his institution for funds to help keep the society solvent. He said that the President usually finds this out after his election.

10. President Crabtree thanked the persons who had helped to make his term in office a success. He listed John Carter, Bonnie Hume, Jerry Popp, Richard Gendreau, Bill McKenney, members of the nominating committee, David Engle, Richard LaBrecque and Gerald Reagan.

11. President Crabreee turned the program over to the new President, Keith Raitz. President Raitz thanked President Crabtree on behalf of the society and adjourned the meeting.

FINANCIAL REPORT
THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1982

INCOME

Balance carried forward/1981		$1250.82
Interest	$57.00	
Dues	$260.00	
Annual Meeting	$662.55	
Total	$980.38	980.38

DISBURSEMENTS

Postage	$123.40	
Supplies	$20.00	
Printing (Proceedings)	$1275.00	
Total	$1418.40	1418.40
	Balance 1/1/83	$812.80

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Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 245.

Periodical:

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Anthologized Article:

Gilbert Ryle, "Teaching and Training," in *The Concept of Education*, ed. R.S. Peters (New York: The Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 109-110.

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